(영문) 서울중앙지방법원 2015.11.26.선고 2013가합544355 판결

2. Attached 1. Nos. 2 through 17, 19 through 32, 34 through 36, and 38 through 48 of the Plaintiff’s list and all of the claims of the Plaintiffs A, B, and C are dismissed.

3. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiffs.

Purport of claim

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiffs 2. Attached Form 2. The amount of money corresponding to each of the above amounts stated in the claim column of the damage amount list by the plaintiff and 5% interest per annum from September 27, 1979 to the service date of a copy of the complaint of this case, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment.

Reasons

1. Facts of recognition;

(a) Issuance of emergency measures by the President;

1) Pursuant to Article 53 of the former Constitution of the Republic of Korea (wholly amended by Act No. 9 of Oct. 27, 1980; hereinafter referred to as the “former Constitution”), the Presidential Emergency Decree for the National Security and the Protection of Public Order (amended by Presidential Emergency Decree No. 9 of May 13, 1975; hereinafter referred to as the “Emergency Decree No. 9”) was issued on December 7, 1979.

2) Article 9(1)(a) of the Emergency Measures Act prohibits “act of openly disseminating, distributing, selling, possessing, or expressing facts by means of public radio waves, such as assemblies, demonstrations, newspapers, newspapers, and broadcasting, or broadcasting,” and Article 9(1)(b) prohibits “act of unfairly opposing, distorting, or slandering, or asserting, petitioning, inducing, or publicizing the Constitution of the Republic of Korea by means of expressions, such as public radio waves, documents, drawings, pictures, music records, etc.,” and item (c) prohibits “act of participating in a student’s assembly, demonstration, or political intervention, except with the instruction and supervision of the school authorities, or with the prior permission of the principal of the school, or other ordinary and non-political activities.” Paragraph (2) prohibits “act of openly disseminating the contents in violation of paragraph (1), or producing, distributing, selling, possessing, or displaying the contents thereof by means of broadcasting, reporting, or by any other means.” Article 9(7) of the Emergency Measures Act prohibits a person who violates this, from committing a limited term or suspension of qualifications for more than 10 years, or conspiracy.

3) Meanwhile, Article 9 (8) of the Emergency Measures Act provides that a person who violates Emergency Measures No. 9 may arrest, detain, seize, or search without a judge’s warrant.

B. The judgment of conviction against the plaintiff A, E, F, B, G, C, D, H, and I

1) Plaintiff A, E, F, B, G, C, D, and H (hereinafter “Plaintiff A, etc.”) were indicted after being forced to conduct an investigation without a warrant due to a violation of Article 9 of the Presidential Emergency Decree (hereinafter “Emergency Decree”) and was detained and sentenced to a conviction on the charges of violating the Emergency Decree No. 4. [Attachment 4]. Plaintiff I was sentenced to a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that Plaintiff A was forced to conduct an investigation without a warrant due to a violation of subparagraph 9 of the Presidential Emergency Decree, and was detained after being detained in custody on the ground that the Emergency Decree No. 9 was released on December 8, 1979.

2) A et al. and Plaintiff I were detained due to the foregoing case. In other words, the period is as follows. Plaintiff A et al. for 564 days from May 13, 197 to December 8, 1979; Plaintiff E for 931 days from May 13, 197 to November 28, 197; Plaintiff F for 929 days from May 21, 197 to December 5, 1979; Plaintiff B was detained for 940 days from May 13, 197 to December 8, 1979; Plaintiff G and C for 564 days from October 13, 197 to December 13, 197 to December 8, 197; Plaintiff B was detained for 97Da17979 decided July 29, 197; Plaintiff B for 2009 to July 29, 1978.

1) Plaintiff A et al. requested a retrial against each of the relevant rulings on review (Plaintiff A: Seoul Northern District Court Order 2011 inventory 3 dated July 26, 2012; Plaintiff E: Seoul Northern District Court Order 2011 inventory 9 dated April 12, 2013; Plaintiff F: Seoul Northern District Court Order 2011 inventory 9 dated April 12, 2013; Plaintiff B: Seoul Northern District Court Order 2011 inventory 6 dated July 26, 2012; Plaintiff G Seoul Northern District Court Order 2011 inventory 6 dated May 23, 2013; Plaintiff C: Seoul High Court Order 2011 Dated May 23, 2013; and Plaintiff D: 2011 Dated May 23, 2013; and Seoul Northern District Court Order 2013No2138 May 21, 2013: Plaintiff 203No316, May 213, 2013

