(a) The case holding that it is not beyond the binding force of the judgment remanded, following the fact-finding based on new evidence after the judgment of remand;

(b) Whether the judgment on the crime of occupational injury or death is made where the crime of escape is not recognized as a result of examining the facts charged in violation of Article 5-3 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, which is

(a) The case holding that it is not beyond the binding force of the judgment remanded, following the fact-finding based on new evidence after the judgment of remand;

B. The crime provided for in Article 5-3(1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes is established when the driver of the relevant vehicle who committed the crime resulting from occupational negligence provided for in Article 268 of the Criminal Act does not take measures provided for in Article 50(1) of the Road Traffic Act, such as aiding the injured party, and the crime is included in the crime resulting from occupational negligence. Thus, in the case where a public prosecutor is not authorized to prosecute the crime resulting from the crime of occupational negligence, only the part of escape is prosecuted and the crime resulting from occupational negligence is not prosecuted. Thus, even if the crime of occupational negligence is not acknowledged as a result of the trial, if the crime of occupational negligence resulting from death is acknowledged, a conviction is found, and if there is no right to prosecute, a judgment should be dismissed without examining whether the part of the crime of occupational negligence resulting from occupational negligence is prosecuted or not.

(a) Article 8 of the Court Organization Act;

Defendant

Prosecutor

Supreme Court Decision 88Do1945 Decided February 28, 1989

Seoul High Court Decision 89No1005 delivered on October 5, 1989

The appeal is dismissed.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

With respect to No. 1:

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the reasoning of the court below's judgment that although the defendant was negligent in operating 12 persons on the 12 persons on the 12 persons on the e-mail and the e-mail, he could not be found to have any point of escape, it is justified, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence such as the theory of litigation and the fact-finding

그리고 원심은 당원의 환송판결후 새로이 증인 유효종, 민부기를 신문하고 이들 증거와 원심이 취신한 증거들에 의하여 피고인이 이 사건 사고 2, 3분전에 공소외 문부산을 충돌하여 6주일간의 치료를 요하는 중상을 입게 한 후 병원에 호송중이던 사실과 위 문부산은 얼굴에서 피가 흐르고 차안에서도 계속하여 아프다고 통증을 호소하여 피고인은 동인에게 참으라고 말하면서 자주 뒷좌석에 있는 동인을 뒤돌아 보았으며, 중상을 입은 것으로 판단하고 극도로 흥분, 당황하고 있었던 사실, 이 사건 사고장소는 노폭이 6미터이고 좌우에 노점상 및 통행인이 많아 차가 교행하기도 어려운 복잡한 길이었고 피고인은 사고후에도 뛰어서 따라 갈 수 있을 정도의 빠르지 않은 속도로 진행하고 있었던 사실, 이 사건 사고직후 현장에 있던 여러사람들의 사고가 났다는 소리를 듣고 공소외 민부기가 집에서 나왔을 때는 피고인 차량은 이미 지나가버린 후였으며 봉고가 사람을 치었다는 누군가의 말을 듣고 지나가던 오토바이를 탄사람에게 "봉고다"라고 혼자서 소리쳐 동인으로 하여금 피고인 차량을 추적하게 하였던 사실을 새로이 인정하고(이 인정사실은 환송전의 원심사실인정과 일치하는 부분이 있기는 하여도 그 사실인정과 같은 것은 아니다) 이 인정사실에 터잡아 이 사건 사고직후에 행인 20여명이 사고가 났다고 고함을 지른 사실이 있으며 차창은 열려 있었고 차의 속도가 시속 10킬로 내외이며 피고인이 그때 고개를 돌려 뒷쪽을 쳐다본 사실까지 있다고 하여도 피고인은 이미 이 사건 사고 이전에 다른 교통사고를 야기하여 중상을 입은 부상자를 호송하느라 극도로 흥분, 당황하고 있었고, 사고당시는 일몰전의 시각으로 훤히 밝았으며 사고장소는 많은 목격자들이 있는 시장 뒷골목의 혼잡한 도로로서 사고후에도 여전히 빠르지 않은 속도로 차를 운전하고 있던 사정 등으로 보아 피고인의 사고가 났다는 사람들의 소리를 듣고 이를 확인하기 위하여 뒤돌아 보았다고 보기는 어려워 피고인에게 도주의 범의가 있었다고 인정하기에는 미흡하다고 판단한 것이므로 원심의 판단이 당원의 환송판결의 기속력을 벗어난 것이라거나 원심판결이 법원조직법 제8조 에 위배된 것이라고 할 수는 없다. 따라서 논지는 이유 없다.

With respect to the second ground:

The crime under Article 5-3 (Aggravated Punishment of Drivers) (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (hereinafter referred to as the above crime) is established when a driver of the vehicle concerned who committed the crime under Article 268 of the Criminal Act does not take measures under Article 50 (1) of the Road Traffic Act (hereinafter referred to as the "the crime of occupational death and bodily injury"), such as aiding the injured party, and the crime of occupational injury and bodily injury is included in the above crime. Therefore, in a case where a public prosecution is instituted for the above crime, only the part of the charge is prosecuted, and the crime of occupational injury and bodily injury is not prosecuted. In this case, the public prosecutor does not have the authority to prosecute the crime of occupational injury and bodily injury.

Therefore, even though the crime of occupational negligence is not recognized as a result of the examination in the above crimes, if the crime of occupational negligence is recognized, a judgment of conviction should be rendered, and if there is no right to institute a prosecution, a judgment of dismissing a public prosecution should not be ordered by the court to judge whether the part of the crime of occupational negligence was prosecuted or not.

Therefore, in this case, the court below's dismissal of the prosecution of this case on the ground that the facts of escape are not recognized as to the above crime, and that there is no right of prosecution as to the crime of injury caused by occupational negligence, and there is no reason to interpret

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Young-ju (Presiding Justice)