[1] Whether an occupant of land whose judgment has become final and conclusive in a lawsuit claiming cancellation of ownership transfer registration shall be deemed to be an occupant in bad faith from the time of filing the lawsuit (affirmative)

[2] In the case of paragraph (1) of the same Article, whether the person who was presumed as an independent possession is converted into the possession of another owner due to the confirmation of the loss (affirmative)

[3] The elements for the conversion of the possession into the possession with intention

[1] If a suit is instituted against an occupant for cancellation of ownership transfer registration in the name of an occupant on land and the litigation case becomes final and conclusive against an occupant by filing a lawsuit against the occupant for cancellation of ownership transfer registration in the name of the occupant on the ground that the ownership transfer registration in the name of the occupant is the registration invalidation of the cause for invalidity of ownership transfer registration, the occupant shall be deemed to be an occupant in bad faith on the land at the time of filing

[2] In the case of paragraph (1) above, since the possessor of land becomes a direct party to a lawsuit claiming a cancellation registration of ownership, and eventually becomes aware of the legitimate owner of the site through the lawsuit, and the judgment against him became final and conclusive that the possessor, as a result of the judgment against him, bears the duty of cancellation registration of ownership transfer in the name of the possessor with respect to the land, it shall be deemed that the possession of the land of the possessor has been converted to another owner, as it is objectively and objectively different from the state of mere bad faith possession.

[3] In order to convert the possession into the possession with an intention to own it again with a new title, the owner must indicate his intention to own it to the person who has occupied it with a new title.

[1] Articles 197(2) and 245 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 197 and 245 of the Civil Act / [3] Articles 197 and 245 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 86Da1372 delivered on January 20, 1987 (Gong1987, 306) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 88Da1039 delivered on April 25, 1989 (Gong1989, 806) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 88Da95 delivered on April 11, 1989 (Gong1989, 738), Supreme Court Decision 92Da51723, 51730 delivered on April 27, 1993 (Gong193, 1561), Supreme Court Decision 93Da1039 delivered on July 13, 1993 (Gong193, 2264)

Plaintiff (Law Firm Taesung, Attorneys Kim Dong-ho et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korea

Busan High Court Decision 95Na12729 delivered on March 29, 1996

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Busan High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Summary of the judgment below

원심은, 그 내세운 증거에 의하여, 부산 해운대구 (주소 생략) 대 596㎡(이하, 이 사건 대지라고 한다)는 1992. 3. 11. 부산 해운대구 (주소 생략) 답 207평에서 분할된 것인데, 분할 전의 답 207평(이하, 분할 전 토지라 한다)은 원래 일제시대 때 소외 주식회사 조선산업은행의 소유로서 해방 이후 대한민국정부에 귀속된 재산인 사실, 그런데 분할 전 토지는 1958. 8. 16. 소외 1 앞으로 1957. 12. 31. 자 상환완료를 원인으로 한 소유권이전등기가 마쳐지고, 원고는 1961. 4. 20. 소외 1로부터 분할 전 토지를 매수한 후, 이를 점유 사용해 오다가 같은 해 5. 16. 원고 앞으로 소유권이전등기를 마치고, 1963. 1. 15.경 그 지상에 시멘트 연와조 와즙 평가건 주택인 여관 건물을 지어 이 사건 대지 중 원심판결 별지 도면 표시 ㉮㉯㉰㉱㉲ 부분 합계 534.0㎡(이하, 이 사건 원고의 점유 부분이라고 한다)를 건물의 부지 및 마당으로 현재에 이르기까지 점유 사용해 오고 있는 사실, 한편 피고는 1963. 4. 15. 분할 전 토지가 농지가 아닐 뿐 아니라, 더욱이 소외 1이 비농가이어서 농지로 분배받을 수 없는데도 불구하고 이를 분배받아 그 명의로 소유권이전등기를 마쳤다는 이유로 소외 1 명의의 소유권이전등기 및 이에 터잡아 마친 원고 명의의 소유권이전등기를 원인무효라고 주장하면서 소외 1 및 원고를 상대로 부산지방법원 63가1288호 로 위 각 등기의 말소를 구하는 소송을 제기하여 1964. 8. 3. 승소판결을 받고, 이에 대한 소외 1 및 원고의 항소와 상고가 모두 기각됨으로써 판결이 1966. 1. 25. 확정되었으나, 피고는 원고의 위 점유상태를 그대로 둔 채, 위 판결에 따라 같은 해 9. 5. 위 각 등기를 모두 말소하고, 1981. 5. 6. 피고 앞으로 소유권이전등기를 마친 사실, 이 사건 토지는 1992. 3. 11. 분할 전 토지로부터 분할되어 현재 피고가 596분의 570 지분, 소외 2가 596분의 26 지분비율로 공유하고 있고, 피고의 지분 한도 내에서 국유재산법상의 잡종재산인 사실을 각 인정한 다음, 원고는 이 사건 대지 중 원고의 점유 부분을 1961. 4. 20. 매수하여 그 때부터 이를 점유 사용하여 왔는바, 취득시효에 있어서 자주점유라 함은 소유자가 할 수 있는 것과 같은 배타적 지배를 사실상 행사하려는 의사를 가지고 하는 점유를 의미하는 것이지, 소유권을 가지고 있거나 또는 이를 가지고 있다고 믿고서 하는 점유를 의미하는 것은 아니며, 그 소유의 의사는 권원의 성질에 의하여 정하여져야 하나, 그 권원의 성질이 분명하지 아니한 때에는 자주점유로 추정된다고 할 것이고, 원고가 소유권이전등기말소청구소송에서 패소판결을 선고받고, 그 판결이 확정되어 그 이후부터 분할 전 토지가 자신의 소유가 아님을 알면서 점유해 왔다 하더라도 원고의 점유의 태양에 아무런 변경이 없는 한, 그와 같은 사유만으로는 원고의 점유가 타주점유로 전환되는 것은 아니라고 할 것이며, 따라서 원고의 취득시효기간은 1966. 1. 26.부터 새로이 진행하게 된다(원고의 패소판결이 확정된 1966. 1. 25.까지는 취득시효의 진행이 중단되었다)할 것인바, 원고는 이 사건 토지 중 원고의 점유 부분에 관하여 1966. 1. 26.부터 20년이 되는 1986. 1. 25. 시효취득하였다고 판단하였다.