2) The judgment of innocence (Plaintiff A: Seoul Northern District Court Decision 2011 inventory sum3, August 31, 2012; Plaintiff E: 2011 inventory sum9, June 14, 2013; Plaintiff F: Seoul Northern District Court 2011 inventory sum9, June 14, 2013; Plaintiff B: the Seoul Northern District Court 201Du166, August 31, 2012; Plaintiff B; the Seoul Northern District Court 201Da316, July 5, 2013; the Seoul Northern District Court 201Da31616, May 201, 201; and the Seoul Northern District Court 201Mo216, July 31, 2013; and Plaintiff C: the Seoul Northern District Court 201Da31616, July 21, 2013; and the Seoul Northern District Court 2015No2716, Sept. 27, 2016.

3) The plaintiff Gap and the plaintiff Eul filed criminal compensation based on each new judgment and each acquittal judgment. Accordingly, the plaintiff Eul and the plaintiff Eul filed criminal compensation for 84.6 million won, the plaintiff Eul totaled 147,642,00 won (12.650 million won + 34,92,00 won), the plaintiff Eul totaled 147,358,800 won (12.950 million won + 34,408,800 won), and the plaintiff Eul totaled 122,080,140 won (85,338,540 won + 36,741,60 won + 36,741,600 won), the plaintiff Eul and the plaintiff Eul received each compensation decision of 54,643,200 won, and the plaintiff Eul and the plaintiff Eul received each of the above compensation decision of 56,764,780,000 won, and the plaintiff Eul became final and conclusive around that time.

D. The plaintiffs' relationship

The remaining plaintiffs and litigants except the plaintiff A, etc. and the plaintiff I as their family members are specified in the relevant column of the damage amount list by the plaintiff, as shown in attached Form 2. The succession relationship is as shown in attached Form 3.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, entry of Gap evidence 1 to 20, purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination on the defense prior to the merits

A. Defendant’s defense

As Plaintiff A, B, C, and D submitted written consent to the restoration of honor of persons related to democratization movements and the decision of the Compensation Deliberation Committee for the payment of living allowances, and received living allowances, judicial compromise was established between Plaintiff A, B, C, and D and the Defendant on the violation of Emergency Measure No. 9. Accordingly, the lawsuit by the Plaintiffs on their part is unlawful.

B. Relevant legal principles

The Act on the Restoration of Honor and Compensation, etc. to Persons Related to Democratization Movements (hereinafter referred to as the "Act on Democratization Movement") provides for the purpose of stabilizing their lives and promoting the improvement of their welfare by compensating persons who have sacrificed in relation to democratization movements and their bereaved family members, as well as contributing to the development of democracy and national harmony. Article 2 subparagraph 1 of the same Act provides that "divers of democratization movements" means activities that contribute to the realization of ideology and values pursuing the Constitution and the establishment of democratic constitutional order and the recovery and extension of the freedom and rights of the people by resisting the authoritative rule that violates the fundamental rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution on or after March 24, 1964, and that "the person related to democratization movements (hereinafter referred to as "persons related to democratization movements") shall be deemed to have been deliberated and determined by the Compensation Review Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee") and that persons who have agreed to receive compensation in relation to the determination of compensation in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act shall be deemed to have been paid by persons related to the Committee without delay:

In addition, Article 20 of the Enforcement Decree of the Democratization Compensation Act provides that "When an applicant who has received a notice of decision to pay living allowances or a notice of decision to restore his/her reputation intends to receive compensation, he/she shall submit to the Committee a written consent and a written application stating the following matters (attached Form 10), along with one copy of the written decision to pay compensation, the original decision to pay compensation or the original decision to restore his/her reputation, and one copy of the applicant's certificate of his/her personal seal impression," and stipulates that "a person consents to the decision to pay compensation and claims the payment of compensation, etc." under subparagraph 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Democratization Compensation Act (attached Form 10), the consent and written application shall state that "where the applicant has received the compensation, etc., he/she shall enter into

In addition to the legislative intent of the Act on the Democratization Compensation, the contents of relevant regulations, the consent prepared and submitted by the applicant, and the contents of the written claim, the legislative purpose of Article 18(2) of the Act on the Democratization Compensation is to promptly terminate and implement it through the procedure for the decision of payment such as the compensation of the Committee and to ensure stability in the decision of payment such as compensation when the applicant gives the applicant consent to the decision of payment such as compensation, in full view of the effects of judicial reconciliation, such as the effect of res judicata, in particular, the effect of granting res judicata, and in particular, granting the applicant’s prompt termination and implementation through the procedure for the decision of payment such as compensation of the Committee, if the applicant has consented to the decision

(See Supreme Court Decisions 2012Da45603 Decided March 13, 2014; 2012Da204365 Decided January 22, 2015, etc.)

