[1] In a case where a third party, other than a registered titleholder, completes the registration of ownership transfer by a disposal act involved, the facts and burden of proof necessary to reverse the presumption of registration

[2] Where it is proved that another person affixes his/her seal to a document on which the seal affixed to the person signing the document, the fact of proof and the person who bears the burden of proof necessary to recognize the authenticity of the document

[3] The method to determine whether the act of unauthorized representation or the act of invalidation is implicitly ratified

[4] The meaning of "donation in writing" under Article 555 of the Civil Code

[5] Where a registration of invalidity of cause not based on the donor’s will has been completed, whether a donee may oppose against the assertion that the cancellation of a donor’s contract without written basis conforms to the substantive relationship (negative)

[6] The legal nature of "cancellation of a donation contract" under Article 555 of the Civil Code (=cancellation) and whether the exclusion period is applied (negative)

[7] In a case where Gap and Eul provided the land as a site for the new building of Byung church and expressed their intent to donate it to Byung church, but they did not transfer their ownership to Byung church with Eul's help, Byung's own confirmation document, the donation contract between Byung and Byung church and the church resolution letter to the same effect in lieu of the registration certificate of the land in Gap's custody, and submitted the registration of ownership transfer to Byung church, the case holding that Gap's revocation of the above donation contract cannot be deemed as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith on the ground of changes in circumstance while maintaining Eul's donation portion as it is, and it cannot be deemed that Gap

[1] In cases where a third party is not a direct act by the former registration titleholder, but a third party is involved in such act of disposal, the registration by the former registration titleholder shall be presumed to have been duly made even if the former registration titleholder is the agent of the former registration titleholder. Therefore, the former registration titleholder is deemed to have been duly made. Therefore, the former registration titleholder who claims for cancellation on the ground that the registration is null and void shall bear the burden of proving the invalidity of the registration procedure, such as whether the third party did not have the right to represent the former registration titleholder, or where there are circumstances suspected that the registration procedure has not been duly followed, such as forging the registration document by the former registration titleholder.

[2] If the stamp image of the person in whose name the document was affixed is affixed, unless there are special circumstances, it shall be presumed that the authenticity of the stamp image is created, i.e., the act of affixing the seal is based on the will of the person in whose name the document was prepared, and once the authenticity of the stamp image is presumed, the authenticity of the entire document shall be presumed. However, if it is proved that the act of affixing the seal was done by a person other than the person in whose name the document was signed, the person in whose name the document was affixed shall bear the burden of proving that the act of affixing the seal was

[3] The ratification of an unauthorized representation or an invalidation is a single act with knowledge of the fact that the effect of the act is attributed to the person in question, and it does not require a certain method as to the method of expression of intent, explicitly or implicitly. However, in order to recognize an implied ratification, there must be circumstances to regard that the person in question fully understand the legal status of the act in question and, even if it is possible to recognize an implied ratification, that the result of the act in question belongs to the person in question. Therefore, in determining this, it should be careful by comprehensively examining various relevant circumstances.

[4] The purpose of legislation that limits the donor's right of rescission only for a written donation under Article 555 of the Civil Act is to prevent a donor from decently donating donation and at the same time to clarify the donor's intent and avoid dispute over subsequent days. Although the language and text of the written document itself is not a donation contract, if it is acknowledged that the written document is a document that directly expresses the donor's intention, it constitutes the above document, and furthermore, it can be viewed as a document that is not at the time of donation, but at the time of donation. However, in the case of a written donation contract, it means that the donor's intention to cancel the donor's own property to the other party is expressed in writing to the extent that the donor can be clearly known through the document, which must be expressed in writing as to the donee.

[5] In the case of a gift not in writing, if the performance has been completed, it shall not be set up against the donee as a cancellation. Accordingly, since the donation on land is completed by the offer of the documents necessary for the registration of transfer of ownership and the registration of transfer of ownership is completed in the name of the donee pursuant to the donor's intention, even if the donor rescinded the donation contract after such performance, it shall not affect the validity of the donation contract or the registration of transfer of ownership. However, in the case where the invalidity of cause not attributable to the donor's intention has been completed, it shall not be deemed that the legitimate performance of the donation contract has been performed, and therefore, it cannot be set up against the assertion that

[6] The rescission of a gift contract under Article 555 of the Civil Code is a special withdrawal that does not apply the limitation period of formation right, unlike the cancellation of the original meaning stipulated under Article 543 of the Civil Code, and it is legitimate, in principle, even if the ten-year period has elapsed.

