[1] The meaning of public performance in the crime of defamation and the violation of the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Election Unlawful Act

[2] The case holding that even if the facts against one person were discovered, there is a possibility of spreading them and there is a performance

[1] Public performance in the crime of defamation or the crime of violation of the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Election Unlawful Act refers to a state in which many and unspecified persons can recognize it. Thus, if there is a possibility of spreading to many and unspecified persons even if the facts are distributed to one person individually, the requirements of public performance are satisfied.

[2] The case holding that the crime of the defendant's judgment is already held to have public performance at the time of the act, in light of the fact that the defendant's oral statement was merely just one person, but it was not a person with a special relationship with the defendant, and the contents of the crime also slanders the person who intends to be a candidate again at the time of the election of a member of the local council, and thus, it is highly likely that the defendant's timely statement would spread since he slandered the person who wants to be a candidate again at the time of the election of a member of

[1] Article 307 (1) of the former Criminal Act (amended by Act No. 5057 of Dec. 29, 1995); Article 251 of the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Unlawful Election / [2] Article 307 (1) of the former Criminal Act (amended by Act No. 5057 of Dec. 29, 1995); Article 251 of the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Unlawful Election

[1] Supreme Court Decision 86Do556 delivered on September 23, 1986 (Gong1986, 2993), Supreme Court Decision 89Do1467 delivered on April 27, 1990 (Gong1990, 1200), Supreme Court Decision 90Do1167 delivered on July 24, 1990 (Gong190, 1834), Supreme Court Decision 92Do445 delivered on May 26, 1992 (Gong192, 2065), Supreme Court Decision 94Do1880 delivered on September 30, 1994 (Gong194Ha, 2919)

Defendant

Defendant

Daegu High Court Decision 96No15 delivered on March 27, 1996

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal and the supplemental appellate brief submitted after the lapse of the period are also considered to supplement the grounds of appeal.

1. Examining the evidence maintained by the court of first instance in accordance with the court below's evidence, since each of the facts stated in the judgment against the defendant can be sufficiently recognized, it cannot be said that the court below erred in finding the facts against the rules of evidence.

2. Public performance in the crime of defamation or violation of the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Election Unlawful Act refers to a state in which many and unspecified persons can recognize it. Thus, even if one person spreads a fact, if there is a possibility of spreading it to an unspecified or many unspecified persons, the requirements of public performance shall be satisfied (see Supreme Court Decisions 90Do1167, Jul. 24, 1990; 92Do445, May 26, 1992; 94Do1880, Sept. 30, 1994).

In light of the records, although the defendant's horses at the time of each crime committed by the defendant was merely one person, they do not have a special relationship with the defendant, and the contents of the crime are also slandering a person who wishes to be a candidate again at the time of the election of a member of the local council at the time of the election of a member of the local council, and thus, there is a high possibility that the defendant's timely facts may spread, and as a result, the facts were spread to the victim and the victim raised a complaint, etc., the crime of the defendant's judgment is deemed to have a public performance at the time of the act. Thus, the decision of the court below to the same purport is just, and the

3. In this case where the Defendant was sentenced to a fine of KRW 1,00,000 for a fine of KRW 1,000, the assertion that punishment is excessive is not a legitimate ground for appeal

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Ahn Yong-sik (Presiding Justice)