Meanwhile, Article 2 subparag. 2(d) of the Democratization Compensation Act provides that "a person who has been convicted of a person on the ground of his/her related party" as one of the persons involved. Article 9(1) provides that "the Committee may grant subsidies to assist his/her livelihood to any of the following persons and his/her bereaved family members." Article 12-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Democratization Compensation Act provides that "a person detained for 30 days or more on the ground of democratization movements." The former part of Article 12-2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Democratization Compensation Act provides that "the person detained for 30 days or more from among the persons eligible for living allowances under Article 9(1) of the Act shall be paid an amount calculated by multiplying the minimum cost of living in the pertinent period of detention, and the amount shall not exceed 50 million won." According to such relevant provisions, the Act on the Democratization Compensation does not distinguish the circumstances leading up to the judgment of conviction for a certain period of time on the grounds of democratization movement, and thus, it shall also be deemed that the applicant is subject to a judicial judgment of conviction or retrial after conviction.

C. Of the instant lawsuit, the determination as to whether the part claiming consolation money of the Plaintiff A, B, and C and the claim part of Plaintiff D are legitimate

1) Facts of recognition

A) Receipt of living allowances from Plaintiff A

(1) On August 14, 2001, Plaintiff A received a decision to recognize a person related to democratization movements as a person who was convicted of or was subject to a bachelor’s punishment for reasons of democratization movements, and who was recognized as a person related to democratization movements under subparagraph 2 (d) of Article 2 of the Democratization Compensation Act.

(2) On September 12, 2005, Plaintiff A received a decision to pay a living allowance of KRW 44,59,080 based on the number of days of detention from the commission. On September 27, 2005, Plaintiff A submitted a written consent and a written claim to the effect that “When receiving a compensation, etc. from the commission, a compromise agreement is made on the case, and no further claim is made in any way with respect to the case.” Plaintiff A received the above living allowance on September 30, 2005.

B) Receipt of living allowances from Plaintiff B

(1) On June 8, 2004, Plaintiff B received a decision to recognize as a person related to democratization movements under subparagraph 2 (d) of Article 2 of the Democratization Compensation Act, who was found guilty on the grounds of democratization movements by the Committee.

(2) On October 31, 2005, Plaintiff B was determined to pay a living allowance of KRW 35,664,120 based on the number of days of detention by the commission. On November 10, 2005, Plaintiff B submitted a written consent and a written claim to the effect that “When receiving compensation, etc. from the commission, it shall be a compromise contract for the case, and shall not be claimed again in any way with respect to the case.” The Plaintiff B received the above living allowance on November 15, 2005.

C) Receipt of the Plaintiff C’s living allowances

(1) On September 25, 2001, Plaintiff C received a decision to recognize a person related to democratization movements as a person who was convicted of or was subject to a bachelor’s punishment for reasons of democratization movements and recognized as a person related to democratization movements under subparagraph 2 (d) of Article 2 of the Democratization Compensation Act.

(2) On October 10, 2005, Plaintiff C was decided to pay a living allowance of KRW 10,676,520 based on the number of days of detention by the commission. On October 19, 2005, Plaintiff C submitted a written consent and a written claim to the effect that, when receiving compensation, etc. from the commission, the settlement contract is entered into with respect to the case, and that, in any way, no further claim is made with respect to the case. Plaintiff C. received the above living allowance on October 10, 2005.

D) Receipt of the Plaintiff D’s living allowances

(1) On October 30, 2001, Plaintiff D received a decision to recognize as a person related to democratization movements under Article 2 subparagraph 2 (d) of the Act on the Compensation for Democratization Movement to the purport that it was “a person who was convicted of or was subject to a bachelor’s punishment on the grounds of democratization movements, and was recognized as a person related to democratization movements.”

(2) On July 4, 2005, Plaintiff D was determined to pay the living allowances of KRW 10,790,100 based on the number of days of detention by the commission. Plaintiff D submitted a written consent and a written request to the effect that, when receiving compensation, etc. from the commission on November 24, 2005, it would be a compromise contract with respect to the case, and would not claim again in any way with respect to the case. Plaintiff D received the above living allowances on November 28, 2005.

