A. Whether Article 181 subparagraph 2 of the Customs Act, which has no definition of origin, violates the principle of no punishment without law

(b) Whether the phrase “import by deception or other unlawful means” as provided in the same subparagraph of the same Article is limited to the case where a license for an invalid import is granted.

A. It is only a specific form of violation of Article 181 subparagraph 2 of the Customs Act that Japan has designated an engine, the import of which is the origin of which is virtually prohibited, as if it were an Indonesia, and it is possible to determine the origin of imported goods by taking into account each of the provisions of Article 53-4 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Customs Act and Article 31 (3) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act, which used the concept of origin, even though it is not prescribed in the law regarding the definition of origin in order to prove that the engine is produced in a country where the import is not necessary, and thus, it is not in violation of the principle of no punishment without the law

B. If an importing license under Article 137 of the same Act is granted to a person who has obtained an invalid import license by fraudulent or other unlawful means, the act constitutes a crime of non-exclusive import under subparagraph 1 of the same Article, and thus, the act of importing a person who has obtained an invalid import license is entirely no longer constitutes a crime of non-exclusive import under subparagraph 2 of the same Article. Thus, the act of punishing a person in violation of subparagraph 2 of the same Article becomes void and causes a misunderstanding of the newly establishing the purport of subparagraph 2 of the same Article.

(b)Paragraph 2 of Article 181 of the Customs Act; (a)Paragraph 3 of Article 53-4 of the Enforcement Decree of the Customs Act; and Article 31, Paragraph 3 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act;

B. Supreme Court Decision 89Do149 delivered on March 28, 1989 (Gong1989, 711) 91Do2011 delivered on February 28, 1992 (Gong1992, 1214) 92Do2685 delivered on February 29, 193 (Gong193, 1028)

Defendant 1 and four others

Defendants

Attorney Gangwon-il et al.

Seoul High Court Decision 92No4158 delivered on April 2, 1993

All appeals are dismissed.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. As to the grounds of appeal No. 1B by the defense counsel of the defendant 1, 2, and 3 and the remaining defendants' defense counsel No. 1

Examining the evidence cited by the judgment below in comparison with the records, as long as it was impossible to import so far as the rush engine produced in Japan that the Defendants intended to import was designated as an imported rush change item and was not recommended to import the manufacture of agricultural machinery of the Agricultural Organization Industry Cooperatives, the above engine, which was produced as a finished product from the automated equipment in Japan in order to pretend that it was imported in Indonesia other than Japan, was dismantled into four parts of engine body, air exhauster, noise, fuel tank, and then re-prefabricatedd into Isra, which is a local subsidiary of the Japanese mixed-do indonesia, and then exported it to this country with the certification of origin indicated in Indonesia, after prior discussions to obtain the certification of origin, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the Defendants’ act of importing 5,00 through five times after obtaining the import declaration form submitted by Defendant 5 Co., Ltd. as the origin in Indones, and obtained the import declaration form as the origin of the Republic of Korea, or by misapprehending the legal principles as to the Defendants’s attempted’s attempted act of origin.

2. Grounds for appeal by the defense counsel of the defendant 1, 2, and 3

With respect to 1A.

It is only a specific form of violation of Article 181 subparagraph 2 of the Customs Act that Japan is designated as an originating change item and is virtually prohibited from import license as if it were an Indonesia, and it is possible to determine the origin of imported goods by taking into account each provision of Article 53-4 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Customs Act that uses the concept of origin, and Article 31 (3) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act, even though it is not prescribed in the law regarding the definition of origin in order to prove that the imported goods were produced in a country where the import is not necessary, it is possible to determine the origin of imported goods, so there is no definition of origin under the above penal provision, and thus

Therefore, the judgment of the court below with the same purport is just and there is no reason to criticize the judgment of the court below on the ground of other legal principles.

3. As to the second ground for appeal by Defendant 1, 2, and defense counsel of Defendant 3

In theory, the effect that the import license should be automatically invalidated under the balance with subparagraph 1 of Article 181, which is a punishment provision for non-licensed import, by fraud or other improper means. However, if the import license is granted under Article 137 of the Customs Act with the permission, approval, recommendation and other improper means, only if the import license is granted under Article 137 of the same Act by fraud or other improper means, it constitutes a crime of non-licensed import under subparagraph 1 of Article 181, and thus, it is entirely nonexistent to punish the violation of subparagraph 2 of Article 181, and thus, the theory of lawsuit cannot be accepted.

The judgment of a party member who is required to bring a lawsuit is not appropriate in this case as the case before the new establishment of Article 181 subparagraph 2 of the Customs Act. Ultimately, there is no reason to discuss.

4. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 3 by the attorney of the defendant 4 and the defendant 5 corporation, since the theory of origin certification issued by the Indonesia was a legitimate document and not a false statement, it does not constitute an import license in an unlawful manner, and the court below did not examine whether the origin certification by the Indonesia complies with the laws and regulations related to the country's origin, or the judgment of whether the origin certification is false or not shall be determined by domestic law. In this case, as long as the origin certification issued by the Indonesia is a false statement in domestic law, it shall be applicable to the case where the import certificate was obtained by an illegal means, and even if the certificate of origin was issued in compliance with the laws and regulations related to the country's origin, it shall not interfere with the establishment of the crime of violating the above customs law.

5. The defendants' appeals are all dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)