(a) Whether the trademark “LI QUD CRYSAL” and “human trademark(1)” and “human trademark(2)” are similar

(b) The case holding that although the English indication of the applied trademark "LI QUD CRYSAL" was the phrase "amount fixed" in advance, it cannot be viewed that it had the meaning of "amount fixed" in the transaction system.

A. The applied trademark “LI QUD CYSAL” is a trademark composed of English and “human trademark(1)” is a trademark consisting of letters and Korean characters, and “human trademark” is a trademark consisting of Korean and English characters, and “human trademark(2)” is a trademark consisting of two trademarks, and it cannot be said that there is a series of indivisible combinations to the extent that it is deemed as natural in the transaction. Therefore, it is difficult to deny the probability of being abbreviationd with “LI QUD CYSAL” or “SAL” and compared trademarks can be referred to as “quid” or “quid” if they are used as trademark under Article 7(1) of the Trademark Act, and there is no possibility of confusion between the two trademarks whose abbreviationd names are combined with the applied trademark and the designated goods in the transaction. Thus, it is not likely to cause confusion between the general consumer and the designated goods in the transaction.

B. The case holding that although the English language “LI QUD CRYSAL” of the applied trademark was the word “amount of pre-determination” in advance, the meaning of the trademark is that the general consumers can report the trademark, and the meaning of the trademark is that the general consumers can wear it directly, and that only the report can be known after being examined and examined or finding it in advance is not subject to consideration, it is difficult to view that the English trademark “LI QUD CRSAL” of the applied trademark in the transactional field of designated goods is not necessarily deemed to have the meaning of “amount of determination” in the designated goods.

Article 7 (1) 7 of the Trademark Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 90Hu1734 delivered on March 27, 1991 (Gong1991, 1294) 92Hu1462 delivered on December 24, 1992 (Gong1993, 613) 93Hu1179 delivered on January 25, 1994 (Gong1994, 832) B. Supreme Court Decision 92Hu636 delivered on November 13, 1992 (Gong193Sang, 117) 92Hu2120 delivered on July 13, 1993 (Gong193Ha, 2299) 93Hu36 delivered on September 24, 1993

Law Firm Central Patent Office, Attorneys Lee Byung-ho et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellant 200

The Commissioner of the Korean Intellectual Property Office

Korean Intellectual Property Trial Office 93Na587 decided September 27, 1994

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the applicant.

The grounds of appeal by the applicant's attorney are examined.

A trademark shall be subject to determination as to whether or not the whole component of the trademark is similar, but at all times, it is not always called or conceptualized by the name of the whole component, but it is not recognized that the separate observation of each component is indivisible to the extent that it is not natural in the transaction, depending on the time, only a part of the component can be simply called or conceptualized, and two or more titles or concepts may occur from one trademark. As such, if two or more titles, names, and concepts are considered to be similar to that of another trademark, if it is deemed that one trademark is similar to that of the other trademark (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 90Hu1734, Mar. 27, 1991; 92Hu1462, Dec. 24, 1992; 9Hu1719, Dec. 31, 1994; 9Hu1734, Dec. 17, 1994).

The court below held that the original trademark applied on February 6, 192 by the applicant is a trademark composed of English persons such as LI QUD CRYSAL and is a trademark consisting of figures and quidgras in English characters and Korean characters, such as the cited trademark (1) which is the trademark which is the trademark of another person by earlier application, and it cannot be said that the separation and observation of words combined with the original trademark in the title is a series of indivisibles to the extent that it is not natural in the trade, and therefore, the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the goods of this case and the registered trademark of this case cannot be seen as a similar trademark in violation of the rules of evidence, since it is not possible to deny the probability that the trademark may be abbreviated "quid" or "quids" as it is a trademark in comparison with the cited trademark of another person by earlier application, and there is no possibility of confusion between the original trademark and the original trademark in violation of the rules of evidence as to goods of this case.

In addition, it is identical to the theory that "LI QUD CRYSAL" in the English language of the original trademark has the meaning of "amount fixed" in advance, but the meaning of the trademark should be able to be reported directly and indirectly shouldered by ordinary consumers, and the purport of the trademark can only be known only after an examination, deliberation, or a prior report is found, shall not be considered (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 92Hu636, Nov. 13, 1992; 92Hu2120, Jul. 13, 1993; 93Hu336, Sept. 24, 1993; 93Hu36, Sept. 24, 1993). Therefore, it is difficult to accept the argument that the issue of the original trademark's trademark's English indication "amount fixed" has the meaning of "amount fixed" in the transaction system of the designated goods, and it is not appropriate to accept all the arguments in this case.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing applicant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-sik (Presiding Justice)