[Reasons for Recognition] Uncontentious facts, the court's restoration of honor of persons related to democratization movements and the result of factual inquiry into the Compensation Deliberation Committee, the purport of the whole pleadings

2) Determination

In light of the above legal principles, Plaintiff A, B, C, and D shall be deemed to have the same effect as a judicial compromise in relation to all the damages incurred by Plaintiff A, B, C, and D related to a violation of Emergency Measure No. 9 of the Demodial Compensation Act by submitting a written consent and a written claim to the Committee for the determination of compensation under the Democratization Compensation Act and receiving living allowances from the Committee.

Ultimately, among the lawsuits of this case, the part concerning the claim of consolation money (excluding the part concerning the claim of consolation money inherited in the status of the heir) and the claim of the plaintiff D are unlawful because there is no benefit of protection of rights. The defendant's defense on the merits of this case is with merit.

3. Judgment on the merits

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

1) The former president, even though not in a state emergency situation, such as the exercise of an emergency measure, publicly announced the long-term power and issued an emergency measure No. 9 on May 13, 1975 to suppress the opposing power of the new constitution. In light of the content, the emergency measure is unconstitutional that seriously infringes on the fundamental rights of the people, such as the principle of no punishment without the law, warrant requirement, and freedom of expression. Therefore, the exercise of the emergency measure by the former president intentionally violates the Constitution while public officials perform their duties.

2) Since Emergency Measure No. 9 is an invalidation of unconstitutionality, the act of judicial duties of a judge who has rendered a judgment of conviction by applying the duties of an investigative agency instituting a public prosecution or the Emergency Measure No. 9, without issuing a warrant under Article 9 of the Emergency Measures Act, is unlawful. A series of acts, such as the issuance of an emergency measure unconstitutional or invalid by the President, the execution thereof, and the subsequent investigation and trial, constitute a defendant's tort.

3) Plaintiff A, etc., and Plaintiff A, etc. were investigated under an isolated confinement with their defense counsel and family members for a long time, and were subject to serious sacity and advisory acts from investigators. The act of the investigative agency’s duty is unlawful.

4) Ultimately, the Defendant is obligated to compensate the Plaintiff, E, F, B, G, C, D, H, and I for consolation money for mental distress sustained during the period of detention, as shown in the Plaintiff’s Schedule of Damage Amount, and is obligated to compensate the Plaintiff, E, F, G, C, D, H, and I’s family members for consolation money for mental distress inflicted upon the Plaintiff, E, F, G, C, H, and I’s family members (the Plaintiff, B, and C’s claim for consolation money and the part of Plaintiff D’s claim were dismissed for the foregoing reasons).

B. Determination

1) Whether the exercise of the presidential emergency power constitutes a tort by an intentional or negligent act by a public official under Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act

A) Article 53 of the former Constitution (wholly amended by Act No. 9 of Oct. 27, 1980; hereinafter “former Constitution”) which provides the basis for the issuance of an Emergency Measure No. 9 is unconstitutional and invalid since it seriously limits the fundamental rights of the people by seriously restricting the freedom of expression, warrant requirement and physical freedom, residence, right to petition, and academic freedom, which are fundamental elements of democracy, and the freedom of expression prescribed by the current Constitution (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Order 2011Hu689, Apr. 18, 201). However, even if Emergency Measure No. 9 is declared unconstitutional and invalid after the court, the exercise of the emergency measure by the President based on the new Constitution is a highly political act with high level of political responsibility for the exercise of the national emergency power, and the President does not have any legal obligation corresponding to each citizen’s rights, and thus, constitutes a tort against the general public (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da2825484, Feb. 25, 2016.

B) Therefore, it is difficult to accept the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the act of issuing the Presidential Emergency Decree No. 9 on different premise itself constitutes a tort by a public official’s intentional or negligent act under Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act in relation to the Plaintiffs.

2) Whether the act of investigating and punishing public officials under subparagraph 9 of the Emergency Measures constitutes a tort by a public official’s intentional or negligent act

A) Relevant legal principles

(1) In a case where the penal law has retroactively lost its effect due to the Constitutional Court’s decision of unconstitutionality, or the court has declared that the statute was unconstitutional or invalid, even if an investigation was initiated based on the relevant statute before the statute was declared unconstitutional, and a public prosecution has been instituted and a conviction has been declared, such circumstance alone alone cannot be deemed as constituting a tort by a public official’s intentional or negligent act as referred to in Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act.

