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(영문) 대법원 1993. 10. 26. 선고 92다54210 판결
[해고무효확인][집41(3)민,194;공1993.12.15.(958),3160]
Main Issues

A. The meaning of dismissal under Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act

B. Whether there exists a justifiable reason under Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act even in the case of dismissal due to the nature of the system under the collective agreement or employment rules

Summary of Judgment

(a) The grounds for termination of an employment contract may be classified into retirement made by the employee’s intent or consent, dismissal made by the employee’s unilateral intent against the employee’s will, automatic termination, regardless of the employee’s intent, and dismissal under Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act refers to the termination of all labor contract relations, regardless of the name or procedure that is actually unfavorable to the workplace.

B. Even if a company provides that the occurrence of a cause as a reason for ipso facto retirement and its procedure differently from ordinary dismissal or disciplinary dismissal, if the employer unilaterally terminates the labor relationship regardless of the worker’s will, it shall be deemed as a dismissal under the Labor Standards Act by nature, and thus, it shall be subject to the restriction pursuant to the Labor Standards Act. Therefore, even if the retirement assistance agency for workers was stipulated in a collective agreement or employment rules as ipso facto retirement, the above retirement assistance agency must have justifiable grounds as stipulated in Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act for the validity of the above retirement assistance agency, and if there is no

[Reference Provisions]

Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act

Reference Cases

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Domin, Attorneys Park Jong-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Plaintiff-Appellant

Plaintiff 1 and 2 others, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Defendant-Appellee

Attorney Park Jong-soo et al., Counsel for the defendant corporation-appellant

Judgment of the lower court

Daegu High Court Decision 92Na2722 delivered on October 29, 1992

Text

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. The gist of the facts found by the court below is as follows.

A. From June 24, 1987, the Plaintiff worked as a member of the Defendant Company’s assembly and was elected as the chairman of the Defendant Company’s trade union on February 7, 1990. The Plaintiff, as the chairman of the Trade Union, obstructed the business of the Plaintiff from April 20, 190 to June 7 of the same year in the course of wage negotiations between the labor and management, and was detained on June 13 of the same year on the grounds that the Plaintiff interfered with the business of the company in the course of wage negotiations between the labor and management, illegally opened and operated an outdoor assembly, and operated the demonstration, and was detained on September 13 of the same year by a sentence of imprisonment of one year with prison labor at the Daegu District Court on January 25, 191, and was sentenced to a suspended sentence of one year at the appellate court on January 25, 191. The appeal was again dismissed on June 26 of the

B. According to Article 23 of the labor-management agreement of the defendant company, when a member was absent without any justifiable reason for at least five days, when he/she reaches the retirement age or dies, or when he/she was convicted of a criminal crime, he/she is declared bankrupt, when he/she is declared bankrupt, he/she is retired ipso facto from office if he/she fails to submit a reinstatement within two weeks from the date of discharge, disease, or injury. Article 9(2)3 of the Rules of Employment provides that a person who was retired from office due to the date of discharge, disease, or injury is retired ipso facto dismissed if he/she is found guilty of a criminal offense.

C. In addition, the rules of employment of the defendant company provide that a person who violates the rules of employment under Article 15(2)1, separate from the obligatory dismissal, may be subject to disciplinary action, and Article 15(2)2 provides warning, reprimand, salary reduction, suspension from office, dismissal as the type of disciplinary action, and subparagraph 4 provides grounds for dismissal different from those of ipso facto retirement, and Article 25 of the labor-management agreement provides the same kind of disciplinary action.

D. The Defendant Company opened a personnel committee on January 29, 191 and notified the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff retired ipso facto from office on the same day after the formal deliberation and resolution of the labor-management agreement and the rules of employment, which was sentenced to a two-year suspended sentence of imprisonment for one year in the appellate trial.

2. The judgment of the court below

Under the above factual basis, the court below held that the defendant company's ipso facto retirement constitutes "when it is convicted of a crime" beyond the limit of violation of ordinary rules and became final and conclusive upon conviction, regardless of whether the worker committed the crime in question, it would impair the social reputation of the company and impair the maintenance of corporate order. In addition, it should be recognized that there is clear that such flight occurred and the degree of flight is so great that it would not be dismissed through separate procedures such as disciplinary action, and that the above ipso facto retirement provision is based on the premise that the defendant company is sentenced to imprisonment of more than one type (including suspension of execution), and it cannot be deemed that it has no effect against the worker without any condition, and that the above ipso facto retirement provision is no more than 90 days, and that the plaintiff would have received notification of the dismissal under the premise that the plaintiff would be subject to 9 years' ipso facto retirement without any special action, and that the plaintiff would have received notification of the dismissal under the premise that the dismissal would be no more than 9 days' ipso facto retirement from the appellate court.

3. Judgment of party members

A. In light of the above, the reason for termination of a labor contract can be divided into retirement made by the employee’s intention or consent, dismissal made by the employee’s unilateral intention against the employee’s will, automatic extinguishment made regardless of the employee’s or employer’s intention. Thus, the dismissal under Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act shall be interpreted as termination of all labor contract relations, regardless of the name or procedure that is actually unfavorable in the workplace, which is the second one. Thus, even if the Defendant Company provides for the occurrence of any reason as a reason for ipso facto retirement and the procedure is different from ordinary dismissal or disciplinary action, it shall be deemed as dismissal under the Labor Standards Act in light of its nature if it unilaterally terminates the labor relationship between the employer and the employee regardless of the employee’s will.

Therefore, even if the retirement disposition of this case against the plaintiff was automatically stipulated in the collective agreement or rules of employment, it is a kind of dismissal in the above meaning. However, in order to distinguish from other general dismissal procedures in that procedure, the company's name and procedure are different internally. Therefore, in order for the plaintiff to be valid, there must be justifiable reasons as stipulated in Article 27 (1) of the Labor Standards Act, and in the absence of such justifiable reasons, the lawsuit seeking nullification of the retirement disposition can be filed.

Therefore, the court below's finding that the retirement disposition of this case against the plaintiff was the notification of concept, and did not judge the legitimacy of the retirement disposition against the plaintiff and dismissed it on the ground that there is no benefit of confirmation.

In this case, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit to confirm the invalidity of the dismissal and filed a lawsuit to confirm the invalidity of the retirement disposition, which is a kind of dismissal, shall be deemed to have sought the invalidity of the above retirement disposition, which is a kind of dismissal. Therefore, the claim to confirm the invalidity of the retirement disposition and the claim to confirm the invalidity of the dismissal

B. Furthermore, the above rules of employment or labor-management agreement at issue in the instant case are automatically retired when an employee is convicted of a criminal offense, and if the completion of the labor-management agreement satisfies the above conditions, he/she shall immediately retire. However, as seen above, it should be recognized as a kind of dismissal. As such, the above rules of employment or labor-management agreement provisions can be deemed a legitimate reason for ipso facto retirement, regardless of the form of the above provisions. If the purport of the above provisions is that all cases fall under the above provisions formally and formally, it can be deemed as a violation of the provisions of Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act.

In this regard, it is reasonable to regard the above rules of employment or collective agreement as having an inherent limitation (in-depth restriction) in the case where justifiable grounds under Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act exist, and in such a case, the above rules of employment or collective agreement shall not be deemed null and void because they violate Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act.

C. The judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the retirement as a dismissal, which did not exhaust all necessary deliberations, and it is justified within the scope of this issue.

Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, we reverse the judgment below and remand the case to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-대구고등법원 1992.10.29.선고 92나2722
-대구고등법원 1994.7.7.선고 93나6356
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