[1] In a case where the defendant appealed only an unreasonable sentencing on the judgment of the court of first instance as a ground for appeal, whether the appellate court may make a mistake of facts or misapprehension of legal principles as to the judgment of first instance as the

[2] In a case where the defendant appealed the judgment of the first instance on the grounds of unfair sentencing along with other grounds for appeal, but withdraws the grounds for appeal other than unfair sentencing before the judgment of the appellate court was rendered, whether the judgment of the appellate court may be considered as the grounds for appeal by mistake of facts

[3] The meaning of the principle of clarity of punishment laws required by the Constitution

[4] The meaning of "safety protection facilities" under Article 42 (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and the method of determining whether such facilities are applicable

[1] Article 383 of the Criminal Procedure Act / [2] Article 383 of the Criminal Procedure Act / [3] Articles 12 (1) and 13 of the Constitution / [4] Article 42 (2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 94Do2134 delivered on February 3, 1995 (Gong1995Sang, 1195) Supreme Court Decision 2002Do7115 Delivered on February 11, 2003 (Gong2003Sang, 870) Supreme Court Decision 2004Do927 Delivered on April 28, 2004, Supreme Court Decision 2005Do3345 delivered on September 30, 2005 (Gong2005Ha, 1755) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 2005Do3244 delivered on September 9, 2005 / [3] Supreme Court Decision 2006Do92064 delivered on May 11, 2006; 2005Do17564 delivered on April 26, 2006

Defendant 1 and five others

Defendants

Law Firm citizen, Attorney Kang Han-soo

Gwangju District Court Decision 2001No2379 Decided December 2, 2005

All appeals are dismissed.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Where a defendant appealed the judgment of the court of first instance on the sole ground of unfair sentencing as a ground for appeal and the appeal is dismissed, the defendant cannot be deemed as the ground for appeal that there was an error of mistake of facts or misapprehension of legal principles with respect to the judgment of the court of first instance (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2002Do7115, Feb. 11, 2003; 2005Do3345, Sept. 30, 2005; 2005Do14, Sept. 14, 2005). This is also applicable to a case where the court below reversed the judgment of first instance on the sole ground of unfair sentencing against the judgment of first instance and rendered a minor sentence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Do2134, Feb. 3, 1995; 2004Do927, Apr. 28, 2004).

The Defendants appealed against the judgment of the court of first instance on November 11, 2005 and claimed a misapprehension of the legal principle as well as the grounds for appeal on the grounds of unfair sentencing, and withdrawn all the grounds for appeal other than unfair sentencing on November 11, 2005 on the second trial date of the court of second instance. The court below dismissed each appeal by Defendants 1, 2, and 3, and reversed the judgment of the court of first instance by citing each appeal by Defendants 4, 5, and 6, and sentenced a minor sentence. Thus, the argument that the judgment of the court of first instance contains errors

2. Even if a concept that requires a supplementary interpretation of a judge is included in the elements of a punishment law, if a person has a sound common sense and ordinary legal sentiment by a usual interpretation method, if such person has a provision that enables him to know the protected legal interest of the relevant punishment law, prohibited act, and the type and degree of the punishment, it is not contrary to the clarity of the punishment law required by the Constitution (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Do920, May 11, 2006, etc.).

The legislative purpose of Article 42(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which provides that an act to suspend, discontinue, or obstruct the normal maintenance and operation of a workplace’s “safety protection facility” shall not be an industrial action, is “protection of people’s lives and bodies,” and the term “safety protection facility” in this context, means a facility necessary for the prevention of harm to people’s lives or bodies, such as the nature of the workplace, the function of the facility in question, and the risks that may occur when the facility is not normally maintained and operated (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Do3450, May 12, 2006). Thus, the argument in the grounds of appeal that the legislative purpose of the above provision is unclear or the interpretation criteria are inconsistent with the principle of clarity in the principle of no punishment without law cannot be accepted.

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yang Sung-tae (Presiding Justice)