(b) Whether the authenticity of a deed signed by a notary public is presumed to have been made;

C. The scope and limitation of the guarantor's liability with respect to the so-called "a continuous guarantee"

B. The authentication system for a deed signed by a private person provided for in the Notary Public Act is presumed to have been established in the deed signed by a notary public, unless there are special circumstances, such as the assertion and proof of the fact that the notary public did not go through the said procedure in the authentication of a deed signed by a private person in the presence of a notary public, or that the party concerned has made the party concerned sign or affix a seal on the deed signed by a private person or his agent, and then has the party concerned or his agent confirm the signature or affix a seal on the deed signed by a private person and then the notary public enters the fact in the deed. In notarial deeds for a deed signed by a private person, it is stipulated that the notary public must go in advance

C. In the case of so-called “a continuous guarantee” in which the principal debtor guarantees an uncertain obligation arising from a continuous transaction relationship between the creditor and the principal debtor, the guarantor is in principle liable to perform all the obligations that the principal debtor has not performed. However, even though the guarantor was expected or could have anticipated the scope of the principal obligation at the time of guaranteeing the principal debtor, the principal obligation was incurred in excess of the objective reasonableness exceeding the expected scope, and as such, the obligee is well aware of the circumstances where the principal obligation significantly aggravated the property status of the principal debtor (the same applies to cases where the obligee was unaware of gross negligence), while the obligee is well aware of the circumstances where the status of the principal debtor significantly aggravated (the same applies to cases where he did not know of gross negligence), and thus, it is recognized that the obligee intentionally extended the transaction volume without any notice or intention to the guarantor, and thus, the obligee’s claim for the full performance of the principal obligation against the guarantor may be limited within the reasonable scope of the guarantor’s liability.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the defendants.

1. Summary of the facts found by the court below

A. On September 3, 1982, the Plaintiff entered into a bank transaction agreement with the Defendant Korea Trade Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant Korea Trade Co., Ltd.”) which mainly engages in clothing export, and again entered into a bill transaction agreement with the said Defendant on January 8, 1983, and extended KRW 1,919,739,371 in total by purchasing export bills over 66 times from that date until June 23, 1983. The said purchase bills have not been settled and the said Defendant’s default on November 3, 1983, resulting in delay in all of the above loans thereafter.

B. On September 23, 1982, Defendant South Korean Life Company (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant South Korean Life Company”), Defendant 3, Defendant 4, and the deceased Non-Party 1 jointly and severally guaranteed all obligations owed to the Plaintiff pursuant to the said Bank Trade Agreement concluded with the Plaintiff on September 23, 1982. As the above Non-Party 1 died on September 1, 1983, Defendant 5, Defendant 6, and Defendant 7, his wife and his wife, jointly succeeded to his property.

C. On September 1, 1983, when the above non-party 1, who was the representative director at the time, died as a case of the promotion of the passengers' flag in the Soviet Sea Area, the provisional shareholders' meeting or the board of directors did not hold a provisional shareholders' meeting or the board of directors' meeting, and the minutes of the shareholders' meeting and the board of directors' meeting convened by the above non-party 1, were prepared on documents to the effect that the non-party 1 was appointed as directors and the representative director, and registered that the defendant 3 was appointed as the director

D. After that, for the purpose of suspending the extinctive prescription of the Plaintiff’s debt of the instant loan, contact with Defendant 3, who was registered as the representative director on the registry of the instant loan, and obtained from December 1, 1987 a letter of debt approval (Evidence 4-1) stating that the Plaintiff, as the representative of the instant export draft, obtained the letter of debt approval (Evidence 4-1) from the effect that: (a) the principal amount calculated by deducting the principal paid up to 909,29,565 won from the total amount of the loans paid up to 1,919,739,371 won from the total amount of the loans paid up to 1,010,439,806 won, including the principal amount paid up to 909,565 won; (b) the delay damages; and (c) the principal amount paid up to 8,609,081,363 won, including the principal and interest of other items.

E. After doing so, Nonparty 2, a shareholder of the Defendant Korea-China Trade, filed a lawsuit against the Defendant Korea-China Trade seeking confirmation of non-existence, such as a resolution of the general meeting of shareholders, etc., and the said judgment became final and conclusive on December 1, 198 and revoked Defendant 3’s registration of appointment of director and representative director on February 24, 1989.