In addition, Emergency Decree No. 9 does not meet the requirements stipulated in Article 53 of the U.S. Constitution, which is the basis for the issuance of the Emergency Decree, as well as the fundamental rights of the people by seriously restricting the freedom of expression, warrant requirement and physical freedom, residence, right to petition, and academic freedom, which are fundamental elements of democracy and the current Constitution. As seen above, Emergency Decree No. 9 is deemed unconstitutional and invalid.

However, insofar as Article 53(4) of the 1999 of the 1999 Constitution of the Republic of Korea provides that "the emergency measures referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not be subject to judicial review" and Article 53(4) of the 1999 of the 201999 of the 1999 of the 1999 of the 1999 of the 201999 of the 201999 of the 201999 of the 201999 of the 201999 of the 201999 of the 201999, which were in force at the time, the act of judicial review shall not be deemed to constitute an unlawful act stipulated in Article 2(1) of the 2010 of the 2019.

(2) On the other hand, in a case where a State agency was indicted on the basis of evidence collected in the course of investigation by an illegal act, and a final judgment of conviction was rendered, but the case under the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act was not proven in the retrial procedure and thus the judgment of innocence became final and conclusive, the State’s liability for damages caused by the reinstatement, etc.

However, in a case where the judgment of innocence under the former part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act (amended by Act No. 9), which is the Act on the Punishment, applied to the defendant in a retrial procedure against a violation of Emergency Decree No. 9, becomes null and void, barring any other special circumstance, it cannot be deemed that the State’s act committed by the State agency, which was in the course of the investigation, was pronounced guilty in the judgment subject to retrial. Thus, solely on the grounds that the judgment of innocence became final and conclusive, it cannot be deemed immediately deemed as a State’s illegal act, and the State’s liability for damages is difficult to be recognized. In this case, the State should separately examine whether a State agency committed an illegal act in the course of investigation and whether there was causation between such illegal act and the conviction, and then determine whether to recognize the State’s liability for damages based on the conviction. Accordingly, comprehensively taking account of the contents of the offense charged, the existence of evidence to acknowledge conviction, the grounds for the decision of retrial, the circumstances and reasons why the person involved in the case was acquitted and the judgment.

B) Determination

(1) The facts charged on the charge of violating subparagraph 9 of this Emergency Measure with the Plaintiff, etc. were arrested and detained without a warrant, and the conviction against the Plaintiff, etc. was finalized and the conviction against the Plaintiff, etc. was returned to the original judgment as seen above (the Plaintiff 1 was released from Emergency Measure No. 9 and rendered a judgment of acquittal). In addition, in full view of the overall purport of the arguments in each of the evidence Nos. 27 through 32 (including branch numbers), the Plaintiff, etc. and the Plaintiff were subject to harsh acts, such as assault and water adviser, during the investigation process, and the fact that the interview and communication of their family members was prevented is also acknowledged.

However, even if an investigative agency, without a warrant, arrested and detained the plaintiff Gap et al. and conducted an investigation, and prosecuted the plaintiff et al. or a judge declared a conviction by applying the Emergency Measure No. 9, insofar as the Emergency Measure No. 9 at the time was not declared unconstitutional or invalid, it is difficult to deem that such circumstance alone constitutes a tort by the public official's intentional or negligent act.

In addition, since the Emergency Decree No. 9, which is the Act on Punishment A, applied to the plaintiff et al. in the retrial procedure on the judgment subject to retrial, became final and conclusive by the former part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act on the ground that the Emergency Decree No. 9, applied to the plaintiff et al., was unconstitutional and invalid, the judgment subject to retrial cannot be deemed a case where the judgment subject to retrial was rendered due to the illegal act of a State agency, which

Furthermore, even though the fact that the Plaintiff et al. was abused and abused during the investigation process and obstructed meeting and communication with his family members is recognized, the evidence submitted in this case alone would not be enough to prove that there was a high probability of having been a cause of innocence under the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act unless there was a cause of innocence under the former part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, such as the Constitutional Court and Nullity of Emergency Measure No.

As a result, the Defendant’s public officials’ liability for damages arising from the illegal acts cannot be recognized regarding the reinstatement, etc. based on the judgment subject to review.

