Plaintiff (Attorney Cha-young et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Hano Motor Vehicle Co., Ltd. (Law Firm A&S, Attorneys Cho Young-ro et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

October 21, 2015

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2013Gahap536064 Decided December 18, 2014

1. Of the part against the defendant in the judgment of the first instance, the part against the plaintiff's failure corresponding to the next order of payment shall be revoked.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 10,00,000 won with 5% interest per annum from November 1, 2014 to December 18, 2015, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

2. The plaintiff's remaining appeal against the defendant is dismissed.

3. The plaintiff and the defendant share ten minutes of the total costs of the lawsuit between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the remaining amount shall be borne by the plaintiff, respectively.

4. The part on the payment of money under paragraph (1) may be provisionally executed.

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 120,000,000 won with 20% interest per annum from the day following the day of delivery of the copy of the application for modification of the claim as of October 31, 2014 to the day of complete payment.

1. Basic facts

A. The defendant is a stock company that employs 4,500 full-time workers and runs the business of manufacturing and selling cars.

B. On August 1, 2005, the Plaintiff joined the Defendant and worked as an employee (class: director) of the ○○○○○ headquarters (the head of the Defendant’s research institute concurrently holds office as the head of the Defendant’s headquarters) in the Defendant’s central research institute (hereinafter “Defendant’s research institute”) located in Yeongdeungpo-gu, Gyeong-gu (hereinafter “Defendant’s research institute”) from March 1, 2012, and Nonparty 2 worked as the head of the △ Malsung (class: director)’s leader (class: 35 of the total number of team members) from March 1, 2013 to which the Plaintiff belongs.

C. From January 1, 2009, Nonparty 1 worked as an employee of the △△ Design Asian Center (English name 2 omitted) in the Defendant Research Institute.

D. Nonparty 3 is an employee of the Defendant Research Institute’s personnel team.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 7, 88, Eul evidence 7, Eul evidence 9, Eul evidence 9, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Related statutes;

▣ 남녀고용평등과 일·가정 양립 지원에 관한 법률(이하 ‘남녀고용평등법’이라 한다)

Article 2 (Definitions)

The terms used in this Act shall be defined as follows:

2. The term "sexual harassment on the job" means that an employer, a superior or a worker causes another worker feel sexual humiliation or aversion by sexual words or actions utilizing a position within the workplace or in relation with duties, or providing any disadvantage in employment on account of non-compliance with the sexual words or actions or any other demands, etc.;

4. The term "worker" means a person employed by an employer and a person having the intention of employment.

Article 10 (Education, Assignment, and Promotion)

No employer shall discriminate on grounds of gender in education, assignment, and promotion of his/her workers.

Article 12 (Prohibition of Sexual Harassment on Job)

No employer, superior, or worker shall commit any sexual harassment on the job.

Article 13 (Preventive Education of Sexual Harassment on Job)

(1) The employer shall conduct preventive education of sexual harassment on the job (hereinafter referred to as "preventive education of sexual harassment") in order to prevent sexual harassment on the job and to create the given conditions where workers may work in a safe working environment.

Article 14 (Measures in Occurrence of Sexual Harassment on Job)

(1) Where the occurrence of sexual harassment on the job has been verified, the employer shall, without delay, take disciplinary action or other measures corresponding thereto against the offender.

(2) The employer shall not dismiss or take any other disadvantageous measures against an employee who has suffered damage with regard to sexual harassment on the job or who has claimed damage from sexual harassment on the job.

Article 25 (Autonomous Settlement of Disputes)

When any worker files a report on grievance of the matters under Articles 7 through 13, 13-2, 14, 14-2, 18 (4), 18-2, 19, 19-2 through 19-6, 21 and 22-2, the employer shall endeavor to autonomously resolve such grievance, such as entrusting the settlement of grievance to the labor-management council established in the relevant place of business pursuant to the Act on the Promotion of Workers' Participation and Cooperation.

Article 30 (Burden of Proof)

The burden of proof in dispute resolution relating to this Act shall be borne by the business owner.

Article 37 (Penal Provisions)

(2) Any business owner who commits any of the following offenses shall be punished by imprisonment with labor for not more than three years or by a fine not exceeding 20 million won:

2. Where he/she dismisses or takes other disadvantageous measures against a worker injured with regard to sexual harassment on the job or a worker who claims sexual harassment on the job, in violation of Article 14 (2);

Article 38 (Joint Penal Provisions)

If the representative of a corporation, or an agent, employee or other servant of the corporation or an individual commits an offence under Article 37 in connection with the business of the corporation or the individual, not only shall such offender be punished, but also the corporation or the individual shall be punished by a fine under the relevant provisions: Provided, That this shall not apply where such corporation or individual has not been negligent in giving due attention and supervision concerning the relevant duties to prevent such offence.

Article 39 (Fine for Negligence)

(1) Where an employer commits sexual harassment on the job in violation of Article 12, he/she shall be punished by an administrative fine not exceeding ten million won.

▣ 남녀고용평등과 일·가정 양립 지원에 관한 법률 시행령(이하 ‘남녀고용평등법 시행령’이라 한다)

Article 3 (Preventive Education of Sexual Harassment on Job)

(1) An employer shall conduct education for prevention of sexual harassment on the job under Article 13 of the Act at least once a year.

(2) Preventive education under paragraph (1) shall include the following:

1. Statutes concerning sexual harassment on the job;

2. Procedures and standards for handling sexual harassment on the job at the relevant place of business;

3. Procedures for counseling and relief on grievances of workers victimized by sexual harassment on the job at the relevant workplace;

4. Other matters necessary for prevention of sexual harassment on the job.

(3) Preventive education under paragraph (1) may be provided through the training of employees, briefing sessions, meetings, cyber education using an information and communications network, such as the Internet, etc., in consideration of the size, characteristics, etc. of the relevant business: Provided, That where it is difficult to confirm whether details of education are properly delivered to workers because educational materials, etc. are simply distributed or posted, electronic mail is sent, or such contents are announced on the bulletin board

▣ 남녀고용평등과 일·가정 양립 지원에 관한 법률 시행규칙(이하 ‘남녀고용평등법 시행규칙’이라 한다)

Article 2 ( Examples of Criteria for Determination of Sexual Harassment on Job)

Examples of standards for determining sexual harassment on the job under subparagraph 2 of Article 2 of the Equal Employment Opportunity and Work-Family Balance Assistance Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") shall be as specified in attached Table 1.

[Attachment 1] Examples of Criteria for Determination of Sexual Harassment on the Job (Related to Article 2)

1. Examples of sexual words and actions;

(a) Physical acts;

(1) An act of physical contact, such as sparing, sparing, or following sparing

(2) Materning a specific body part, such as her chest, her, etc.

(3) The act of coercioning a person to engage in euthanasia;

(b) Languages;

(1) An act of making obscene agricultural fences or making drinking and talking (including telephone communications).

(2) conduct an appraisal or non-performance or evaluation of the appearance of a person;

(3) Seeking sexual factual relations or intentionally spreading sexual information;

(4) Compelling sexual intercourse or joining a meeting;

(5) Coercing a person to sit next to the door on the door, etc. in a unreasonable manner;

(c) Visual acts;

(1) Posting or showing obscene pictures, pictures, fallens, publications, etc. (including where computer communications, facsimile, etc. are used)

(ii) intentionally exposing or exposing a specific part of his or her body involved;

(d) Other language or behavior deemed to cause sexual humiliations or aversions according to social norms;

▣ 근로기준법

Article 2 (Definitions)

(1) The terms used in this Act shall be defined as follows:

2. The term "employer" means a business owner, a person responsible for the management of a business, or a person who acts on behalf of a business owner with respect to matters relating to workers;

Article 23 (Restriction on Dismissal, etc.)

(1) An employer shall not, without justifiable cause, dismiss, lay off, suspend, transfer a worker, reduce wages, or take other disciplinary measures (hereinafter referred to as "unfair dismissal, etc.") against a worker.

▣ 노동조합 및 노동관계조정법

Article 2 (Definitions)

The terms used in this Act shall be defined as follows:

2. The term "employer" means a business owner or a person responsible for the management of a business or a person who acts for a business owner with respect to matters concerning his/her workers;

▣ 장애인차별금지 및 권리구제 등에 관한 법률

Article 6 (Prohibition of Discrimination)

No person may discriminate against anyone on the ground that he/she has a disability, previous disability, or presumed disability.

Article 47 (Allocation of Burden of Proof)

(1) In resolving disputes related to this Act, the fact that there has been a discriminatory act shall be proved by the person claiming that such act has been committed.

(2) If a party asserts that a discriminatory act under paragraph (1) was not committed on the ground of disability, or that there was a legitimate ground, the other party shall prove that such discriminatory act has been committed.

▣ 민법

Article 750 (Definition of Unlawful Act)

A person who causes damage to another person by intention or negligence due to an illegal act shall be liable to compensate for such damage.

Article 756 (Employer's Liability for Damages)

(1) A person who has had an employee engage in any business affairs using a third person shall be liable for the damages inflicted upon a third person regarding the execution of his/her business affairs: Provided, That this shall not apply where the employer has paid due attention to the appointment of an employee and his/her supervision of business affairs, or where the

▣ 상법

Article 389 (Representative Director)

(3) Articles 208 (2), 209, 210 and 386 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the representative director.

Article 210 (Liability for Damages)

If a representative member causes damage to any other person in the course of managing his/her affairs, the company shall be jointly and severally liable with the member.

3. The gist of the cause of the Plaintiff’s claim (the Plaintiff, via a preparatory document dated February 23, 2015, finally arranged the cause of the claim as follows)

The defendant is liable for damages against the plaintiff as follows, and the defendant is liable for paying to the plaintiff the sum of KRW 120,000,000 as consolation money and damages for delay.

