(a) Whether the provisions of a collective agreement that does not stipulate that grounds for ipso facto retirement should be subject to procedures for dismissal of other disciplinary actions, etc., are invalid as it intends to avoid the provisions of restrictions on dismissal under the Labor Standards Act, and in such a case, whether such provisions

B. The meaning of “where the labor-management agreement is found guilty for a criminal offense” as the grounds for ipso facto retirement

C. Whether the provision of “B” goes against the presumption of innocence

D. Where a change in circumstances occurs in which a new disease of a detained worker is released after the reason for his/her ipso facto retirement as referred to in paragraph (b) occurs, whether the reason for ipso facto retirement

A. In a case where an employer provides that a certain reason exists as a reason for ipso facto retirement and the procedure is ordinarily dismissed or disciplinary action, it shall be deemed that a ipso facto retirement disposition is subject to restrictions under Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act, unless the reason for ipso facto retirement is shown as a reason for automatic extinguishment of labor relations, such as the death or retirement age of the worker, the expiration of the term of the labor contract, etc. Therefore, in order to be valid, there must be justifiable reasons under Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act. Therefore, the collective agreement, etc. does not stipulate the procedure for dismissal of other grounds for ipso facto retirement as a reason for ipso facto retirement, and thus, it shall not be deemed null and void because it is intended to avoid the provision on restriction on dismissal under the Labor Standards Act, unless the general procedure provisions are provided as a reason for ipso facto retirement, unless the same reason for ipso facto retirement are provided as a reason for ipso facto retirement, and it shall not be interpreted differently.

B. The case holding that the meaning of "in a case where the worker is convicted of a criminal offence" as the grounds for ipso facto retirement should be determined reasonably in light of the purport of the provision or the contents of other reasons for ipso facto retirement, etc., and it is reasonable to say that the above provision is a case where the worker receives a conviction (e.g., a judgment of conviction) on the ground that "in a case where the worker is unable to provide labor due to ipso facto retirement or reasons for ipso facto dismissal as provided by the labor-management agreement or the rules of employment, where the worker is unable to provide labor due to her nature, 2 where the worker cannot provide labor due to her nature, 3 where the scheduled period of employment expires, etc., the above provision's purport is that "the situation where the worker is unable to provide labor, which is the basic obligation of the worker under the labor contract, has continued for a long time, has continued to do so for an objection against the worker, i.e.

C. As long as the meaning of “in a case where a person is convicted of a criminal offence” as stated in the grounds for ipso facto retirement, it cannot be said that the provision on ipso facto retirement or the provision on ipso facto dismissal of the rules of employment violates the presumption of innocence in the labor-management agreement.

D. As long as the grounds for ipso facto retirement under “B” occurred once, the reason for ipso facto retirement shall not be deemed extinguished on the ground that there is a change in the situation under which a new disease of the detained worker is released thereafter, unless there are circumstances such as cancellation

(b)Article 27(1)(c) of the Labor Standards Act; Article 27(4) of the Constitution;

A.B. (c) Supreme Court Decision 92Nu6082 Decided November 13, 1992 (Gong1993Sang, 135) (Gong193Ha, 1672) Decided May 25, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 1893). Supreme Court Decision 92Da54210 Decided October 26, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 3160). (b) Supreme Court Decision 92Da20712 Decided May 11, 1993 (Gong193Ha, 1672)

Plaintiff 1 and 2 others, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Suwon Industrial Co., Ltd., Ltd., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee and one other

Supreme Court Decision 92Da54210 Delivered on October 26, 1993

Daegu High Court Decision 93Na6356 delivered on July 7, 1994

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. On the first and fifth grounds for appeal

In a case where an employer provides the grounds for the occurrence of a certain reason as a ground for ipso facto retirement and provides the procedure different from ordinary dismissal or disciplinary dismissal, unless the grounds for ipso facto retirement are shown as the grounds for automatic extinguishment of labor relations such as the death, retirement age, expiration of the term of labor contract, etc., the ipso facto retirement disposition shall be deemed as dismissal subject to the restrictions under Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act. Therefore, in order to be valid, there should be justifiable grounds under Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act. Thus, in a collective agreement, etc., the collective agreement, etc. does not stipulate that the grounds for ipso facto retirement should be subject to other procedures for dismissal, and thus, it shall not be deemed null and void by intending to avoid the restrictions on dismissal under the Labor Standards Act. Thus, unless there are any procedures other than that for ipso facto retirement, unless the grounds for ipso facto retirement are provided

This should not be interpreted differently even if the reason for ipso facto retirement is actually the reason for the disciplinary action.

Article 23 of the labor-management agreement concluded between the defendant company and the defendant company trade union at the time of the instant ipso facto retirement stipulates the grounds for ipso facto dismissal and ex officio dismissal separately from the grounds for the disciplinary action. Article 9 of the Rules of Employment of the defendant company provides the grounds for ipso facto dismissal and ex officio dismissal separately from the grounds for the disciplinary action. However, the procedures for ipso facto retirement are not provided.

Therefore, in the case of this case, the provisions of the above labor-management agreement, collective agreement, rules of employment, etc. which automatically state "in a case where one is convicted of a criminal offense" cannot be deemed null and void for the purpose of avoiding the restrictions on dismissal of the Labor Standards Act, and accordingly, the provisions of the disciplinary procedure on the disposition of ipso facto retirement should not be applied. Therefore, there is

2. On the second ground for appeal

A. As above, the meaning of “in a case where a person is convicted of a criminal offense” as the grounds for ipso facto retirement should be determined in light of the purport of the provision or the contents of other reasons for ipso facto retirement.