2. Determination on the grounds of appeal No. 1-(1) and (2)

The judgment of the court below on the point that the theory of lawsuit points out (the point that recognized each of the facts Nos. 1. A and d. in the above) shall be justified in light of the evidence relations stated by the court below, and it shall not be deemed that there was an error of law that erroneously recognized facts in violation of the rules of evidence without making a proper deliberation like the theory of lawsuit. All of the arguments shall not be accepted because the judgment of the court below is removed because it is merely a slafing of the judgment of the court below on the premise that the determination of the evidence belonging to the whole jurisdiction of the court below and the recognition of facts is inconsistent with

3. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 2-1

Since Article 395 of the Commercial Act provides for the company's liability for the acts of directors using a name that can be recognized as having the authority to represent the company, it is the theory that the expressed representative director is required to be qualified as a director. However, in order to protect a third party who trusted the appearance of the representative director in accordance with the doctrine of gold-instation or external appearance theory, it is intended that the company which is responsible for the existence of such appearance should be held liable for the acts of the third party acting in good faith. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret the above provision to apply mutatis mutandis to cases where the company allows a person who is not qualified as a director to use the name of the expressed representative director, as well as cases where the company leaves the name of the expressed representative director with the knowledge that a person who is not qualified as a director uses the name of the expressed representative director at his own discretion without taking any measures (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 7Da2436, Feb. 13, 197; Supreme Court Decision 84Meu9636, Jun. 111, 1987).

In addition, the authentication system for a deed signed by a notary public provided for in the Notary Public Act is presumed to have been established as a notarial deed before a notary public, or after having the parties concerned sign or seal it in the presence of a notary public, or after having the parties concerned or their agents confirm the signature or seal it (Article 57(1)). If a notary public authentication for a deed signed by a notary public is conducted, it shall be stipulated in advance as a procedure for confirmation of a client (Article 27) or confirmation of an agent (Article 30) and certification of his/her right of representation (Article 31) in accordance with the Notary Public Act. Thus, unless there are special circumstances, it is proved that a notary public did not go through such procedure in the authentication of a deed signed by a notary public, the authentication system is presumed to have been established as a notarial deed signed by a notary public or its agent, and the court below did not have any conflict between the non-party 4 and the non-party 3's representative director's resolution and the non-party 4's signature and seal affixed to the above notarial deed.

In addition, according to the records (e.g., evidence No. 1-2 and No. 6, and the result of Defendant 3's personal examination) that Defendant 3 had been appointed as the representative director of the board of directors, and that Defendant 3 had participated in the preparation of the minutes of the board of directors to the effect that Defendant 3 was appointed as the representative director of Korea Trade; that Defendant 3 had been registered as the representative director of Korea Trade until the registration was cancelled on February 24, 1989; and that records (in particular, the statement of evidence No. 1-2 and No. 6; and that of the court below's decision, the court below's decision that Defendant 3 did not have any relation to Defendant 3's primary trade; that Defendant 3 did not have any relation with it; that at least from March 13, 1981 to October 20, 1982, the representative director of Korea Trade Co., Ltd., which is a joint and several surety of Defendant Korea, and that Defendant 3 did not have any legitimate evidence of this case.

In the end, all arguments are not acceptable.

4. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 2-2 (2)

The court below rejected the evidence consistent with the defendants' assertion that the plaintiff was aware that he was not a representative director of the defendant Handong Trade when he received the above letter of debt approval from the defendant 3. The decision of the court below as to the above letter of debt approval is just in light of the evidence relation as stated in the judgment below, and it cannot be deemed that the defendant 3 was negligent in not knowing that he was not a legitimate representative director of the defendant Handong Trade. Thus, the court below erred in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the liability of the representative director or by misapprehending the legal principles as to the liability of the expression representative director cannot be accepted, since the judgment of the court below is just in light of the evidence relation as stated in the judgment below.