A. The employer's liability for the tort of Nonparty 2

The plaintiff is the defendant's female worker, and the non-party 2 was the plaintiff's superior as the team leader of the team to which the plaintiff belongs. The non-party 2 committed an unlawful act of sexual harassment on the job against the plaintiff in violation of Article 12 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act from April 2012 to March 2013, and the plaintiff suffered mental damage. The defendant is liable for damages against the above illegal act of non-party 2 as the employer.

B. Defendant’s tort liability

In violation of Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, the Defendant: (a) made the Plaintiff, a victim of sexual harassment on the job, in violation of Article 14(2); (b) made a notification of unfair assignment of duties to exclude the Plaintiff from the professional services previously performed by the Plaintiff; and (c) made the Plaintiff’s preparation of a written statement from Nonparty 5 on September 4, 2013; and (d) made a retaliation against the Plaintiff on July 19, 2013; (b) on December 11, 2013, Nonparty 1 was suspected of being involved in the Plaintiff’s unlawful removal of the Defendant’s document from the Defendant’s unlawful act; (c) made a unfair suspension of duties and a standby order on the ground that there is no ground for the said suspicion; and (d) made the Plaintiff liable for damages to the Plaintiff due to an unlawful unlawful act, such as larceny; and (d) made the Defendant liable for damages due to the said offense.

C. The employer's liability against the illegal act of the non-party 3

Non-party 3 is an employee of the personnel team of the defendant research institute in charge of the plaintiff's investigation of sexual harassment in the workplace caused by the non-party 2. There is a thorough confidentiality of the above case. Around March 2013, the plaintiff committed an unlawful act of speaking that damages the plaintiff's reputation in relation to the above case. The plaintiff suffered mental damage. The defendant is liable as the employer for damages against the above illegal act by the non-party 3.

4. As to the claim for the employer's liability against the non-party 2's tort

(a) Facts of recognition;

1) Nonparty 2 is a man of the year of birth (the year of birth 1 omitted) and the Plaintiff is unmarried as a woman (the year of birth 2 omitted). Nonparty 2, as the team leader of Dogggggl team, had the right to direct and supervise its team members, including the Plaintiff, and the primary right to evaluate work performance.

2) On April 8, 2012, Nonparty 2 proposed that Nonparty 2 go to go to the Plaintiff only on the day of the in-house Messenger’s team member, and the Defendant’s head, Nonparty 9, and Plaintiff 3, who is one of his own clubs on April 8, 2012, was in North Korea. At the time, the Plaintiff was in the state of wearing a simple Messen, not on the premise that Nonparty 2 would go to go to North Korea. Unlike the Plaintiff’s expectation, Nonparty 2 took hand to avoid getting out of a dangerous place. However, when Nonparty 2 went to a close door after the Plaintiff’s Messenger’s work, Nonparty 2 refused to go to go to the Plaintiff, including Nonparty 2’s e-mail, even though Nonparty 2 attempted to go to go to go to the Plaintiff.

3) On April 18, 2014, Nonparty 2 offered the Plaintiff with an intra-company alcohol to drink, and had only two persons drink in the part of the head of the Suwon-si. At that time, Nonparty 2, at the same time, provided personal talks with the Plaintiff, such as “Ap and the horses,” mainly in the part of the head of the Suwon-si. After the completion of the foregoing drinking site, Nonparty 2 was able to walked to the Plaintiff only at the time, and the Plaintiff was charged with the Plaintiff’s wife. At that time, Nonparty 2 did not request the Plaintiff to cover off the clothes, but did not request the Plaintiff to cover the clothes, and covered the Plaintiff’s two uniforms with the Plaintiff’s humbbek.

4) Despite the fact that Nonparty 2’s home was commercialized, around April 2012, he was going to drive the Plaintiff to the Plaintiff’s house located in Seongbuk-gu Seoul. At the time, Nonparty 2 was driving, while Nonparty 2 said, Nonparty 2 said to be “Gang-ro,” the Plaintiff. Nonparty 2 offered several proposals to the Plaintiff that Nonparty 2 would take the Plaintiff’s house to go to the Plaintiff’s house at the time of the Plaintiff’s night, but the Plaintiff refused this.

5) 소외 2는 2012년 4월경부터 5월 초순경까지 사이에 사내 메신저 등을 통하여 원고에게 업무와 무관한 사적인 이야기들을 종종 하였는데, 그 과정에서 혼자 사는 원고에게 “◇ 과장 주말에 놀러갈까”라고 한 다음, 원고가 이를 거절하자, “내가 청소를 잘하니, 청소를 해주러 가겠다”고 한 적도 있었다.

6) On May 10, 2012, the Plaintiff was driving his own vehicle to work, and around his retirement, Nonparty 2 requested the Plaintiff from the Defendant’s research institute to work in front of the International Camp of the Gyeonghee University located at approximately ten minutes, and the Plaintiff was getting on and off the vehicle. The Plaintiff was unable to drive the vehicle before the Gyeonghee University International Camp, and Nonparty 2 did not get off the vehicle while Nonparty 2 called “Ising on and off the vehicle.” Accordingly, the Plaintiff was going on to go on and off the vehicle, and Nonparty 2 went on the Plaintiff’s vehicle.

7) On May 11, 2012, the following day, the Plaintiff worked at the Defendant Research Institute and divided the following conversations with Nonparty 2 during the period from 08:11 to 08:15 (the working hours of the Defendant Research Institute are 8:0 am) (the working hours of the Defendant Research Institute are 8:0 am).

본문내 포함된 표 ○ 원고 : 팀장님 저 사실 어제 잠을 잘 못 잤어요. 그냥 이런 상황이 저에겐 좀 불편한 것 같아요. 유부남이신 팀장님과 밖에서 자리하는 것도 문자로 연락하는 것도. 이런 게 이상한 일은 아닌 거 아는데 제가 이상한가 봐요. 죄송해요. 저 이런 얘기 하면 안 되는 거죠. 저 솔직히 팀장님께 미움받고 또 예전에 ☆ 상무님처럼 저 다른 데로 보내거나 괴롭히실까봐 정말 무서워요. 저 이런 얘기 하면 안 되는 거 아는데. 그냥 가만히 시키는 대로 해야 하는 거 아는데. 어제 저녁엔 정말 이런 상황이 너무 싫고 죄책감 느껴지고, 그런데 어떻게 해야 할지도 모르겠고. 그래서 정말 죽고 싶단 생각까지 들더라구요. 근데 정말 팀장님이시니까 저 배워야 할 것도 많고 팀장님께 도움받는 것도 많아서. 저 또 모든 걸 망쳐버린 거 같아요. 저 정말 일 열심히 할게요. 소외 10이랑도 잘 지내고 일도 잘 가르쳐 주고. 팀장님이 시키는 일도 정말 잘할게요. 그냥 평범한 팀장님과 아랫사람과의 관계로 지내고 싶어요. 저 정말 잘할게요. ○ 소외 2 : 아직도 나를 잘 모르는구나. 좀더 많은 대화가 필요할 거 같다. 네가 전에 살아왔던 잣대로 날 보지 않았으면 좋겠다. ○ 원고 : 저 팀장님과 개인적인 대화 싫어요. 불편해요. ○ 소외 2 : 내가 걱정하지 말랬잖아. 애그. ○ 원고 : 저 정말 일 열심히 할게요. 그렇지만 개인적인 자리는 싫어요. ○ 소외 2 : 그래 알았다. 차차 알게 되겠지. 네가 별로 필요하지 않는 걱정을 하고 있다는 것을. ○ 원고 : 왜 제 말을 안 들으세요. 전 그냥 퇴근 후에 팀장님과 개인적으로 연락하고 만나는 자리가 불편해요. 왜 이런 말을 제가 꼭 직접적으로 하게 만드세요. 전 팀장님 팀원이란 말이에요. 싫어도 표현 못하고 제 고과를 주는 사람인데. ○ 소외 2 : 알았으니 마음 편하게 하고.

8) Even after May 2012, Nonparty 2 sent a text message to the Plaintiff, stating that “I are in the process of reporting” to the Plaintiff at the office while on duty in May 2012.

9) 소외 2는 2012년 5월 하순 내지 6월 초순경 원고와 사내 카페에서 아이스크림을 먹으며 대화를 하였는데, 당시 원고가 소외 2에게 야근을 해서 몸이 뻐근하다고 말하자, 소외 2가 원고에게 “내가 마사지를 잘하는데 온몸에 아로마 오일을 쫙 발라서 전신마사지를 해줄 수 있다”고 말한 적이 있다.

10) On June 15, 2012, the plaintiff and the non-party 2 were able to drink alcoholic beverages and food at the right place in the event of a satisfied competition after conducting a erogic game at the Yenggu Team workshop on June 15, 2012. At the time, the plaintiff was not a non-party 2, and the plaintiff was able to sit back on the right side of the entrance. The non-party 2 did not want to face the face of the non-party 2, and the non-party 2 returned the body of the plaintiff, and the non-party 2 said that the plaintiff bucks back the body, and "I am I am."

11) 원고는 2012. 8. 8. 친구인 소외 11과 카카오톡 대화를 나누면서 “나 돈보다 더 이상 이 회사 못 다니겠어 … 다른 건 다 참겠는데 팀장이 계속 찝쩍거리는 건 정말 하루에도 일하다 오바이트가 나올 거 같아 … 내가 왜 신고 안하는지 너 더 잘 이해하잖어” 등의 말을 하였다.

12) On March 4, 2013, at the time, Nonparty 2 told the Plaintiff to “revey,” and continued to “revest,” while making a conversation. The Plaintiff called that “I will attend the company any longer due to the absence of sexual harassment in the company,” and that “I will no longer attend the company even if I will attend the company,” on the next page of the Plaintiff.

13) On March 7, 2013, the Plaintiff told Nonparty 12, who was the highest person responsible for the performance malfunction of the vehicle in which the △△ Group is located, as the Defendant’s director, to attend the company on March 7, 2013, saying that “the Plaintiff was sexual harassmentd by Nonparty 2.”