In this case, except for cases where a worker is convicted of a criminal offense, the grounds for ipso facto dismissal or the grounds for ipso facto dismissal stipulated in the labor-management agreement or the rules of employment (in the case of this case, where the worker has submitted his/her private employee, and it is deemed that there is no intention of reinstatement due to the worker's failure to submit his/her reinstatement due to the termination of the prescribed period of temporary retirement or the termination of the grounds for temporary retirement, and the worker's failure to respond to the request for employment after the absence without permission is converted to his/her occupational soldier).

Therefore, as long as the meaning of “in a case where a person is convicted of a criminal offense,” which is defined as the grounds for the instant ipso facto retirement, it cannot be said that the ipso facto dismissal provision or the rules of employment of the labor-management agreement violates the presumption of innocence.

The plaintiff asserts that the ground for the above ipso facto retirement is "a case where a final judgment of conviction has been obtained for a criminal offense" but the labor-management agreement or the rules of employment applied at the time of the above ipso facto retirement does not have a separate provision that the person detained for a criminal offense is laid off, but in such a case, the company may take a disposition of temporary retirement on the ground that there is an inevitable reason recognized by the company (see Article 21(1)(c) of the Labor-Management Agreement, Article 10.1(1)(d) of the Rules of Employment, but in such a case, the period shall not exceed three months. In addition, the separate provision that the person detained for a criminal offense alleged by the plaintiff is first stipulated in Article 22(1)(c) of the collective agreement concluded on May 1, 191, which was the date of the above ipso facto retirement disposition, and even according thereto, the period of temporary retirement should not exceed the period until the period of punishment has been determined.

In other words, as the Plaintiff agreed on June 12, 1990 that the number of persons under detention should not be determined by the agreement to take personnel measures, the meaning of "where the person under detention is convicted of a criminal offense" should be interpreted as "when the final judgment of conviction has been obtained", but the above agreement merely states that the time when personnel measures can be taken for workers under detention in relation to wage negotiations in 1990 is reserved until the final judgment of punishment has become final and conclusive, it cannot be interpreted that the meaning of "where the person under detention has been convicted of a criminal offense," which means "where the person under detention has been convicted of a criminal offense," which means "when the final and conclusive judgment of a criminal offense has been obtained."

B. Even if the meaning of "in a case where the plaintiff is convicted of a criminal offence" is interpreted as "in the first instance court's sentence on the grounds that it is practically impossible to provide labor, the plaintiff at the time of the instant ipso facto retirement disposition against the plaintiff, as the plaintiff was released by a judgment of suspended execution at the appellate court at the time of the instant ipso facto retirement disposition, it cannot be said that the reason for ipso facto retirement is extinguished on the ground that there was a change in circumstances, unless the reason for ipso facto retirement occurred, unless it is revoked, and it does not cause the termination of the reason as alleged by the plaintiff. In addition, in this case, as the plaintiff in this case, the labor-management agreement was concluded to withhold personnel measures until the determination of 190 regarding wage negotiations as stated by the plaintiff, and thus, once the grounds for ipso facto retirement have occurred, the plaintiff was sentenced to imprisonment with prison labor for a prolonged period of 4 months on June 13, 190 and 4 months on the ground that ipso facto retirement was declared as one of the above reasons for 19th consecutive 16 months imprisonment.

Although the court below's interpretation of the meaning of "in a case where a person is convicted of a criminal offence" is inappropriate, it is reasonable that the meaning of "in a case where a person is sentenced to a sentence in the court of first instance as above, and therefore there is no reason to see any other opinion."

3. On the third ground for appeal

The defendant's judgment of conviction of the first instance court against the plaintiff who was detained for a long time as a criminal offense and did not provide labor, and the reason for ipso facto retirement under the labor-management agreement and the rules of employment occurred between the defendant's trade union and the defendant's company, even though the new disease was not released under the labor-management agreement as of June 12, 1990, it is not a ipso facto disposition against the plaintiff under detention. On January 25, 1991, the appellate court sentenced a suspended sentence for one year of imprisonment at the appellate court on January 25, 199, and upon the release of the new disease, the defendant's ipso facto disposition against the plaintiff on the 29th of the same month is justified.

Although the lower court erred in interpreting the above agreement differently, it is reasonable to have rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that the instant ipso facto retirement disposition goes against the above agreement on June 12, 1990, and therefore, there is no reason to discuss.

4. On the fourth ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, since the court below ruled that the defendant company's ipso facto retirement disposition against the plaintiff is legitimate, it is clear that the court below judged the defendant's ipso facto retirement disposition against the plaintiff on January 29, 191. However, while the court below ruled as above, it is erroneous in the judgment of the court below that the defendant has the duty to pay wages to the plaintiff from January 29 of the same year to June 26 of the same year on the ground that the date when the reason for ipso facto retirement against the plaintiff occurred was June 26, 191. However, in the case of appeal by only the plaintiff, the court below's error in violation of the principle of pleading and partyism is not a legitimate ground for appeal.

5. Therefore, the grounds of appeal are without merit, and all costs of appeal are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Jong-sik (Presiding Justice)