[1] The meaning of “self-injury” excluded from the registration of a person of distinguished service to the State under the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support of Persons, etc. of Distinguished Service to the State, and the standard for determining whether suicide is free from a soldier’s stress

[2] The case holding that suicide by a non-commissioned officer who was unable to adapt to the newly entrusted work due to a change in a special period of time at a time of time constitutes self-injury under Article 4(5)4 of the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support of Persons, etc. of Distinguished Service

[1] “Death due to self-injury” excluded from the registration of a person of distinguished service to the State under the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support of Persons, etc. of Distinguished Service to the State refers to death based on the grammatic meaning. In light of the legislative intent and its regulatory form, etc. of the above Act, the mere fact that a soldier’s suicide resulted in suicide as a direct motive or an important cause for stress in the performance of his/her duty, shall not be considered free will. Whether the suicide is free should be determined with regard to the age, character, and position of the person of distinguished service, the degree and duration of the tension or pressure caused by stress in the performance of his/her duty, the degree and duration of the suicide, the physical and mental situation of the person of distinguished service to the State, the occurrence of depression, the timing of the suicide, the circumstances leading up to the suicide, and the existence of existing mental illness and family history.

[2] The case holding that suicide by a non-commissioned officer who was unable to adapt to the newly entrusted work due to a change in a special period of time at a time of time constitutes self-injury under Article 4 (5) 4 of the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support of Persons, etc. of Distinguished Service

[1] Articles 4(1)5 and 4(5)4 of the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support of Persons, etc. of Distinguished Service to the State / [2] Articles 4(1)5 and 4(5)4 of the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support of Persons, etc. of Distinguished Service to the State

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2002Du4136 Decided November 14, 2003, Supreme Court Decision 2003Du12202 Decided February 27, 2004, Supreme Court Decision 2003Du14789 Decided March 26, 2004, Supreme Court Decision 2003Du13533 Decided July 22, 2004, Supreme Court Decision 2004Du7702 Decided October 27, 2004, Supreme Court Decision 2005Du944 Decided April 29, 2005

Plaintiff (Uidong Law Firm, Attorneys Kim Hong-chul, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Head of Suwon Veterans Branch Office

Seoul High Court Decision 2005Nu4115 delivered on October 13, 2005

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Article 4(1)5 of the Act on the Honorable Treatment and Support of Persons, etc. of Distinguished Service to the State (hereinafter “Act”) provides that the person who died during the performance of his/her duty as a soldier (including a person who died of disease in the line of duty) and his/her bereaved family shall be entitled to honorable treatment as a person of distinguished service to the State. Meanwhile, Article 4(5)4 of the same Act provides that where a person who meets the above requirements for a person of distinguished service

In this context, death due to self-injury refers to death according to free will in a grammatic sense. In light of the purport of the law aimed at promoting the livelihood stability and the improvement of welfare by providing honorable treatment for persons who have contributed to or sacrificed persons of distinguished services to the State and their bereaved family members and contributing to the cultivation of patriotism of the people (Article 1 of the Act), and its regulatory form, etc., it cannot be said that a soldier’s death is not based on free will solely on the circumstance that a soldier’s stress arising from stress in the performance of his/her duties directly motive or important cause, and led to suicide. Determination of whether the suicide is free will depends on the age, character, and position of the person who committed suicide, degree and duration of the tension or severe pressure that the person who committed suicide was committed, the physical and mental situation of the person who committed the suicide, surrounding circumstances surrounding the person who committed the suicide, the outbreak of depression and the timing of suicide, circumstances leading to suicide, and family history of the existing mental illness (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Du4676, Apr. 26, 2007

2. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the deceased non-party 1 (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased non-party 2") was 0. The deceased non-party 2's husband 2 and 0. The deceased's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 3's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 2's non-indicted.

In addition, according to the records, the non-party 2, who is the superior of the deceased, was aware of the fact that the deceased was unable to adapt properly to his new duties, from February 23, 2003, he had the deceased take measures to have the deceased perform facsimile operations only at the communications station, and the deceased had a usual chronological character, and the deceased was hospitalized from March 13, 2003 to April 4, 2003. The doctor of the National Armed Forces Waterworks Hospital, who was hospitalized by the deceased, could have a low level of adaptation disorder compared to the main depressions or depressions against the deceased. The deceased not only driven the mixed while driving the vehicle at the place of suicide but also carried out telephone communications with the plaintiff, who was the wife before the suicide, several times.

Examining the facts acknowledged by the court below or based on the records and the legal principles as seen earlier, the depression of the deceased was an important cause of suicide, and the depression of the deceased was presumed to be related to stress during the performance of his duties. However, even if the newly performed duties were stressed on the deceased, it is difficult to conclude that the deceased’s suicide falls under self-injury as provided in Article 4(5)4 of the Act, in light of the following circumstances: (a) it is difficult to readily conclude that the deceased’s failure to adapt to new duties due to emercism, etc. of the deceased’s emercism, thereby causing the deceased to waive his/her life; (b) it is possible to choose suicide as a means of actual exposure to his/her will; and (c) in light of other various circumstances, such as the deceased’s behavior at the time of suicide, etc., it is difficult to deem that the deceased’s suicide was committed in a state where free will was completely excluded from his/her free will.

Nevertheless, the court below's decision that the deceased's death does not constitute self-injury as it goes beyond the scope of free will, is erroneous in the misapprehension of facts due to the violation of the rules of evidence or the misapprehension of legal principles as to the violation of Article 4 (5) 4 of the Act, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.

3. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Shin Hyun-chul (Presiding Justice)