14) On March 13, 2013, the Plaintiff reported to Nonparty 2, who was sexual harassment by Nonparty 2, to Nonparty 13, a person in charge of sexual harassment counseling in the workplace of the Defendant Seoul Office, as well as to Nonparty 13, a person in charge of sexual harassment counseling in the workplace of the Defendant Seoul Office. Nonparty 13 knew of the above report to Nonparty 6, the head of the Defendant research institute’s personnel team, and Nonparty 6, the head of the Defendant research institute’s personnel management team, notified Nonparty 2 of the suspension of duties and standby order in relation to sexual harassment against the Plaintiff on March 15, 2013.

15) On May 9, 2013, Defendant ○○○○○ Headquarters imposed a 14-day disciplinary measure on Nonparty 2, based on the sexual speech and behavior of “I am sexual harassment that caused the Plaintiff to feel sexual humiliation and sexual humiliation with the sexual words and behavior of “I am going against the inside of the forum” on April 18, 2012, and on April 18, 2012, “I am sexual harassment that caused the Plaintiff to feel sexual humiliation and sexual humiliation for the purpose other than the designated purpose of use.”

16) A counseling center that was issued on June 7, 2013 by the “Psychological counseling center” located in Gangnam-gu, Seoul, which is specialized in psychological counseling, on the part of the Plaintiff, prior to the filing date of the instant lawsuit (the Plaintiff, even after the filing date of the instant lawsuit, received psychological counseling from the said psychological counseling center, and received a total of 44 times from September 22, 2012 to January 25, 2014, and paid a total of KRW 3,960,000 for considerable expenses).

On September 22, 2012, the Plaintiff, included in the main text, filed an application for counseling with the head of the Center as a major lake and marsh for counseling on inappropriate sexual dialogue and friendship with his superior on September 22, 2012, and psychological suffering therefrom, etc. In the course of counseling on 22 occasions as of June 17, 2013. The Plaintiff dealt with this in the course of counseling by asserting sexual humiliations caused by his superior’s speech and behavior, and symptoms, such as inorganic sense, depression, and apprehensions, and deterioration of business efficiency. Although the Plaintiff was at present friendly, it is difficult to provide constant psychological counseling.

17) Meanwhile, the Defendant conducted the education for preventing sexual harassment in November 201 under the supervision of the head of each department once every November. According to the Defendant’s education for preventing sexual harassment, the Defendant stated that the education was conducted by Nonparty 2, the team leader of Nonparty 2, under the supervision of Nonparty 2, the team leader, from November 12, 2012 to 10:00.

18) In relation to the education to prevent sexual harassment in November 2012, the Defendant posted on the “prevention of sexual harassment” column on the bulletin board of the inside computer network of the company killed in action in action in November 2012 (hereinafter “Defendant’s sexual harassment prevention manual”) stated that “where a sexual harassment case occurred, it shall be reported to the head of the department or in-house counseling office, and the procedures for remedy shall be followed.” According to “the guidance note for reporting and remedy of sexual harassment in the workplace” sent to all female employees on November 12, 2012, the Defendant’s total three persons (in the case of Seoul office, Nonparty 13, in the case of the Defendant’s research institute, the Plaintiff, and Nonparty 14 in the case of the Busan office) are designated.

[Reasons for Recognition] The facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 3, 7, 9, 10 through 16, 22, 33 through 38, 47, 70, 87 (including branch numbers for those with a serial number; hereinafter the same shall apply), Eul evidence Nos. 5, Eul evidence Nos. 1, 13 through 17, 19, 20, 26, 75, 97, 107, 110, 116, 132, and the purport of the whole pleadings;

B. The non-party 2's tort (the non-party 2's sexual harassment on the job against the plaintiff)

1) Article 2 Subparag. 2 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act provides that “The term “sexual harassment on the job” means that an employer, a superior, or a worker causes another worker to feel sexual humiliation or aversion by sexual words and actions, etc. using a position within the workplace or in relation to his/her duties, or giving any disadvantage in employment on the ground that he/she did not comply with sexual words and actions or any other demands, etc.,” and Article 12 prohibits sexual harassment on the job.

The requirement of “using a position or in relation to duties within a workplace” under the above provision indicates a comprehensive business relevance, and includes not only the case where a sexual speech or behavior was made by taking advantage of an opportunity to perform duties or a performance of duties, but also the case where a sexual speech or behavior was made by abusing authority or under precluding the performance of duties. Whether a sexual speech or behavior is recognized as having business relevance should be determined by taking into account specific circumstances such as the relationship between both parties, place and situation where the act was committed, details and degree of the act (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Du13414, Dec. 21, 2006).

In addition, in the case of “sexual speech and behavior, etc.” as referred to in the above provision, the attached Table 1 of Article 2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act applies to acts directly contact, sexually speaking, or showing obscene media, such as sexual contact, etc. However, “sexual speech and behavior, etc.” as referred to in the above provision is not necessarily limited to the above-mentioned acts, but is reasonable in light of the specific circumstances such as the party’s relation, place and situation where the act was committed, the other party’s explicit or presumed response to the act, the contents and degree of the act, whether the act is one-time or short, or continuous, etc., to the general and average person in the same place as the other party, so that he may cause sexual humiliation or aversion to the other party, even if the other party does not want it, it is unreasonable to interpret that it constitutes a “sexual speech and behavior, etc. which may not be easily seen as an act of sexual humiliation or sexual pressure between the other party and the other party’s sexual behavior.”

2) Therefore, considering the facts as follows, it is reasonable to see that Nonparty 2’s speech and behavior against the Plaintiff (hereinafter “instant speech and behavior”) as described in the above facts-finding 2 through 6, 8 through 10, and 12 as follows: Nonparty 2’s sexual harassment in the workplace under Article 2 subparag. 2 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act is an act that Nonparty 2 caused Nonparty 2 to feel sexual humiliation or aversion by using his position or sexual speech and behavior in relation to his duties as a superior in the workplace, and constitutes sexual harassment in the workplace under Article 2 subparag. 2 of the same Act; it is obvious in light of the empirical rule that the Plaintiff suffered emotional distress. Accordingly, the instant speech and behavior constitutes tort under Article 750 of the Civil Act.

A) Since Nonparty 2, as the team leader of △△ Group, had the right to direct and supervise its team members, including the Plaintiff, and the primary right to supervise and supervise its team members, Nonparty 2 demanded that the Plaintiff personally communicate or have a meeting with the Plaintiff, it is not easy for Nonparty 2 to present it on behalf of the Plaintiff even if it is evident that it is out of the work.

B) In the instant case, Nonparty 2 is a man with spouse, and the Plaintiff is an unmarried female, barring any special circumstance, and there is no reason to keep personal conversations or correspondence between Nonparty 2 and the Plaintiff having the nature of sexual intercourse, barring any special circumstance.

다) 한편, ① 원고가 2012. 5. 11. 카카오톡 대화를 통하여 소외 2에게 “소외 2와 개인적 대화가 싫고 불편하다, 퇴근 후에 소외 2와 개인적으로 연락하고 만나는 자리가 불편하다”는 등의 말을 한 점, ② 원고가 2012. 8. 8. 카카오톡 대화를 통하여 친구인 소외 11에게 “나 돈보다 더 이상 이 회사 못 다니겠어, 다른 건 다 참겠는데 팀장이 계속 찝쩍거리는 건 정말 하루에도 일하다 오바이트가 나올 거 같아” 등의 말을 한 점, ③ 원고가 2013. 3. 4. 회식 자리에서 소외 2로부터 개인 이름과 함께 “사랑한다”는 말을 연속하여 들은 이후에 옆에 있던 직장 동료에게 “회사 내에 성희롱만 없어도 회사 다니겠다, 더 이상 못 다니겠다”는 말을 한 점, ④ 원고가 이미 2012. 9. 22.부터 소외 2의 성희롱으로 인한 정신적 고통으로 인하여 심리상담을 받아 온 점 등을 종합할 때, 원고는 소외 2의 이 사건 언동으로 인하여 심리상담을 받아야 할 정도의 성적 굴욕감이나 혐오감을 느꼈을 뿐만 아니라 이러한 감정을 소외 2에게 명시적 내지 추정적으로 표명한 것으로 보인다.

D) Furthermore, in light of the fact that the instant speech and behavior was made by Nonparty 2 by Nonparty 2 by presenting to the Plaintiff using the intra-company mailer, etc. at the office while on duty, it is reasonable to deem that there was a comprehensive business relationship between the instant speech and behavior and the performance of duties by Nonparty 2.

E) Although Nonparty 2’s speech and behavior is derived from Nonparty 2’s attitude of ordinary sexual behavior formed by distorted social behavior or unsylled workplace culture, etc. against the women who are fluent in our society, even if there was no sexual speech and behavior directly in the case of a part of the speech and behavior (in this regard, the Defendant asserts that it does not constitute sexual harassment even if he denies the fact of the speech and behavior itself, it does not constitute sexual harassment in light of the relationship between the Plaintiff and Nonparty 2, the place and situation where the instant speech and behavior took place, the Plaintiff’s explicit or presumed response to the instant speech and behavior, the content and degree of the instant speech and behavior, the period and frequency of the speech and behavior, etc. of this case, and it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff and the other party to the instant work are objectively and objectively sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexually sexual.

