[1] In a case where a traffic accident occurred due to a truck driver's negligence in the course of business who intrudes the central line along a narrow road, the case affirming the judgment below holding that the driver's negligence on the part of the other driver who did not keep the front line well while driving the vehicle in the state of main taking, is 5:5

[2] The case where the loss of labor ability is recognized due to an abstract disorder caused by a tort

[3] The case affirming the judgment below which held that the presumption of a traffic accident victim's external appearance has a considerable improvement effect to the extent that there have been two anti-salutical anti-salutic and anti-salutic anti-salutic salutic salutic salutic salutic salutic salute

[4] The case holding that where the first instance court's legal brief and purport of appeal, and the appellate court's argument that the initial date of the damages for delay should be prior to the date of tort, the extension of the claim shall be deemed to exist

[1] In a case where a traffic accident occurred due to the occupational negligence of a truck driver who gets left at the center at a speed of 20 to 30 km speed on a narrow road, the case holding that the judgment below holding that the rate of fault of the truck driver and the other driver cannot be deemed significantly unreasonable in light of the principle of equity, on the ground that there was the negligence of the other driver who was unable to avoid the accident or prevent the expansion of damage because he was driving the vehicle under the influence of alcohol concentration of 0.128% due to the driving of the vehicle under the influence of alcohol concentration of 0.128%

[2] In a case where a person’s subsequent disability caused by a tort is presumed to have lost the ability to work due to an abstract disorder, only if such abstract disorder has a significant impact on future employment, job selection, promotion, possibility of change of occupation, etc. in relation to the status of the person who was injured, and the degree of such abstract disorder, gender, age, etc.

[3] The case affirming the judgment below which held that since the abstract of the victim of a traffic accident caused by his appearance has a considerable improvement effect to the extent that he left a scammatic scambling and scambling scambling in the next two times, the operation expenses do not recognize the loss of labor ability for the anti-scambling in addition to recognizing the operation expenses as the future treatment expenses.

[4] The case holding that unlike the description in the column of the claim for change of the cause of claim stated on the date of the first instance trial, in the column of the cause of claim, the damages for delay should be deemed to have been extended in case where the initial date of the claim is advanced as the date of tort, and the purport of appeal and the grounds of appeal also have the same purport

[1] Articles 396, 750, and 763 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 393, 750, and 763 of the Civil Act / [3] Articles 393, 750, and 763 of the Civil Act / [4] Article 262 of the Civil Procedure Act

[2] Supreme Court Decision 90Da9773 delivered on August 27, 1991 (Gong1991, 2412) Supreme Court Decision 93Da35421 delivered on November 23, 1993 (Gong1994Sang, 185) Supreme Court Decision 2003Da39927 Delivered on October 15, 2004 (Gong2004Ha, 1818)

Plaintiff 1 and three others (Attorney Park Jong-chul, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

ELA M&D Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Jeong, Attorney Park Jong-young, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Busan High Court Decision 2009Na4725 Decided November 20, 2009

1. The part of the judgment below against the plaintiffs as to delay damages shall be reversed, and the part shall be modified as follows. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 1 1 1 5% interest per annum from December 25, 2003 to February 5, 2009; the remaining 2,278,269 interest per annum from December 25, 2003 to November 20, 209; 20% interest per annum from the next day to the date of full payment; 5 million won per annum from December 25, 2003 to the date of full payment; 1.5 million won per annum from December 25, 2003 to the date of full payment; 20% interest per annum from the next day to the date of full payment; and 1.5% interest per annum from December 25, 2003 to 4 to the date of full payment; and 5% interest per annum from the next day to the date of full payment.