5. Determination on the third ground for appeal

The lower court rejected the Defendants’ assertion on the following grounds: (a) the Defendants’ following arguments, namely, the Plaintiff bank’s foreign exchange business process: (i) the amount of the outstanding export bill was deposited after the date of the default on the payment of the export bill; (ii) the purchaser shall purchase a new export bill after the repayment of the defaulted Daejeon; and (iii) the purchase of a new export bill at the time of the default on the payment of the default on the payment of the outstanding Daejeon War, despite the fact that the Plaintiff bank continued to purchase the export bill issued by the same party as the previous default on the payment of the outstanding amount of the purchase price; and (iv) the Plaintiff bank paid the outstanding amount of the purchase price to the Defendant Han Korea Trade; and (iii) the Defendants, a joint and several surety, had been negligent in expanding damages by continuously purchasing the export bill issued by the same party as the previous default on the payment of the outstanding amount of the purchase price; and (iv) there is no evidence to deem that the Plaintiff continuously purchased the export bill even after the default on the payment of the export bill, as alleged by the Defendants.

In cases of so-called “ continuous guarantee” that guarantees an uncertain obligation arising from a continuous transaction between an obligee and the principal obligor, the surety is in principle liable for the performance of the obligation that the principal obligor has failed to perform. However, although the surety was expected or could have anticipated the scope of the principal obligation at the time of guaranteeing the obligation, the principal obligation was excessive to the extent that the principal obligation has lost its objective reasonableness beyond the expected scope, and as such, the obligee is well aware of the circumstances where the principal obligation substantially aggravated the property status of the principal obligor (the same applies to cases where the obligee was unaware of gross negligence) while the obligee was well aware of the circumstances where the property status of the principal obligor considerably aggravated (the same applies to cases where the obligee was unaware of gross negligence), and thus, it is recognized that the obligee intentionally extended the transaction size without any notice or intention to the surety, and thus, the obligee’s claim for the performance of the principal obligation against the surety may be limited to the reasonable scope of the surety’s liability (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 87Meu214384, Apr. 27, 19898).

However, as a result of domestic litigation, even at the time when the Plaintiff purchased an export bill from Defendant Korea Trade on May 25, 1983, which was already purchased at the time of purchasing the export bill as set forth in No. 54 through No. 60 attached to the judgment of the court below, the Plaintiff was in a state of refusing to pay or accept part of the export bill. Under the foreign exchange standard procedure (Evidence No. 8 and Seoul Trust Bank's business operation guidelines but all domestic banks such as the Plaintiff are common to all domestic banks), if an exporting company which does not settle the export bill requests purchase of a new export bill, it is in violation of the internal guidelines of the bank to preferentially pay the outstanding bill. However, in this case, even if the Plaintiff violated the above guidelines for the payment of the purchase price, it cannot be concluded that the Plaintiff violated the above reasons alone that the principal obligation was excessive to the extent that the guarantor would have anticipated or anticipated at the time of guarantee, and therefore, it cannot be concluded that the Defendants violated the rules of evidence selection and did not properly hear the above argument by the court below and thereby affecting the conclusion.

6. Determination on the fourth ground for appeal

Although the defendants' attorney at the court below's decision on February 5, 191 through the preparatory documents on the same date as stated in the court below's fourth date for pleading (2. 14.00 of February 5, 1991), although the defendant's three trade in domestic affairs is liable for the debt approval in accordance with the legal principles of representative director for the above letter of debt approval (Evidence A-4-1 of the above letter of debt approval), this is effective only for the defendant's three trade in domestic affairs, which is the principal debtor, and has no effect against the other defendants who are the guarantor, the court below's decision on

However, the interruption of the prescription against the principal obligor is effective as against the joint and several surety (Article 440 of the Civil Act). Since the statute of limitations on the loans of this case was interrupted due to the approval of the above obligations, so long as the lower court determined that the statute of limitations for the loans of this case expired, the Defendants’ assertion that the claims for the loans of this case had been completed, such judgment of the lower court may be deemed to include the purport of rejecting the remainder of the Defendants’ assertion except for the Defendant Korea-U.S. trade. Accordingly, we cannot accept the argument of the lower court that there

7. Therefore, all appeals by the Defendants are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants who have lost them. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Choi Jae-ho (Presiding Justice)