(c) Relation to performing affairs;

1) The phrase "in relation to the execution of an employee's business, which is the requirement for an employer's liability under Article 756 of the Civil Act," means that when an employee's unlawful act appears objectively to be an employee's business activity, an act of performing an employee's business, or an act of performing an employee's business, without considering the offender's subjective circumstances. In principle, whether it is objectively related to the employee's performance of business shall be determined by considering the degree of the employee's inherent duty and tort, the degree of the employee's occurrence of risks to the employee's loss, and the degree of the employee's responsibility for failing to take preventive measures (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da39930, Jan. 2

However, according to the provisions of Articles 5(2) and (3), 12, 13(1), and 14 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, an employer is obligated to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace and protect the victimized employee from sexual harassment in the workplace in the event that sexual harassment in the workplace has been verified, the employer’s duties pursuant to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act include duties such as the prevention of sexual harassment in the workplace as above in normative terms. Furthermore, considering the fact that a superior who may have an impact on the victimized employee’s business environment mainly engages in sexual harassment in the workplace using his/her status, it is reasonable to view that the above legislative intent of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act is to be practically implemented, separate from his/her paid employee or simple superior, in cases of a superior who may have an impact on the working environment of his/her subordinate, even if the superior did not explicitly receive sexual harassment in the workplace, the prevention of sexual harassment in the workplace against his/her subordinate employee constitutes a normative duty, and therefore, it is reasonable to deem that such act constitutes a superior’s occupational act in the workplace.

2) Considering the fact that Nonparty 2’s instant speech and behavior (hereinafter “sexual harassment on the job of this case”) is related to the performance of duties, it is reasonable to deem that Nonparty 2’s sexual harassment on the job of this case against the Plaintiff constitutes a tort regarding execution of duties under Article 756 of the Civil Act, in itself, as a violation of duties, by taking into account: (a) Nonparty 2’s sexual harassment on the job of this case against the Plaintiff is not a mere superior; and (b) Nonparty 2 is the head of the unit department with the right to direct and supervise the team members and the primary right to perform performance rating; (c) Nonparty 2 is a superior who may have the largest influence on the Plaintiff’s business environment; and (d) Nonparty 2 was provided with education to prevent sexual harassment on the job by the Defendant against the Plaintiff of this case on the job of this case by itself.

3) As to this, the defendant asserted that sexual harassment on the job of this case on February 10, 1998 by the Supreme Court Decision 95Da39533 Decided February 10, 1998, and that it cannot be viewed as a tort related to the defendant's act of performing duties objectively since it has no relation to the non-party 2's original duties. However, the above Supreme Court decision as well as the above case's decision itself was adopted by the amendment of the former Equal Employment Opportunity Act by Act No. 5933 on February 8, 1999, prior to the first introduction of the employer's duty to prevent sexual harassment on the job of this case. Thus, the defendant's above assertion on a different premise is not acceptable.

In addition, the defendant asserts that the relation between job performance of sexual harassment on the job of this case should be denied in terms of the degree of liability for the creation of risk of damages and the lack of preventive measures for the occurrence of damages by faithfully providing education to prevent sexual harassment on the job. However, in light of the above recognized facts and the circumstances of Gap's evidence Nos. 54, 59, Eul's evidence No. 1 and the whole purport of oral argument as a whole, it is insufficient to recognize that the defendant faithfully provided education to prevent sexual harassment on the job during the period in which the behavior of this case was conducted by the defendant, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this otherwise, the defendant's assertion on different premise cannot be accepted.

A) According to the Defendant’s educational programs for the prevention of sexual harassment on the job, during the period of sexual harassment on the job of this case, the education for the prevention of sexual harassment on the job to the employees of Doggggl team, for 30 minutes between November 12, 2012 and 10: (a) during the period of sexual harassment on the job of this case, was conducted once under the supervision of Nonparty 2, who is the team leader, and the instructor is also Nonparty 2, who is the team leader, and it is difficult to view that the education for the prevention of sexual harassment on the job of this case was conducted faithfully by 30 minutes per year; and (b) Nonparty 2, who is the perpetrator of sexual harassment on the job of this case, who is not a person in charge of the instructor, and is not a person in charge of the instructor.

B) In light of the characteristics of sexual harassment in the workplace, it is appropriate to take a measure to separate the perpetrator from the victim, even though the Defendant posted on the “prevention of sexual harassment” column of the inside computer network bulletin board of the company in relation to the prevention of sexual harassment in the workplace in 2012, the “measures to remedy the victims of sexual harassment” refers to the measures to be taken to ensure that the parties can resolve themselves to the maximum extent possible upon filing a report of sexual harassment in the workplace (Article 25 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act provides that where a report of sexual harassment in the workplace is filed in the worker’s workplace, they shall endeavor for autonomous resolution, rather than directly resolving by the Defendant, it does not refer to autonomous resolution between the perpetrator and the victim).

C) According to Article 3(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, where it is difficult to verify whether the contents of education have been properly delivered to workers, such as simply distributing and posting educational materials, etc., sending e-mails, or notifying on the bulletin board, etc., they shall not be deemed to have been provided with education for sexual harassment in the workplace. Thus, the probability that sexual harassment in the workplace against the Doggggggggllllllllll team, which was considered to have been provided by force for 30 minutes from November 12, 2012 to 10:0, was actually distributed and posted, or sent e-mails or announced on the bulletin board, cannot be ruled out.

(d) the existence of reasons for exemption;

1) In light of the Supreme Court Decision 95Da39533 delivered on February 10, 1998, the defendant asserts that the defendant should be exempted from liability unless he knew or could have known of sexual harassment in the workplace of his employee. The non-party 2's sexual harassment in the workplace of this case was committed in a secret private way, and the plaintiff did not disclose it for a considerable period of time, and the defendant did not know it. Thus, the defendant should be exempted from liability.

2) It is difficult to view that the employer could not be aware of the sexual harassment on the job of the employee as an exemption from employer liability (see Supreme Court Decision 95Da39533, Feb. 10, 1998; Supreme Court Decision 95Da3953, Feb. 10, 1998; purport cannot be viewed as an exemption from employer liability that the employer could not be aware of the sexual harassment on the job of the employee; and even if it is determined that the employer could not be aware of the sexual harassment on the job of the employee, it constitutes an exemption from employer liability; although the Plaintiff did not have reported the sexual harassment on the job of the employee during the period of sexual harassment on the job of the Defendant (see Supreme Court Decision 200Da39533, Feb. 10, 200), it is reasonable to view that Nonparty 2 was in charge of the counseling office of the Defendant’s sexual harassment on the job of this case (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Da395320, Feb. 2, 2019).

E. Defendant’s employer liability

Thus, pursuant to Article 756 of the Civil Code, the defendant is responsible for compensating the plaintiff for mental damage caused by the sexual harassment on the job of this case by the non-party 2 as an employer of the non-party 2.

Furthermore, with respect to the amount of consolation money that the Defendant is liable, the amount of consolation money that the Defendant is liable shall be determined as KRW 7,00,000, in consideration of all the circumstances shown in the arguments in the instant case, including the health team, the Plaintiff, the Nonparty 2, and the Defendant’s relationship, the Plaintiff’s age and gender, the content, degree and period of sexual harassment in the instant workplace, and the time when the Plaintiff reported sexual harassment

Therefore, barring any other special circumstances, the Defendant is obligated to pay the Plaintiff damages calculated at a rate of 7,00,000 won per annum from November 1, 2014 to December 18, 2015, which is the date following the delivery date of a copy of the application for modification of the purport of the claim made on October 31, 2014, as the Plaintiff seeks against the Plaintiff, jointly with Nonparty 2, who is the principal of the tort (for one another’s independent obligation arising from separate causes or the same economic purpose, with respect to one another’s overlapping parts, the purport is that the other’s obligation is extinguished due to repayment, etc.) and as the Plaintiff seeks, the Defendant is obligated to pay damages for delay calculated at a rate of 20% per annum from the date of delivery of the copy of the application for modification of the original purport of the claim made on October 31, 2014 to the date of the original judgment that the Defendant’s obligation to perform is reasonable.

F. Defendant’s defense of repayment

Even if the Defendant is liable for the employer for sexual harassment on the job of Nonparty 2 in this case, the Defendant made a preliminary defense to the effect that, under the judgment of the first instance court, Nonparty 2 paid full damages calculated at the rate of KRW 10,000,000 and damages for delay calculated at the rate of KRW 5% per annum until December 18, 2014, and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment, since the Defendant paid full amount after December 18, 2014, which is the date of the judgment of the first instance, which is the date of the judgment of the first instance, the Defendant shall be liable for damages to the Plaintiff on the basis of the employer’s liability for sexual harassment on the job of this case, the entire amount of consolation money and damages for delay that the Defendant is liable for damages to the Plaintiff is extinguished. Thus, it is not clearly disputed by the Plaintiff. Thus, it is deemed that the Plaintiff led to confession under

G. Sub-determination

Therefore, the entire amount of consolation money and damages for delay that the defendant is liable to compensate for to the plaintiff with respect to sexual harassment on the job of this case was extinguished by the repayment of the non-party 2, who is in an in personam joint and several relationship. Thus, this part of the plaintiff's claim is without merit.

5. As to the Defendant’s claim for tort liability

(a) Arrangement of the cause of the claim;

1) The Plaintiff’s ground for the claim is the Plaintiff, the victim of sexual harassment in the instant workplace, in violation of Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. On October 17, 2013, the Defendant: (a) notified the Plaintiff of unreasonable assignment of duties to exclude the Plaintiff from the professional duties previously performed by the Plaintiff; (b) on September 4, 2013, the Plaintiff received a written statement from Nonparty 5; (c) on July 19, 2013, the Plaintiff was subject to an unfair disciplinary action against the Plaintiff; and (d) on December 11, 2013, Nonparty 1 was suspected of participating in the act of illegally taking out the Defendant’s document; (b) issued an unfair suspension of duties and a standby order on the ground that the Plaintiff participated in the act; and (c) thereafter, the Plaintiff suffered emotional injury due to the above suspicion, such as the crime of larceny, etc., and (d) suffered from mental injury by the Defendant.