[7] In a case where Gap and Eul provided the land as a site for the new building of Byung church and expressed their intent to donate the land to Byung, unlike the promise, Byung's ownership was not transferred to Byung with Eul's help, prepared and submitted a written confirmation of Gap himself, a donation contract between Gap and Byung church and a written resolution by the board of directors of the same purport in lieu of the certificate of registration of Gap's land which was kept by Byung with Eul's help and submitted the same purport and completed the registration of ownership transfer in Byung, the case holding that Gap's cancellation of the above donation contract cannot be deemed as an abuse of rights against the principle of trust and good faith on the ground that the circumstance changes in Eul'

[1] Article 186 of the Civil Act, Articles 202 and 288 of the Civil Procedure Act / [2] Article 358 of the Civil Procedure Act / [3] Articles 130 and 139 of the Civil Act / [4] Article 55 of the Civil Act / [5] Articles 55 and 558 of the Civil Act / [6] Article 55 of the Civil Act / [7] Articles 2 and 55 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 97Da416 decided Apr. 8, 1997 (Gong1997Sang, 1397), Supreme Court Decision 2002Da27811 decided Jan. 24, 2003 (Gong2003Sang, 916) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 2002Da69686 decided Apr. 8, 2003 (Gong2003Sang, 10829) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 2001Da59297 decided Oct. 11, 202 (Gong2002Ha, 2683, 2089) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 2002Da698497 decided Oct. 29, 2002

Plaintiff (Law Firm continental Aju, Attorneys Lee Jae-gu et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant (Law Firm Han, Attorneys Song Hong-chul et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Chuncheon District Court Decision 2008Na3507 Decided May 1, 2009

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

A. Where a third party is not a direct act by the former registration titleholder, but a third party is involved in such act of disposal, the registration by the former registration titleholder is presumed to have been duly made even if the former registration titleholder is the agent of the former registration titleholder. Therefore, the former registration titleholder is deemed to have been duly made. Thus, the former owner of the property, who claims for cancellation on the ground that the registration is void, bears the burden of proving the invalidity of the registration procedure, such as: (a) whether the former owner was not authorized to represent the third party on the ground that the registration is void; or (b) there are circumstances under which the third party is suspected that the registration procedure has not run lawfully, such as forging the registration document by the former owner, etc. (see Supreme Court Decisions 97Da416, Apr. 8, 1997; 2002Da27811, Jan. 24, 2003; 2002Da46256, Feb. 28, 2003).

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles and records, the court below is justified in holding that the plaintiff's unmanned and signature portion on each of the above documents were falsely prepared when submitting the plaintiff's written confirmation, the gift contract between the plaintiff and the defendant and the church resolution of the same purport in lieu of the certificate of registration of the land in this case kept by the defendant's cooperation with the defendant, while the plaintiff and the plaintiff's wife, who were the first founder of the defendant church and the plaintiff's wife who had been employed as the head of the defendant church, expressed their intent to donate the land in this case as a site for a new building of the defendant church, and did not transfer the land in this case to the defendant, although they did not transfer the ownership in this case, they did not go through legitimate procedures, but did not fit the plaintiff's genuine intent, and thus, the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the defendant as to the remaining 1/2 shares except for the non-party's shares, among the land in this case's case.

B. If the authenticity of the seal imprint affixed to a document is withdrawn by his seal, barring any special circumstance, it shall be presumed that the act of affixing the seal is based on the will of the person who prepared the document. Once the authenticity of the seal imprint is presumed, the authenticity of the document shall be presumed. However, such presumption is broken if it is proved that the act of affixing the seal was done by a person other than the person who prepared the document. Thus, the person who submitted the document bears the responsibility to prove that the act of affixing the seal is based on the legitimate title delegated by the person who prepared the document (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da69686, Apr. 8, 2003, etc.). As seen above, in the registration of the transfer of the title in this case under the name of the defendant, it shall be prepared in lieu of the registration certificate, the document confirming the plaintiff himself and the signature and seal affixed to the plaintiff as stated in the donation contract and the resolution of the board of directors, even if there is no dispute over the identity of the plaintiff's name on the above donation contract and the resolution of resolution of directors.

C. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, we affirm the judgment of the court below that the plaintiff granted the non-party the right to represent the ownership transfer of the plaintiff's share or the right to manage and dispose of the property among the land in this case, or that such right cannot be deemed to exist among the non-party's ordinary household affairs, and further, the defendant cannot be deemed to have any justifiable ground to believe that the non-party has such right. Further, the circumstances cited in the ground of appeal alone do not constitute the confession of the plaintiff's assertion that the non-party has such right to represent. Thus,

D. The court below affirmed the judgment below that the plaintiff's act of non-party's act of non-party's act of transfer of ownership or the non-party's act of non-party's act of non-party's non-party's non-party act of non-party's non-party act of non-party's non-party act of non-party's non-party act should be sufficiently understood and the result of the non-party's act should be recognized to belong to his own, although the ratification of non-party's act of non-party act of non-party's act of attribution is a sole act of which the effect of the act should belong to his own with the knowledge of the act of non-party's act of attribution, and it does not require a certain method as to the method of declaration of intention, explicitly or implicitly (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Da36488, Dec. 10, 200).

