(a) Whether the rules of employment, such as rules of employment, are applied to a person who is a full-time employee, retired, etc.;

B. The meaning of absence from work without permission in the case of a former worker

A. Although a worker is a full-time employee, the basic labor relationship is maintained between the employer and the full-time employee, and the application of rules of employment or private rules is not entirely excluded, so the collective agreement is subject to the application of the rules of employment or private rules to the full-time employee, unless there is a special provision or no special practice.

B. Since the labor union’s work is not entirely unrelated to the employer’s labor management, and is more closely related to the formation of stable labor-management relations, in the case of a full-time employee who is exempted from the original work under the labor contract and full-time employee who is full-time employee of the labor union, his work is in a situation where the union’s work can begin at the union’s office where the ordinary union work is performed, and if the full-time employee fails to take the procedure as prescribed under the employment rules and fails to take the above conditions against the employer, it constitutes absence without permission.

Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act

(b) Supreme Court Decision 92Da34926 delivered on August 24, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 2576)

[Defendant-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 3 others

Hanjin Heavy Industrial Manager Co., Ltd., Ltd., Counsel Song-hee-hee, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Busan High Court Decision 93Na8047 delivered on October 27, 1994

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. On the first ground for appeal:

Although the dismissal of the plaintiff under Article 26 of the collective agreement was required to undergo the disciplinary procedure under Article 26 of the collective agreement, the argument that the dismissal of the plaintiff is null and void is only asserted in the appellate brief, and it cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal (the plaintiff's attorney stated this argument with a preparatory document dated September 28, 1994). However, the above preparatory document must be justified in terms of social norms in cases where the collective agreement provides that the dismissal can be dismissed without undergoing the required disciplinary procedure under Article 23 of the collective agreement, and unless it does not fall under objective obvious reasons, the ground for dismissal of the plaintiff must be subject to disciplinary procedure to give a minimum opportunity for defense. It is inevitable in terms of social norms, and it is not objectively obvious that the dismissal of the case without undergoing such procedure is null and void, and it is evident that it did not undergo the disciplinary procedure under the collective agreement, and it does not constitute a separate ground for dismissal under Article 26 (1) of the collective agreement, and it does not constitute a disciplinary procedure under Article 26 (2) of the collective agreement.

Therefore, it cannot be said that the court below did not make any decision as to whether the absence from office under the plaintiff's decision constitutes grounds for dismissal under Article 23 (4) of the above collective agreement, and the above non-party company was dismissed accordingly, in holding that the dismissal of the plaintiff was justifiable. The plaintiff's assertion that there was an error of misunderstanding of legal principles as to disciplinary procedure and omission of judgment is without merit.

2. On the second ground for appeal:

Even if an employee is a full-time employee, the basic labor relationship is maintained between the employer and the employee, and the collective agreement does not completely exclude the application of the rules of employment or company regulations, so it is subject to the application of the rules of employment or company regulations to the employee’s full-time employee (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da34926, Aug. 24, 1993). In general, it is premised on the provision of work under the labor contract at the workplace designated by the employee’s full-time employee’s work place. However, since the labor union’s work is not related to the employee’s labor management, but rather closely related to the formation of stable labor-management relations, it is more closely related to the employee’s work (see Supreme Court Decision 92Nu14502, Feb. 22, 1994). If an employee is a full-time employee who is exempted from the original work under the labor contract and takes full-time employee’s work, the employee’s work can start in the union’s work without permission for the employee.

Therefore, if the facts are found by the court below, the plaintiff's act of misconduct constitutes "when an employee is absent from work without permission for at least seven days a month," which is a ground for dismissal under Article 23 subparagraph 4 of the collective agreement of the above non-party company, is just and the judgment of the court below to the same purport is not erroneous, and there is no error of law in the misapprehension of legal principles as to legal status or absence without permission for

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jae-soo (Presiding Justice)