2) In the case of a corporation such as the defendant, it is inevitable to act through its representative or agent. The effects of the act are limited to the defendant, who is the business owner, regardless of whether the act was done by a representative representative method through the representative director who is the representative representative method, or through other officers and employees. However, in the case of a tort, if the representative director commits a tort in connection with the performance of his duties, it shall be held liable for the defendant's tort under Articles 389(3) and 210 of the Commercial Act. However, if an officer or employee other than the representative director commits a tort in connection with his duties, it shall be held liable for employer's tort under Article 756 of the United Nations Civil Act. As examined below, even if the plaintiff's act of classifying the plaintiff as a disadvantageous measure against the defendant in violation of Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act belongs to the defendant (the effect of the disciplinary action against the plaintiff on September 4, 2013 is attributed to the defendant), the defendant's representative director's act is not based on the defendant's liability for damages.

3) However, in light of the progress of the instant lawsuit, the Plaintiff’s written evidence submitted by the Plaintiff revealed that the Plaintiff was the subject of the act of treating the Plaintiff as disadvantageous measures violating Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, and thus, it is sufficiently able to sufficiently select the Defendant’s employer’s liability on the ground that the Plaintiff’s officers and employees, other than the representative director, took unfavorable measures contrary to Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Accordingly, the Defendant also appears to be against the Plaintiff’s claim and submit relevant evidence and sufficiently guaranteed the opportunity for defense. Thus, this part of the Plaintiff’s claim is deemed to include taking employer’s liability pursuant to Article 756 of the Civil Act, and it is determined as to this.

B. The premise for the determination

1) Persons who have committed the crimes under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act

Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act provides that “the employer shall not dismiss or take any other unfavorable measure against an employee who has suffered damage in connection with sexual harassment on the job or who has claimed damage from sexual harassment on the job.” The term “the employer” refers to an individual, a corporation itself, in the case of an individual, or an employee of a corporation. Therefore, in the case of a corporate company, the term “the employer” refers to the individual, an employee, other than its representative, or the employee, who has suffered damage in connection with sexual harassment on the job (hereinafter referred to as “victim”), shall not dismiss or take any other unfavorable measure (hereinafter referred to as “unfair measure”) against the employee, who has suffered damage in relation to sexual harassment on the job, and the term “the employer shall not be collectively referred to as a “the employer” under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, but the term “the employer shall not be construed as a “the employer” under Article 37 through 2 of the same Act and shall not be construed as a “the employer’s agent or employee, other than the employer’s representative, who shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 30 years.”

2) The meaning of any unfavorable measure as referred to in Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act

Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act provides that an employer, etc. shall not take any disadvantageous measure against a victimized employee in relation to sexual harassment on the job. The term “favorable measure” refers to “in the workplace’s issue raising, etc. of the victimized employee” in itself or in relation thereto (hereinafter “in the workplace’s issue raising, etc. of sexual harassment.” With respect to sexual harassment on the workplace of this case, it is reasonable to deem that the same does not apply to cases where there exist other substantial reasons for having taken unfavorable measures, and that there is another employee to take unfavorable measures. Whether the unfavorable measure against the victimized employee of sexual harassment on the job of this case was based on the issue raising, etc. of sexual harassment on the job of this case. Whether the unfavorable measure against the victimized employee on the ground of sexual harassment on the job of this case was merely a nominal reason for the unfavorable measure on the job, and whether the unfavorable measure was taken as a retaliation against the victimized employee on the basis of sexual harassment on the job of this case before the employee’s issue raising, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000Do1268.

3) The burden of proving the disadvantageous measure under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act

Article 30 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act provides that "the burden of proof in dispute resolution relating to this Act shall be borne by the employer." In civil cases where a worker suffering from sexual harassment in the workplace is liable for damages on account of unfavorable measures under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act against the employer, etc., it is not reasonable to deem that all the burden of proof exists against the employer, etc., and also does not comply with equity. Therefore, it is reasonable to prove that at least disadvantageous measures have been taken, and to allocate the burden of proof to the employer, etc. with the burden of proof as to the fact that there are other substantial reasons for the disadvantageous measures, and the burden of proof should be borne by the employer, etc. (Article 46 of the Act on the Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities and Remedies for Infringement of Rights, Etc. shall not be discriminated on the ground that there is any disability, past disability or disability," and Article 47 of the same Act distributes the burden of proof to the above purport).

C. Whether, on October 17, 2013, notification of work division adjustment to the Plaintiff constitutes an unfavorable measure under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act by Nonparty 8, a director in charge of system engineering malfunction, falls under an unfavorable measure against the Plaintiff.

(i) the basic facts

가) 원고는 2012년 1월부터 공통업무는 수행하지 아니하고 전문업무인 HMI(Human Machine Interface) 업무만을 수행하여 왔는데, 2013년 8월경 피고 ○○○ 본부의 부서 통폐합에 따라 기존 차량 성능 오퍼레이션 산하 □□□□□팀에서 시스템 엔지니어링 오퍼레이션 산하 ◁◁◁◁◁◁◁◁◁◁◁팀으로 소속 부서가 변경된 이후에도 계속하여 공통업무는 수행하지 아니하고 HMI 업무만을 수행하여 왔다.

B) However, on October 17, 2013, Nonparty 8, a director in charge of the system engineering malfunction of the Defendant research institute, who is holding the authority to allocate the work of the system engineering malfunction, was considerably reduced. The Plaintiff’s work on October 17, 2013, which is in charge of the Plaintiff’s management, is finished at the time of April 2014, and the Plaintiff’s work is now underway for a period of one month. However, it is difficult for the Plaintiff to take charge of the actual development project without any engineering experience, and it is difficult for the Plaintiff to take charge of the actual development project,” on the ground that “the Plaintiff’s work is recommended to provide multiple files files to improve and comply with the ISO standards, and file multiple files related to education (the fact-finding work is carried out by each team, but it is multiple files) to encourage the Plaintiff to participate in the project, such as inducing the Plaintiff to improve and arrange the company’s work in relation to the improvement and patent placement (hereinafter “the Plaintiff’s work”).

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 26, 31, Eul evidence No. 119, the purport of the whole pleadings

2) Determination

A) Whether the instant allocation of work constitutes an unfavorable measure against the Plaintiff

In light of the following circumstances, Gap's basic facts and Gap's evidence Nos. 26, 31, Eul's evidence Nos. 119, 123, which are acknowledged as being comprehensively based on the overall purport of the pleadings: ① The plaintiff performed only the HMI's business without performing the previous common business; ② HeMI's business is a specialized business; ② HeMI's business is a non-specialized business; and most of it is a non-professional business; ③ the plaintiff wanted to continue to perform the HMI's business at the time of the instant assignment of the business; ④ According to the system engineering division table at the time of the instant placement of the business; ④ According to the system engineering division table at the time of the instant placement of the business, other employees belonging to the system engineering operation will not perform the common business, or be entrusted with the common business by up to 13 degrees, while the plaintiff's common business is assigned to the plaintiff, it is reasonable to deem the measure of this case to be disadvantageous to the plaintiff.

B) Whether the job placement of the instant case is related to the Plaintiff’s filing of an issue of sexual harassment on the job of the instant case

In light of the following circumstances, it is insufficient to view that the allocation of work in this case is not related to the plaintiff's proposal of sexual harassment in the workplace of this case, but to have other practical reasons, in light of the following circumstances, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it differently. Thus, it is reasonable to view that the allocation of work in this case is related to the plaintiff's proposal of sexual harassment in the workplace of this case as to sexual harassment in the workplace of this case, and there is no other evidence to support it.

(1) At the time of October 2013, the personnel in charge of HMI’s work at the Defendant research institute’s excluding the Plaintiff. The personnel in charge of HMI’s work are also deemed to have majored in engineering. On the other hand, the personnel in charge of HMI’s work are also recognized to have majored in engineering. On the other hand, ① HMI’s work is to study methods in which humans can easily use machinery based on the fundamental nature of human beings, and is not necessarily capable of engaging in engineering. ② In fact, it can be deemed that the Plaintiff was performing HMI’s work from January 2012 to March 2013, including the Plaintiff’s receiving “SP” rating, which is the highest class in the 2012 rating. ③ From January 2012 to March 9, 2012, Nonparty 1’s new ground for experience of sexual harassment on the part of the Plaintiff, which occurred after the Plaintiff’s work experience, not Nonparty 1, 2013.

(2) In addition, Nonparty 8’s another reason for Nonparty 8’s assignment of the instant work, “the fact that the Plaintiff’s work in charge of the Plaintiff would be significantly reduced if it took place on or after April 2014,” does not have any additional HMI work to be granted since April 2014, and appears to be based on the Defendant’s human resources management plan. However, although it is an inevitable measure that the Plaintiff had respected the Plaintiff’s intent, it is an inevitable measure that the Plaintiff had been granted the HMI work again from March 31, 2014, and the Plaintiff continued to have been performing only the HMI work until then, the need and rationality of the Defendant’s human resources management plan, which is a premise for the foregoing reason, seems to be insufficient.

(3) In addition, in the case of the common business that Nonparty 8 agreed to assign the instant work through the instant placement of the work, it did not have to proceed with the instant work, if it excludes multiple files related to education, and according to the system engineering malfunction’s work division schedule set by Nonparty 8 at the time when Nonparty 8 performed the instant work, other employees belonging to the system engineering malfunction are not in charge of, or are in charge of, one to three common duties. On the other hand, in the case of the Germany Plaintiff, Nonparty 8 was in charge of, five or more common duties. In light of the fact that Nonparty 8, who was engaged in only HMI business, a specialized business, was assigned to the Plaintiff instead of granting HMI business, thereby giving the Plaintiff a non-specialized and single-professional common business.

(4) As to the assignment of work in the instant case is one of the “disposition” under Article 10 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act or Article 23 of the Labor Standards Act, a considerable discretion is granted to an employer who is a personnel authority within the scope necessary for his/her duties. However, this is limited to the discretion recognized to the extent that does not violate the mandatory provisions such as the Labor Standards Act or the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Du20157, Apr. 23, 2009). The unfavorable measures under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act are more likely to be taken under the pretext of exercising the discretionary power in personnel affairs as seen above.