2. Judgment on the grounds of appeal

First, according to Article 197 of the Civil Act, the possessor shall be presumed to have occupied in good faith (Article 197 (1) of the Civil Act), but if the possessor in good faith has lost in a lawsuit concerning this right, he shall be deemed to have been a bad faith possessor from the time the lawsuit is brought (Article 197 (2) of the Civil Act). Since the defendant's land is owned by the defendant as legally determined by the court below, the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the plaintiff is a registration invalidation, and if the litigation case against the plaintiff is finalized against the plaintiff by filing a lawsuit against the plaintiff for the cancellation of the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the plaintiff as to the land in this case, the plaintiff shall be deemed to have been a bad faith possessor in the land in this case from April 15, 1963 (see Supreme Court Decision 86Meu1372 delivered on January 20, 1987).

Next, the possessor of another person's real estate is presumed to possess it with the intention of possession in the first place, but if there are special circumstances to reverse such presumption, he can be recognized as possession in the second place (see Supreme Court Decision 73Da1689, 73Da1690, Apr. 30, 1974). As determined by the court below, the plaintiff becomes a direct party to the lawsuit for cancellation of ownership registration, and the legitimate owner of the site in this case was aware of the defendant through the above lawsuit, and the judgment against the plaintiff became final and conclusive, and the plaintiff was liable for registration of cancellation against the defendant as to the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the plaintiff as to the site in this case. Thus, it is reasonable to deem that the possession of the plaintiff's land in this case was converted to the possession in the second place after the judgment against the plaintiff became final and conclusive.

In addition, in order to convert the possession into the possession with an intention to own it again with a new title or to own it to a person who has occupied it with a new title (see Supreme Court Decision 88Meu95, Apr. 11, 1989). According to the records, there is no trace to deem that the Plaintiff occupied the site of this case with a new title or expressed the intent to own it to the Defendant after the judgment of loss became final and conclusive (see Supreme Court Decision 88Meu95, Apr. 11, 1989). (In accordance with the evidence No. 8, the Plaintiff may recognize the fact that the Plaintiff expressed his intention to purchase the said site to the above Daegu Maritime Transportation Agency as part of state property management at the end of March 1986 at the time of confirming the intention to purchase the State-owned land by the occupant of the State-owned land).

Nevertheless, the lower court’s acceptance of the Plaintiff’s assertion of prescriptive acquisition on the ground that the Plaintiff’s possession is not converted into the possession of another owner on the ground as indicated in its reasoning does not constitute an unlawful act affecting the conclusion of the judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the presumption of autonomous possession. Therefore, the allegation in the grounds of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

3. Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition with the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)