[1] In a case where the contents of the enforcement decree or the enforcement decree of the parent law are not only to specify whether it is possible to interpret the parent law by systematically and systematically examining the legislative intent of the parent law and the whole of the relevant provisions, or to specify them based on the purport of the mother law provision, whether it is invalid on the ground that there was no provision directly delegated to the mother law (negative)

[2] Whether Article 16 (1) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Infant Care Act exceeds the delegation scope of the Infant Care Act (negative)

[1] Articles 75 and 95 of the Constitution / [2] Articles 1, 2 subparagraph 2, 4(2), 20, 21(2)2, 23, and 41 of the former Infant Care Act (amended by Act No. 9932, Jan. 18, 2010); Articles 13(1) and (2), 14, 15, and 16(1) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Infant Care Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs No. 124, Jul. 3, 2009)

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2012Du19526 Decided August 20, 2014 (Gong2014Ha, 1872)

Plaintiff (Law Firm Successful, Attorneys Lee Han-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Do Governor of Gyeongnam-do

Busan High Court (Chowon) Decision 2014Nu11772 decided October 14, 2015

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Busan High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The Enforcement Decree or the Enforcement Rule of the Act may not change or supplement the contents of an individual’s rights and obligations or determine new contents that are not prescribed by the Act, unless otherwise prescribed by the Act. However, the legislative intent of the mother Act and the entire relevant provisions are merely to specify the possible interpretation of the mother Act by systematically and systematically examining the legislative purpose of the parent Act and the entire relevant provisions, or where they are intended to specify them based on the purport of the provisions of the mother Act, they may not be deemed to exceed the scope of the parent Act’s regulation. In such a case, even if the parent Act did not directly delegate such provisions, it shall not be deemed null and void (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Du19526, Aug. 20,

2. Article 21(2) of the former Infant Care Act (amended by Act No. 932, Jan. 18, 2010; hereinafter “ Infant Care Act”) provides that “Any person who has graduated from a high school or any other school equivalent to or higher than such high school and has completed a prescribed educational and training course in the education and training facilities prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry for Health, Welfare and Family Affairs.” Accordingly, Article 13(1) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Infant Care Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry for Health, Welfare and Family Affairs No. 124, Jul. 3, 2009; hereinafter “Enforcement Rule”) provides that “educational and training facilities under Article 21(2)2 of the Act shall mean facilities designated by the Mayor/Do Governor as education and training facilities after deliberation by the Local Child Care Policy Committee under Article 6 of the Act in order to nurture infant care teachers.” Furthermore, the Enforcement Rule provides for the criteria for the establishment of education and training facilities and the procedures for the change thereof, and the designation thereof may be revoked.

3. We examine whether Article 16(1) of the Enforcement Rule, which served as the basis for the revocation of the designation of the instant case, (hereinafter “instant Enforcement Rule clause”), prescribed matters not delegated by the Infant Care Act.

In light of the aforementioned legal principles, the provision of the instant Enforcement Rule, which provides for the revocation of designation of education and training facilities for fostering infant care teachers, may be deemed to have been embodied on the basis of the purport of the Infant Care Act, and therefore, the provision of the instant Enforcement Rule shall not be deemed to have exceeded the scope of delegation of the Infant Care Act.

A. In full view of the legislative purpose of the Infant Care Act (Article 1), the concept of infant care (Article 2 subparag. 2), the concept of infant care (Article 3 subparag. 1 and 3(2)), the concept of infant care (Article 3(2)), the responsibility of the State and local governments (Article 4(2)), etc., the purpose of the Infant Care Act is to protect the mental and physical health of, and educate, the infants in a sound manner, and infant care should be provided

B. In order to achieve this legislative purpose, the Infant Care Act provides a system of qualification with strict qualifications for employees working for nursery facilities, such as infant care teachers (Articles 20 and 21), while providing for the authority to manage and supervise the founders and operators of nursery facilities and infant care teachers and staff (Article 41). Furthermore, the Minister of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs provides that the Minister shall provide supplementary education (training) to improve the quality of infant care teachers and staff (Article 23).

C. As such, strict qualifications for infant care teachers are required, management, supervision, and education and training. As such, Article 21(2) of the Infant Care Act provides the basis for education and training facilities, which serve as the premise for granting qualifications for infant care teachers, and whether to designate certain facilities as education and training facilities can be deemed delegated to the Minister for Health, Welfare and Family Affairs. Furthermore, as long as the designation of “education and training facilities,” which train infant care teachers is possible, the management and supervision thereof is naturally necessary. Furthermore, if circumstances arise where it is difficult to function properly due to reasons that occurred after the designation of a certain facility as education and training facilities, it is also necessary to determine

On the other hand, the Enforcement Decree of the Infant Care Act and the Enforcement Decree of the same Act do not have specific regulations on education and training facilities. Therefore, it should be deemed that the Infant Care Act plans to determine the detailed matters such as the procedures and standards related to the designation

Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the Infant Care Act provides room for broad formation in the Enforcement Rule with regard to the designation of “educational and training facilities” and overall maintenance of such designation.

D. Furthermore, all of the grounds for revocation of designation of education and training facilities include cases where the designated education and training facilities have difficulty in properly performing their roles, and thus, it can be easily predicted that the grounds for revocation of designation can be the reasons for revocation of designation.

4. On the contrary, the lower court determined that the provision of the instant Enforcement Rule was null and void because it limits the rights of those who are designated as education and training institutions without delegation of the Infant Care Act. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the scope and limit of delegated legislation, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation contained in the grounds of

5. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Sang-ok (Presiding Justice)