C) Whether the allocation of the instant work was not realistic

If an employer, etc. expressed his/her intent to take a disadvantageous measure under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, but fails to realize it, it cannot be viewed as a disadvantageous measure under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Do3891, Aug. 30, 2004). Even after the assignment of the instant work, it is possible to see that even if the Defendant’s assertion that the allocation of the instant work is not realistic even if it is preliminaryly against the Defendant’s assertion that the Plaintiff continued to perform his/her work, and the Plaintiff did not have been unfairly excluded from the existing HMI’s work, it is possible to view this as a result.

In light of the following circumstances, Gap's evidence Nos. 52, 63, Eul's evidence Nos. 119, 123, 138, 151, and 152 and the overall purport of the arguments, namely, ① after the plaintiff was notified by non-party 8 of the assignment of the work of this case from November 13, 2013 to December 11, 2013, the plaintiff performed various education-related files newly granted as well as the previous work of this case. ② The plaintiff's failure to perform other common work of this case during the above period is due to the fact that the other common work of this case did not have to proceed with the other common work of this case. ③ The plaintiff's withdrawal of the assignment of the work of this case from 200 to 10.3, 2013 to 31, 201, 3.4, 201, 21, 201, 3.4, 2013.

3) Sub-determination

Ultimately, the assignment of the instant work against the Plaintiff on October 17, 2013 by Nonparty 8 constitutes a disadvantageous measure under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, and this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion is with merit.

D. Whether a disciplinary action taken against the Plaintiff on September 4, 2013 by Defendant ○○○○ Headquarters head constituted a disadvantageous measure under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act

(i) the basic facts

A) Article 41 of the Rules of Employment of the defendant provides that "where a member falls under any of the following subparagraphs, a disciplinary action may be taken against him/her" and subparagraph 1 of the Rules of Employment provides that "where a member commits an illegal act which causes criminal prosecution," subparagraph 2 thereof, "in violation of a pledge or a provision of a company," and subparagraph 15 thereof, "where there is a need to take other disciplinary action," and Article 49 provides that "where a member performs his/her duties, he/she shall strictly observe the following matters in performing his/her duties, he/she shall clarify the division of the corporation, respect the other party's personality, and put him/her in honor and in friendship."

B) On August 21, 2013 and August 27, 2013, Nonparty 4 held a disciplinary committee on the two occasions on August 21, 2013. On September 4, 2013, the Plaintiff was subject to the resolution of the disciplinary committee on August 27, 2013, and on September 4, 2013, the Plaintiff’s disciplinary action against the Plaintiff (hereinafter “instant disciplinary action”) against the Nonparty 5, who is the assistant staff of the ○○○○○ Headquarters, from June 11:40 to December 12:15, 2013, in the office and conference room from June 24, 2013 to Nonparty 5, who is the assistant staff of the ○○○ Group, of the ○○○○○ Group, was the head of the party at present, and the “an act of receiving a written statement without obligation from Nonparty 5” (hereinafter “instant disciplinary action”) constituted the Defendant’s disciplinary action under Article 41 subparag. 15 and 4 subparag. 41.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap's statements in Gap's 24, 48, and 60, the purport of the whole pleadings

2) Determination

A) Comprehensively taking account of the respective descriptions of evidence Nos. 25, 48, 60, and 63 as well as the overall purport of oral argument, the Plaintiff rendered an application for remedy against the instant disciplinary action to the Gyeonggi Regional Labor Relations Commission on October 15, 2013, and the Gyeonggi Regional Labor Relations Commission rendered a decision recognizing the Plaintiff’s application for remedy on December 4, 2013. ② The Defendant filed an application for review with the National Labor Relations Commission on January 6, 2014, but the National Labor Relations Commission rejected the application for disciplinary action against the Plaintiff on March 17, 2014 by Nonparty 5 on the ground that the Plaintiff’s refusal to comply with the instant request for disciplinary action by Nonparty 2 cannot be seen as having rejected the Defendant’s request for disciplinary action on the ground that Nonparty 1 did not appear to have been subject to disciplinary action on the ground that the Plaintiff’s refusal to comply with the instant request for disciplinary action by Nonparty 2 was unreasonable. Meanwhile, in light of the fact that the Defendant did not appear to have any ground for disciplinary action against the Plaintiff’s disciplinary action.

B) However, when comprehensively considering the following circumstances, Gap's evidence Nos. 25, 48, 60, 89, 100, Eul's evidence Nos. 31, 40, and 110, and Eul's evidence Nos. 31, 40, and 110 and the testimony of non-party No. 17 of the first instance trial witness, it is reasonable to see that the instant disciplinary action was based on the instant action not related to the plaintiff's filing of problems against sexual harassment in the workplace of this case, but on the other hand, it can be viewed as a separate case. Thus, the instant disciplinary action does not constitute an unfavorable measure under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, and thus, the plaintiff's assertion in this part is rejected.

(1) At least from June 24, 2013 to December 12:15, 2013, in the process of receiving a written statement from Nonparty 5, who is an employee of △△ Group, within the Defendant’s research institute, Nonparty 5 saying, “If Nonparty 5 does not want to do so promptly in the family register, it would be said that the Plaintiff would bring about a complaint if he goes against the other person’s reputation while harming the other person.” The realization of harm and injury notified in the crime of intimidation does not necessarily require that the act itself is unlawful (see Supreme Court Decision 91Do2344, Nov. 26, 191; Supreme Court Decision 91Do2344, Apr. 16, 199; Supreme Court Decision 200Do414466, Apr. 16, 196; Supreme Court Decision 2008Do1484, Apr. 4, 196).

(2) In addition, the instant act did not occur before or after the Defendant’s filing of a problem with regard to sexual harassment on the job of this case, and it did not actively detection of the fact that the Defendant committed the instant act by the Plaintiff. Nonparty 5 received consultation with Nonparty 18, a representative of the employee representative committee belonging to the Defendant’s trade union, on June 25, 2013, on the Plaintiff’s instant act, and subsequently Nonparty 18 did not receive a written statement from the Plaintiff, even after Nonparty 1 went through a face-to-face meeting between the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff, and Nonparty 18 did not receive a written statement from the Plaintiff on June 28, 2013, and requested the Defendant’s personnel management team to resolve the Plaintiff’s grievances related to the instant act through Nonparty 18 to the Plaintiff.

(3) Furthermore, on August 27, 2013, in order to ensure the fairness of deliberation and resolution at the time of the meeting of the second disciplinary committee, Defendant 2’s headquarters attended Nonparty 5 and Nonparty 19’s non-party 18’s statement as a witness, and made the statement as a witness, and Nonparty 5 respondeded to Nonparty 5’s question as to whether the member of the disciplinary committee would have a mind to see the Plaintiff, and Nonparty 5 should be punished against the Plaintiff’s mistake. The head of Defendant 200 headquarters appears to have been in a situation where Nonparty 5’s position could not be considered, and at the same time, Nonparty 19 and the head of the non-party 19 present as a witness at the time of the meeting of other witnesses to “the Plaintiff (a seal affixed by Nonparty 5’s written statement) did not hear the Plaintiff’s legitimate evidence, and the Plaintiff’s act did not appear to have “the Plaintiff’s oral statement” to the effect that the Plaintiff’s statement was not a legitimate witness.

(4) Meanwhile, unless otherwise provided for in the rules of employment or disciplinary regulations, an employee subject to disciplinary action cannot be held as a matter of course to guarantee the right to attend a disciplinary procedure on behalf of the employer. Since there is no provision guaranteeing the right of an employee subject to disciplinary action to attend a disciplinary procedure by joining an attorney-at-law, Defendant ○○ Headquarters cannot be deemed as having procedural defect that the Plaintiff refused to act as an attorney-at-law in holding the disciplinary committee (it is not a direct issue, but the Supreme Court Decision 2014Du44045 Decided February 12, 2015 and its second instance judgment, which is the Seoul High Court Decision 2014Nu40526 Decided October 2, 2014, and the Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2013Gu680 Decided December 20, 2013, which is the first instance judgment, the Plaintiff did not hold a disciplinary action on the ground that the Plaintiff did not appear to have sufficient opportunity to attend the disciplinary committee, and therefore, the Plaintiff did not appear to be present at the Plaintiff’s 20.

(5) Unlike the above opinion, considering that the Plaintiff’s act stated in the instant disciplinary cause may be subject to criminal punishment, Defendant ○○○○ Headquarters’s procedural defect in refusing to act with the Plaintiff’s attorney at the time of holding the disciplinary committee on August 21, 2013, it is difficult to conclude that the instant disciplinary action constitutes a ground to suspect that the instant disciplinary action is related to the Plaintiff’s raising of problem with regard to sexual harassment on the job of this case, aside from the fact that it acts as a defect in the instant disciplinary action itself.