(2) As seen above, the judicial duties of the judge who sentenced the presidential emergency measures, the duties of the investigative agency against the plaintiff Gap, etc., and the judgment of conviction cannot be deemed to constitute a tort by the public official's intentional or negligent act. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' assertion that the issuance of emergency measures which are unconstitutional or invalid, and the series of investigations and trials pertaining thereto are unlawful is without merit.

3) Whether the State’s liability for damages is established with respect to the blocking of harsh acts and visitation and communication among family members in the course of investigation

A) According to Article 89 of the former Criminal Procedure Act (amended by Act No. 3282, Dec. 18, 1980; hereinafter the same) which applies mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article 209 of the same Act at the time of the arrest of the Plaintiff, A, etc. and the Plaintiff, the detained suspect may meet with others, receive documents and articles, and receive medical treatment within the scope of the law. However, according to each of the written evidence Nos. 26 through 31 (including the branch number) and the overall purport of oral arguments, it can be recognized that the interview with the Plaintiff, etc. and their family members during the police investigation of the Plaintiff, etc. was restricted, and there is no counter-proof. The above blocking of meeting and communication by the Defendant investigator constitutes a tort in violation

B) According to the reasoning of the evidence No. 28, Plaintiff F, who was arrested without a warrant due to a charge of violating Article 9 of the Emergency Measures Act, and was investigated in the information and office, and was subject to violence and adviser from time to time. The act of assault by investigators belonging to the Defendant constitutes a tort.

C) Ultimately, the Defendant is liable to compensate the Plaintiffs for damages incurred by the tort, such as the above (A) and (b) of the public officials belonging to the Defendant, unless there are special circumstances.

4) Judgment on the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription

A) The defendant defense that the damage claim of the plaintiffs expired five years after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the plaintiffs asserted that there was an objective disability that the plaintiffs could not exercise the right to claim damages of this case against the defendant until the new judgment became final and conclusive from the court which rendered the judgment of conviction, and that the defendant's defense for the expiration of the statute of limitations cannot be allowed as an abuse of rights.

B) The Plaintiffs’ damage claim is a right against the State for monetary payment, and its prescription expires if it is not exercised for five years from the date of tort pursuant to Article 96 of the former Budget and Accounts Act (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the National Finance Act, Act No. 8050, Oct. 4, 2006).

The facts that Plaintiff A was detained on May 24, 1978 and was detained on December 8, 1979; Plaintiff E was detained on May 13, 197; Plaintiff F was detained on November 28, 197; Plaintiff F was detained on May 21, 197; Defendant B was detained on December 5, 1979; Plaintiff B was detained on May 13, 1979; Plaintiff B was detained on December 8, 1979; Plaintiff G and C were detained on October 13, 1978; Plaintiff D was detained on July 17, 1979; Plaintiff D was detained on September 197, 197; Defendant B was detained on September 197, 197; and Defendant B was released on July 197, 197.

C) The obligor’s exercise of the right of defense based on the statute of limitations is governed by the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of our Civil Act. As such, the obligor’s exercise of the right of defense based on the statute of limitations is subject to the control of the principle of good faith and the principle of prohibition of abuse of rights. Thus, in special circumstances where the obligor and public officials belonging to the Defendant in this case were unable or considerably difficult prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, committed acts that make the obligee believe that such measures are unnecessary, or there was an objective obstacle that the obligee was unable to exercise the right, or the obligor was unable to use the right after the expiration of the statute of limitations, or where there was a great need to protect the obligee, and where there were special circumstances, such as where other creditors of the same condition receive the repayment of the obligation, and where it is remarkably unreasonable or unfair for the obligor to refuse the performance of the obligation, the obligor’s assertion on the completion of the statute of limitations is not permissible as abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Da32332).

In addition, it is difficult to deem that the statute of limitations defense by the Defendant is abuse of rights, since more than 30 years have passed since the date of the release of the Plaintiff, A, etc. and the time of the institution of the instant lawsuit, and there have been many changes in the social and political atmosphere in Korea. Considering these circumstances, in relation to the tort recognized above, there is no special circumstance, such as where the Defendant’s refusal to perform his/her obligations is recognized and thus unfair or unfair.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the part concerning the claim of consolation money and the part concerning the claim of plaintiffs A, B, and C among the lawsuit of this case are dismissed as it is unlawful because there is no benefit of protection of rights. The remaining plaintiffs' claims except plaintiffs A, B, C, and D and the remaining claims of plaintiffs A, B, and C are dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.