[거절사정][공1995.12.15.(1006),3917]
A. Criteria for determining similarity of combined trademarks
B. Whether the trademark "SUPERVS" and "SUPPPPPS STS STIC" are similar
A. At all times, a trademark is not necessarily called or conceptualized by the name or shape of the entire constituent part, but can be briefly called or conceptualized by only a part of the constituent part unless the separate observation of each constituent part is inseparably indivisible to the point that is natural if it is not natural. In addition, in a case where two or more names or concepts can be thought from a single trademark, if one of them is deemed identical or similar to another's trademark, the two trademarks are similar.
B. Examining the similarity between the “SUPPERVS” and the cited trademark registered prior thereto (registration number omitted), the cited trademark cannot be deemed as being indivisiblely combined to the extent that it is natural in the trade, since three words constituting the cited trademark are externally divided, and no new concept can be derived by combining them, and each part can not be seen as being separated from each other, and if observing each part separately, the cited trademark can be referred to only the two words “SUPPPVS”. In this case, the cited trademark can be referred to as the name “SUPPPS” and the “SSSSS” respectively, and it is similar to the name of both trademarks because it is merely a difference in the end to the end to the end to the end to the end to the end to the end to the end to the end to the end, and there is a concern that both trademarks may cause confusion and confusion between the general consumers as to goods and the same kind of goods as the designated goods of both trademarks.
Article 7 (1) 7 of the Trademark Act
A. (B) Supreme Court Decision 95Hu996 delivered on Nov. 10, 1995 (Gong195Ha, 2274). Supreme Court Decision 93Hu1179 delivered on Jan. 25, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 832) 94Hu1466 delivered on Dec. 2, 1994 (Gong1995Sang, 495) 94Hu2070 delivered on Mar. 17, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 1754) 95Hu88 delivered on May 26, 1995 (Gong195Ha, 2274)
Patent Attorney Lee Jae-chul et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant
The Commissioner of the Korean Intellectual Property Office
Korean Intellectual Property Office Decision 94Na146 Dated April 28, 1995
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the applicant.
We examine the grounds of appeal.
A trademark is not necessarily called or conceptualized by the name or pattern of the entire constituent part at all times, but can be briefly named, conceptualized by only a part of the constituent part unless it is inseparably indivisible to the extent natural if it is observed separately from each constituent part, and if it is possible to think at least two names or concepts from one trademark, one of them is deemed identical or similar to another's trademark (see Supreme Court Decision 93Hu179 delivered on January 25, 1994, see Supreme Court Decision 93Hu1179 delivered on January 25, 1994).
According to the reasoning of the original decision, with respect to the similarity between the trademark of this origin and the cited trademark registered as the trademark of this origin (registration number omitted), the court below held that the cited trademark is an integral combination to the extent that it is not natural in the trade since the three words constituting the cited trademark are distinguishable externally from those in appearance, and that it is not possible to derive a new concept, and each part is not combined, and therefore, if each part is separately observed, it can be viewed that the cited trademark is indivisible to the extent that it is not natural in the trade. In addition, according to the tendency of ordinary consumers who want to associate with the trademark through a brief name or concept, the cited trademark can be abbreviated only with the above two words "SUPPERVSS". In this case, the name and the trademark of this origin are as the last part of the trademark "SBSco" and it is not appropriate to see that both trademarks are similar to those of this case, and it is not reasonable to see that there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to products or similar trademarks in light of the records.
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing applicant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)