(6) Meanwhile, according to Article 6 of the Defendant’s disciplinary provision, the chairman of the Defendant’s ○○○ Headquarters Disciplinary Committee is entrusted to the chief of the headquarters, but there is a problem that it is difficult to interpret and translate, etc., and Nonparty 4, the chief of the headquarters, delegated his authority to Nonparty 16, the deputy chief of the headquarters, and Nonparty 16, the managing director of Nonparty 16, the chairman of the Plaintiff’s Disciplinary Committee. Therefore, it is difficult to deem this to

E. Whether a disciplinary measure taken against Nonparty 1 on July 19, 2013 by Nonparty 7, who is the head of the △△△ Design Center (English name 2 omitted), constitutes a disadvantageous measure under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act

(i) the basic facts

On July 19, 2013, Nonparty 7, the head of the △△ Asian Design Center (English name 2 omitted), was subject to one week of suspension from office for Nonparty 1, on the ground that “the number of hours Nonparty 1’s non-compliance with the working hours of eight hours from January 14, 2013 to June 26, 2013 without the approval of the head of the department from 48 times, etc., the number of non-party 1’s failure to comply with the working hours without the approval of the head of the department from 48 times, etc.” was subject to the Defendant’s disciplinary action under one week of suspension from office on the ground that the Defendant’s act constitutes the grounds for disciplinary action under Article 41 subparag. 2, 10,

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 27 and 88, the purport of the whole pleadings

2) Determination

A) The Plaintiff, after reporting his sexual harassment on the job of this case to the Defendant by Nonparty 1, gave advice to the Plaintiff by Nonparty 1. The Plaintiff asserted that the above disciplinary action was taken against Nonparty 1 who assisted the Plaintiff as a retaliation on the part of the △△ Design Asian Center against the Plaintiff in order to dismiss the Plaintiff from the club fee, and that it constitutes a disadvantageous measure under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act.

B) Taking unfavorable measures under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act by either the lives or the employer, etc. correspond to the elements of Article 37(2)2 of the same Act, which are the Criminal Act, and the expanded interpretation or analogical interpretation of Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act unfavorable to the employer, etc. is not in violation of the principle of no punishment without the law. Since the subject of disadvantageous measures under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act is the victimized employee himself/herself, in case of a third party who is not the victimized employee as in the instant disposition, even if the third party helps the victimized employee in relation to sexual harassment on the job, it is reasonable to deem that the subject of disadvantageous measures under Article 14(2) of the same Act cannot be the subject of disadvantageous measures under this Act even if the third party

C) Therefore, this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion, which is based on the different premise, cannot be accepted without further review.

F. On December 11, 2013, the non-party 6, who is the head of the personnel team of the defendant research institute, was suspended from office and standby order against the plaintiff on December 11, 2013, and whether the complaint filed around that time constitutes a disadvantageous measure under Article 14(2)

(i) the basic facts

On December 11, 2013, Nonparty 6, the head of the personnel team of the Defendant research institute, notified the Plaintiff of the suspension of duties and standby order (hereinafter “instant suspension of duties and standby order”) from December 12, 2013 to the time the suspension of duties and standby order is terminated, on the ground that the Plaintiff’s act of illegally taking out the Defendant’s document from the office of the △△△ Design Center on December 6, 2013 (hereinafter “instant complaint”) is likely to constitute a disciplinary cause, such as the act causing criminal prosecution.” At that time, Nonparty 6, the head of the Defendant research institute, notified the Plaintiff of the suspension of duties and standby order (hereinafter “instant suspension of duties and standby order”), and filed the Plaintiff for the crime of larceny (hereinafter “instant complaint”).

[Ground of recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence No. 52, the purport of the whole pleadings

2) Determination

A) On June 30, 2014, the Plaintiff asserted to the effect that, in light of the purport of the entire argument in the statement of evidence No. 77, the Plaintiff was subject to a disposition of Non-Party 1 on the part of Non-Party 1 on the part of Non-Party 1 on the part of Non-Party 1 upon receiving a request from the public prosecutor in charge of the instant complaint case on June 30, 2014 that “the Plaintiff was on the part of Non-Party 1 for taking out Non-Party 1’s animals on the part of Non-Party 1, and was on the part of Non-Party 1 on the part of Non-Party 1, and that there was a fact that Non-Party 1 had been on the part of Non-Party 1 on the part of Non-Party 1. The assertion of Non-Party 1 also supported the Plaintiff’s assertion. It is difficult to view that the CCTV and the Kakao Akao

B) However, considering the following circumstances, considering Gap evidence Nos. 101, Eul-B, 45 through 59, 96, 106, 110, 140 through 143's testimony and images, non-party 17's testimony of the first instance trial witness, and the whole purport of the present court's inspection result, it is deemed that there is a considerable reason to suspect that the plaintiff is suspected of being suspected of being suspected of being a key issue. Thus, it is reasonable to deem that non-party 6, the head of the personnel research institute of the defendant, filed the instant case's suspension of duties and standby order and the instant complaint based on the suspicion of a key issue that may be separate from the plaintiff's issue issue, and therefore, the instant case's suspension of duties and standby order do not constitute a disadvantageous measure under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Accordingly, the plaintiff's assertion in this part is not accepted.

(1) On October 15, 2013, Nonparty 1 filed an application for remedy with the Gyeonggi Regional Labor Relations Commission on the disciplinary action against himself/herself, and was judged to have cited an application for remedy from the Gyeonggi Regional Labor Relations Commission on December 4, 2013.

(2) However, the defendant alleged that part of the evidentiary documents submitted by the non-party 1 to the Gyeonggi Regional Labor Relations Commission in the case of the above request for remedy contains suspicion that it could not be acquired in a normal way.

(3) Accordingly, the Defendant’s representative director sent an e-mail notice from December 9, 2013 to the suspension of duties and standby issuance order directly to Nonparty 1, 2013, on the ground that “the suspicion, etc., submitted to the Gyeonggi Regional Labor Relations Commission without the consent of the person who has the authority to obtain data by illegal or illegal means in the above request for remedy, is likely to constitute a disciplinary cause, such as criminal prosecution,” pursuant to Article 48 of the Defendant’s Rules of Employment (Article 48 of the Defendant’s Rules of Employment provides that the representative director or the person who has the authority to obtain the authority to issue a disciplinary action, may immediately prohibit the person subject to disciplinary action from performing his/her duties on his/her oral or documentary basis, even before the decision of disciplinary action is made, and immediately after the transmission of the above e-mail, the head of the Defendant research institute’s personnel team sent the notice of suspension of duties and standby issuance directly to Nonparty 20.”

(4) By December 9, 2013, the notice of suspension of duties and standby order was written that the company’s computer and other equipment related to the company’s business should be returned to the relevant department and requested to be returned, and Nonparty 20 also verbally delivered up to December 9, 2013 to the relevant department the goods should be disposed of by December 12, 200.

(5) After being notified of the suspension of duties and the standby order, Nonparty 1 sent a text message to Nonparty 17, the head of the △△ Design Center’s office, who was in charge of personnel management of the Defendant’s research institute, sent out a large quantity of data stored in the company’s computer for two consecutive hours, and Nonparty 7, the head of the △△△ Design Center’s office, who was in charge of managing the Defendant’s confidential documents around 18:30 on the same day, sent it to Nonparty 17, who was the head of the △△△ Design Center’s office.

(6) Meanwhile, between 17:49 and 18:11 on the same day, the Plaintiff received text messages from Nonparty 1, “I am the same as Kakaooo Kaooo Kaooooo .......... the head of the division now needs to go?” On the same day, Nonparty 1 was waiting for Nonparty 1 at the entrance of △△△ Design Center from around 18:33 on the same day, and Nonparty 1 moved to the vehicle of Nonparty 1 while waiting for Nonparty 1 at the entrance of the △△△△ Design Center.

(7) At around 19:00 on the same day, Nonparty 1 was driving his own vehicle with the head of the conciliation division and was under security inspection. At the time, Nonparty 1 and the Plaintiff did not actively cooperate with the Defendant’s personnel team employees at the time when Nonparty 1 and the Plaintiff did not actively cooperate. Ultimately, Nonparty 1 called the Defendant’s personnel team employees, the Plaintiff, and Nonparty 1 were dispatched by the police upon the report by the Plaintiff and Nonparty 1, and went to the nearby police box.

(8) In the box box, Nonparty 1 returned part of the documents recognized as the Defendant’s document to the Defendant’s personnel team employees, and the remaining documents were kept in the box box by means of a conflict of opinion between the Defendant’s personnel team employees and Nonparty 1.

(9) Although Nonparty 1 was notified of the suspension of duties and standby order on the grounds of the suspicion of illegal leakage of the Defendant’s data, the Defendant’s personnel team determined that Nonparty 1 was guilty of having attempted to illegally carry out another Defendant’s documents again, based on the fact that Nonparty 1 did not cooperate with the Defendant’s personnel team employees’ request for document confirmation on the date of receipt of the notification, and that Nonparty 1 did not actively cooperate with the Defendant’s personnel team employees’ request for document confirmation. Furthermore, in the case of the Plaintiff, Nonparty 1 was waiting for Nonparty 1 before the △△ Design Center Office, and Nonparty 1 was moved to Nonparty 1’s vehicle at the time of the security inspection at the Defendant’s research institute’s emotional room, and Nonparty 1 was moved to Nonparty 1’s vehicle at the time of the security inspection at the Defendant’s research institute’s emotional room, and Nonparty 1 did not actively cooperate with Nonparty 1 at the Defendant’s personnel team employees’ request for document confirmation.

(10) Accordingly, on December 11, 2013, Nonparty 6, the head of the Defendant research institute’s personnel team, filed the instant complaint with the Plaintiff on the ground of the charge of the issue.

(11) In the case where the defendant's complaint was filed by the non-party 1 against the non-party 1 as larceny on the basis of the suspicion of taking out the defendant's document as of December 6, 2013, the prosecutor in charge issued a disposition of suspending indictment on June 30, 2014 on the ground that "it is recognized that the non-party 1 brought about the defendant's document, but the fact that the non-party 1 was guilty of larceny, upon being notified of the suspension of duties and the issuance of a standby order, the non-party 1's document was brought to the non-party 1's book and the documents in the West, which could not be taken out of the office, and the non-party 1 could not take out to the outside, but the documents brought to the non-party 1 were seized or returned to the defendant."

(12) On October 28, 2014, the Defendant brought an appeal against the foregoing suspension of indictment, and the prosecutor in charge of the Seoul High Prosecutor’s Office ordered the suspension of indictment against Nonparty 1 to re-examine the same.