The court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the probative value of a disposition document, binding force of confession, meaning of document Article 1, burden of proof, representation and expressions, invalid act or ratification of an act of unauthorized representation as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

The remaining arguments in the grounds of appeal are not legitimate grounds of appeal or are just grounds for lack of legal principles or incomplete deliberation on the premise that there are errors in the selection of evidence or fact-finding, which belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court below, or that there are errors in the judgment of the court below on the premise of facts different from the facts recognized by the court below. It is therefore without merit.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

Under Article 555 of the Civil Act, the purpose of legislation that limits the right of rescission of a donor only with respect to a written donation is to prevent the donor from doing so, and at the same time, to avoid disputes arising from subsequent days by clarifying the donor’s intent (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 86Meu2634, Sept. 27, 1988). Thus, even if the language and text of a written contract are not provided as a gift contract, it constitutes the above written document if it is deemed that the written document is a document that directly expresses the donor’s intention, and further, it can be seen as just for the subsequent written document that is not at the time of donation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 88Da2271, May 9, 1989). Such written document refers to the document that the donor gives his/her own property to the other party to the contract, and it must be expressed in writing to the extent that the donor’s intention is clearly known through the document.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles and records, although the defendant's written evidence Nos. 1, 2-1, 2-2, and 13, which the plaintiff's donation of this case cited as the ground on which the plaintiff's donation of this case was made, are decided to transfer the land of this case to the part of the defendant church at the meeting of the defendant church where the plaintiff 2, who is the chairperson, is present at the meeting of the defendant church, although it is clear in the form of the document that the plaintiff puts his signature and seal on the documents recording the examples or the progress of the meeting or the resolution of the members of the attending the meeting of the defendant church and the plaintiff as the chairperson and the clerk of the defendant church in the capacity of the defendant church, it is hard to view the court below's decision that the plaintiff's act of donation of this case was conducted on the premise that the plaintiff did not go through the registration procedure, despite the promise of transfer of ownership, and that the plaintiff's act of donation of this case can not be seen as a reasonable resolution to confirm the agreement of donation of this case.

As another ground for the above written donation, the gift contract and the resolution of the board of directors attached to the certificate of completion of registration of this case, which are alleged in the ground of appeal, shall not be deemed to be a document containing the above declaration of intent of the above donation, unless the judgment of the court below is deemed to be justifiable, and the judgment below which denied the authenticity of each of the above documents shall be deemed to include the purport of rejecting the defendant's assertion.

Meanwhile, in the case of a donation not in written form, it cannot be asserted against the donee as a cancellation, and since the donation on land is completed upon the consent of the donor by providing the documents necessary for the registration of transfer of ownership and the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the donee, even if the donor rescinded the donation contract after such implementation, the validity of the donation contract or the registration of transfer of ownership thereby shall not be affected (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2001Da29643, Sept. 18, 2001; 2004Da63484, May 12, 2005; 2004Da63484, May 12, 2005). Thus, the judgment below rejected the defendant's assertion that the cancellation of the donation contract not in written form conforms to the substantive relationship of the donor as to the cancellation of the transfer of ownership in the name of the defendant due to the cancellation of the donation contract in this case, which is not based on the plaintiff's written form.

Each part of the judgment below is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to donation and registration in accordance with substantive legal relations, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

The remaining arguments in this part of the grounds of appeal are nothing more than errors in the selection of evidence or fact-finding, which belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court below, or errors in the misapprehension of legal principles or incomplete deliberation on the premise of fact-finding which is different from the facts recognized by the court below, and thus, it

3. As to the fourth ground for appeal

The rescission of a contract of donation under Article 555 of the Civil Act is a special withdrawal that is not subject to the limitation period of right to formation, unlike the cancellation of its original meaning, which is stipulated in Article 543 of the Civil Act. It is legitimate, in principle, even if ten years have passed (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Da1755, Apr. 11, 2003). Although the cancellation of the contract of donation of this case was made 10 years or more after the date of the first donation agreement or the date of the registration of transfer invalidation of cause invalidation, the ownership of the building and the land of the defendant church is the subject of dispute. However, on the land of this case offered by the plaintiff, the building of the defendant church newly constructed by the plaintiff's absolute contribution and the land of this case, which is its site, and about KRW 1.5 million as compensation for its land, and about KRW 370,000,000,000,000 to the representative of the defendant church, even if it can be seen that it constitutes abuse of rights before and after the plaintiff's new donation.

We affirm the lower judgment that rejected this part of the Defendant’s assertion.

The court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the good faith principle, omitting judgment, or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yang Chang-soo (Presiding Justice)