2. The plaintiffs' remaining appeals and the defendant's appeals are all dismissed.

3. The total costs of the lawsuit are four-minutes, and three-minutes are assessed against the plaintiffs, and the remainder is assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Regarding the plaintiffs' ground of appeal No. 1 and the defendant's ground of appeal

In a damage compensation case due to a tort, the fact-finding or the ratio of comparative negligence should be taken into consideration in determining the scope of liability to compensate for damages by negligence (see Supreme Court Decision 89Meu1275, Jul. 23, 1991, etc.) is a matter within the full power of the fact-finding court, unless it is deemed that it is manifestly unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision

citing the reasoning of the first instance judgment, the lower court acknowledged the facts as indicated in its reasoning, and determined that the Nonparty’s (vehicle registration number omitted) fault ratio of Plaintiff 1 and the Nonparty’s fault ratio of Nonparty 5:5, on the ground that Plaintiff 1 was negligent in avoiding the instant accident or preventing the expansion of damage, on the ground that Plaintiff 1 was driving the instant truck at a driving state with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.128% as well as the Nonparty, driving the truck at a speed of 20 to 30km in front of the same new shares on a narrow road, which affected the central line and left-hand at the speed of 20 to 30km.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above fact-finding or determination by the court below is within the acceptable scope and shall not be deemed considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity. The court below did not err by violating the rules of evidence or by misapprehending the legal principles, as

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2 by the plaintiffs

In a case where a person suffers from a subsequent disability due to an illegal act, he/she may be deemed to have lost his/her ability to work due to an abstract disorder, only when such abstract disorder has a significant impact on future employment, job selection, promotion, possibility of transfer, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Da39927, Oct. 15, 2004).

In light of the above legal principles and records, the court below is just in finding that the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance citing the reasoning of the judgment, on the ground that the plaintiff 1 had a considerable improvement effect to the extent that the plaintiff 1 had a rare anti-scopic scopic scopic scopic scopic scopic scopic scopic scopic scopic scopic s

3. As to the plaintiffs' grounds of appeal Nos. 3 and 4

The allegation in the grounds of appeal in this part is a legitimate ground of appeal, and it is not a legitimate ground of appeal, as it contests the selection of evidence belonging to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court

4. As to the plaintiffs' ground of appeal No. 5

The amount of consolation money for mental suffering caused by tort can be determined by the fact-finding court at its own discretion in consideration of all the circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da41377 delivered on April 23, 199).

citing the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, the court below set the amount of consolation money against the plaintiffs in consideration of the age, family relation, circumstance of the accident of this case, degree of injury, and all circumstances related to the accident of this case. In light of the above legal principles and records, the court below's decision is just and acceptable, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles as to

5. Regarding the plaintiffs' sixth ground of appeal

An alteration of a claim may, unless there are special circumstances, be made within the extent that the basis of the claim is not altered, until the closure of pleadings by the fact-finding court (Article 262 of the Civil Procedure Act).

According to the records, the plaintiffs' legal representative stated that he/she claimed damages for delay after December 3, 2006 in the column for purport of the application for change of the cause of claim as of March 6, 2008 stated that he/she shall claim damages for delay after December 3, 2006. However, in the column for the cause of claim, he/she stated that he/she shall claim damages for delay of 5% per annum under the Civil Act from December 25, 2003, which is the date of the accident in this case, to the date of the first instance judgment, from the date of the first instance judgment, until the date of the first instance judgment, and the plaintiffs' legal representative shall claim damages for delay of 205% per annum from the date following February 27, 2009, which was stated on the date of the first instance judgment, to the purport of appeal from April 3, 2009 to the date of 201.

Thus, the plaintiffs sought damages for delay from December 25, 2003, which is the date of the accident of this case as to the total amount of the claim for damages of this case, and it is deemed that they modified the purport of the claim.

Nevertheless, unlike this, the plaintiffs claim for damages for delay from December 3, 2006 as to the amount claimed by the plaintiffs, and the judgment of the court below based thereon is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the modification of claims, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

6. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiffs on damages for delay is reversed, and that part is sufficient for this court to directly judge, so it is decided as follows.

From December 25, 2003 to February 5, 2009, which is the date of the first instance judgment, with respect to KRW 160,964,09, which was cited in the first instance judgment among KRW 163,242,359, the Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff 1 1 the remainder of KRW 2,278,269, which is the date of the accident in this case. From December 25, 2003 to December 205, 2003, with respect to KRW 2,278,269, which is the date of the first instance judgment, 5% per annum prescribed in the Civil Act from December 20, 209, which is the date of the original judgment, until November 20, 209, and 20% per annum from the next day to the date of the full payment, the Defendant shall pay the remainder of the plaintiffs' damages for delay in this case to Plaintiff 2 and 3, respectively, by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee In-bok (Presiding Justice)