(13) Meanwhile, Nonparty 1 filed an adjudication on constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (2014Hun-Ma574) on the disposition of suspending indictment. On February 26, 2015, the Constitutional Court rendered a decision to revoke the disposition of suspending indictment on the grounds that it is difficult to recognize the intention of the thief’s intentional theft or illegal acquisition, even though Nonparty 1 took part of the Defendant’s document on December 6, 2013.

G. Sub-determination

On October 17, 2013, the head of the system engineering malfunction department of the Defendant research institute, Nonparty 8, the head of the Defendant’s system engineering malfunction, committed against the Plaintiff on October 17, 2013, with regard to the execution of its business affairs, the allocation of the instant work against the said Plaintiff constitutes an unlawful act that constitutes a disadvantageous measure under Article 14(2) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, and thereby, the Plaintiff suffered mental loss is obvious in light of the empirical rule. Therefore, pursuant to Article 756 of the Civil Act, the Defendant is the employer of Nonparty 8, who is the employer of Nonparty 8, and is liable for the Plaintiff’s mental damage incurred

Furthermore, with respect to the amount of consolation money that the Defendant is liable for compensation, there is no significant meaning to prohibit the employer, etc. from taking disadvantageous measures against the victimized employee in relation to the raising of the risk of sexual harassment in the workplace when the victimized employee is subjected to disadvantageous measures from the employer, etc. after raising a problem about sexual harassment in the workplace. This leads to the result of raising the risk of sexual harassment in the workplace. In order to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace, it cannot be said that it is very important to prohibit the employer, etc. from taking disadvantageous measures against the victimized employee in relation to the raising of the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace. ② In light of the structural characteristics of the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace as seen above, our legislators prohibit the employer, etc. from taking disadvantageous measures against the victimized employee in relation to the raising of the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace, and instead, provide that the employer, etc. shall make compensation for such disadvantageous measures as stipulated in Article 14(2)2 of the Equal Employment Opportunity in the workplace without taking account of the overall circumstances related to the Defendant’s sexual harassment in the workplace, etc.

Ultimately, as the employer of Nonparty 8, the Defendant is obligated to pay consolation money of KRW 7,00,000 to Nonparty 8’s illegal acts related to the performance of the above affairs and damages for delay calculated at the rate of 5% per annum as stipulated in the Civil Act from November 1, 2014 to December 18, 2015, which is the day following the day of service of a copy of the application for modification of the purport of the claim as of October 31, 2014, which is the day of service of the Plaintiff’s request for modification of the purport of the claim as of this case, until December 18, 2015, which is the day of the ruling of the first instance, and twenty percent per annum from the following day to the day of full payment.

6. As to the claim for the employer's liability against the tort committed by the non-party 3

(a) Facts of recognition;

1) In relation to education for prevention of sexual harassment on the job in 2012, the “measures to remedy and cope with sexual harassment victims” posted by the Defendant on the “prevention of sexual harassment” column of the inside computer network bulletin board of the company in question is to investigate the content of sexual harassment on the job in a prompt, fair, and accurate manner under the status of thoroughly maintaining confidentiality when the occurrence of sexual harassment on the job is reported. In addition, when the investigation is completed, it is required to notify the victim and the perpetrator of the results of the investigation and disclose

2) The personnel team of the Defendant research institute performed the duties of investigating sexual harassment in the workplace from March 15, 2013 to April 29, 2013. Nonparty 3, as an employee of the Defendant research institute’s personnel team, took charge of part of the said investigation duties by converting the Plaintiff and Nonparty 2’s written statement into English.

3) On March 2013, Nonparty 3, who started an investigation into sexual harassment in the workplace of this case, divided the following opinions: (a) Nonparty 21 (a staff member of the Plaintiff and Nonparty 22 (a staff member of the Defendant Research Institute operating the Defendant Research Institute with Nonparty 3, along with Nonparty 3) who was asked Nonparty 21 about the investigation into sexual harassment in the workplace of this case; and (b) Nonparty 21 and Nonparty 21, who were subject to questioning about the investigation into sexual harassment in the workplace of this case; and (c) who was able to interpret “sexual harassment is most disadvantageous to the male, because there is a lot of cases where the male does not know himself/herself; and (d) Nonparty 3 did not unilaterally criticize Nonparty 23 of this case’s sexual harassment in the workplace of this case.” In addition, Nonparty 3 and Defendant 23, an employee of the Defendant Research Institute engaging in the activities of the Defendant Research Institute on March 29, 2013.

4) Although Nonparty 3 did not state the Plaintiff’s real name in making the above remarks, at the time of Nonparty 3’s remarks, Nonparty 3 had already reported sexual harassment in the instant workplace within the Defendant Research Institute and was widely known to the extent of who is the party concerned. Thus, both Nonparty 21, Nonparty 22, and Nonparty 23 knew that the above remarks by Nonparty 3 were made in relation to the Plaintiff and Nonparty 2.

5) 2013. 5. 15. 피고 연구소의 댄스동호회 여직원들 사이의 카카오톡 채팅방에서 이 사건 직장 내 성희롱 사건에 관하여 기존에 퍼져 있는 소문은 잘못된 것 같다는 취지의 말이 나오면서 대화가 오갔는데, 당시 소외 22는 “나도 최초로 들은 게 소외 3, 소외 21이었고, 성희롱은 항상 남자에게 불리하다고 그렇게 얘기했는데. 그래서 나도 솔직하히 여자가 오버했겠지 예민했을 수도. 이야기를 오늘 들으니 술자리에서 소외 21과 소외 22가 괘씸하네”라는 말을 하고, 소외 23은 “나도 여자가 먼저 꼬신 거라는 얘기 들었어요. 남자들은 다 쌍방인 것처럼 말하더라구. 소외 3이 그러던데”라는 말을 하였다.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 5, 6, 17, 40, 41 evidence, Eul evidence Nos. 1, 6 through 10, 13 through 16, and the purport of the whole pleadings

B. Determination

1) Establishment of employer liability

Although there is no express provision in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, it is reasonable to view that a person who conducts an investigation into a sexual harassment case on the job by a victim’s report is obligated to keep confidentiality and fairness strictly because he/she shall not openly make any speech or behavior likely to infringe on the social value or evaluation of the perpetrator and the victim of sexual harassment on the job, including revealing the content of the sexual harassment case on the job. In particular, in relation to a victimized employee, it is probable that a person who conducts an investigation may cause considerable second injury if he/she openly makes such speech or behavior, which eventually leads to the prevention of a victimized employee from reporting sexual harassment on the job. Thus, a person who conducts an investigation into a sexual harassment case on the job under the legislative purport of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act has a duty to pay special attention to the above point.

However, in relation to the prevention of sexual harassment in the workplace in 2012, the Defendant’s statement to the employees of the Defendant’s research institute to the effect that “the victim is not ordinarily but unilaterally subject to the victim’s sexual harassment in the workplace.” Although Nonparty 3 had reported sexual harassment in the workplace to the “measures to remedy and cope with sexual harassment,” it would have to fairly investigate the damage under the circumstances of thorough confidentiality, Nonparty 3 would have to do so. However, at the initial stage of the investigation into the sexual harassment in the workplace in this case, it is highly probable that the Plaintiff could have an initial and subjective interpretation as to the sexual harassment in the workplace as seen above.” The Defendant’s statement to the effect that “the victim would not have been exposed to the nature of the sexual harassment in the workplace as seen above, and it is evident that the Plaintiff would have been subject to the duty of sexual harassment in the workplace in this case, and that it would have an early stage of sexual harassment in the workplace in this case with the victim’s sexual harassment in this case, it is likely that the Plaintiff would have any other mental harm.

The defendant asserts that the defendant should be exempted from liability because the non-party 17, who is the head of the personnel management department of the defendant research institute, demands the personnel team staff of the defendant research institute to pay attention to the appointment of the non-party 3 and the supervision of the affairs thereof. However, considering all the evidence submitted by the defendant, it is insufficient to recognize that the defendant had paid due attention to the appointment of the non-party 3 and the supervision of the affairs thereof, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it, and the defendant'

2) Amount of consolation money

Furthermore, with respect to the amount of consolation money that the Defendant is liable, the amount of consolation money that the Defendant is liable shall be determined as KRW 3,00,000, considering all the circumstances indicated in the arguments of the instant case, such as the health team, the contents of Nonparty 3’s above remarks, the degree of infringement of the Plaintiff’s social value or assessment, the circumstances revealed in the above remarks, the circumstances before and after Nonparty 3 made the above remarks, and the scope of dissemination of Nonparty 3’

C. Sub-decision

Therefore, as the employer of Nonparty 3, the Defendant is obligated to pay the Plaintiff damages for delay calculated at the rate of 3,00,000 per annum from November 1, 2014 to December 18, 2015, which is the day following the delivery date of a copy of the application for modification of the purport of the claim as of October 31, 2014, which is the day when the Defendant rendered a ruling that it is reasonable to dispute as to whether the Defendant is liable for performance or not, as the employer of Nonparty 3, and the damages for delay calculated at the rate of 20% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

7. Conclusion

Therefore, the defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiff 10,00,000 won as consolation money (the above 7,000,000 won + the above 3,000,000 won + the above 3,000,000 won) and the damages for delay calculated at the rate of 5% per annum under the Civil Act until December 18, 2015, which is the date of the ruling of the court of first instance, where it is deemed reasonable to dispute as to the existence or scope of the defendant's obligation to perform as to the defendant from October 31, 2014 on the day following the delivery date of a copy of the application for modification of the purport of the claim as stated in this case. Since the plaintiff's claim against the defendant is justified within the above recognition scope, and the remaining claims against the defendant are unfair, and thus, the part of the judgment of the court of first instance as to the plaintiff's remaining part of the judgment against the defendant is revoked, and thus the plaintiff's appeal against the defendant is dismissed.

Judges Kim Jae-sik (Presiding Judge)