2015No684 A. Violation of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (Good Offices)

Franchisium (a child or office of a criminal defendant D)

Violation of the Juvenile Protection Act (Good Offices, etc.)

[Assistance]

B. Violation of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents

(c) Violation of the Road Traffic Act;

1. A.

2. A. B

3. (a) C.

4. A. (b) (c) D

Defendants and Prosecutor

Kim Jong-chul (prosecution) and in-depth trial

Attorney X (KO for the defendant A)

Y Law Firm, Attorney Zin (Defendant B)

Attorney F (for the defendant C)

Attorney AA (for defendant D)

Daegu District Court Branch Decision 2015Gohap87, 112 decided November 30, 2015

2) Judgment

May 3, 2016

1. The judgment below is reversed.

2. Defendant A, B, and C shall be punished by imprisonment for 2 years and 6 months, by imprisonment for 2 years and 6 months, and by a fine of 300,000 won.

3. When Defendant D does not pay the above fine, the above Defendant shall be confined in a workhouse for the period calculated by converting 100,000 won into one day.

4. However, from the date this judgment became final and conclusive, the execution of each of the above imprisonment years shall be suspended for Defendant A and B, for each of three years, and for Defendant D, for four years.

5. To order Defendant A, B, and D to be put on probation, to provide community service for 200 hours and to take sexual assault treatment programs for 80 hours, and to complete sexual assault treatment programs for 80 hours for Defendant C.

6. 1,50,00 won from Defendant A, 2,250,000 won from Defendant B, and 3,600,000 won from Defendant C shall be collected respectively.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Defendant A, B,

1) misunderstanding of facts or misunderstanding of legal principles (defendant A, D) Defendant A and D do not have engaged in the arrangement of commercial sex acts as "business."

Defendant D is not a joint principal offender but a joint principal offender.

2) The sentence of the lower court (Defendant A, B, and D) on the grounds that the sentence of unfair sentencing (Defendant A, B: each of the imprisonment on a maximum of 3 years and 2 years and 6 months, Defendant D: imprisonment on a maximum of 3 years and 3 years and 6 months and 300,000 won) is too unreasonable.

(b) Prosecutors;

The sentence of the lower court against the Defendants is too uneased and unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. As to Defendant C

1) Determination on appeal

According to the provision of Article 361-2 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, when a defense counsel is appointed before the notification of the receipt of the trial records, the court of appeals shall order the defense counsel to receive the notification of the receipt of the trial records. Thus, if the defense counsel is appointed after the notification of the notification of the trial records to the defendant (see, e.g., Supreme Court Order 65Mo34, Aug. 25, 1965). The same applies to the case where the appellate court appoints a public defense counsel and then revokes the appointment of a public defense counsel following the appointment of the defendant and his/her defense counsel. In such a case, the period for submitting the grounds for appeal shall be calculated from the date when the public defense counsel or the defendant receives the notification of the receipt of the trial records (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision

According to the records, Defendant C filed an appeal on December 2, 2015, but only filed an appeal against the lower judgment, without stating the grounds for appeal; ② from the first instance court to December 24, 2015, Defendant C and the state appointed a state appointed defense counsel for Defendant C on December 28, 2015, respectively; ③ Defendant C and the state appointed a public defense counsel on the same day following the appointment of a private defense counsel on January 8, 2016; ④ Defendant C’s private defense counsel for Defendant C submitted a document stating “a summary of the pleading” to Defendant C’s private defense counsel on March 3, 2016. Meanwhile, the above summary of the pleading is unreasonable, but it can be seen that Article 15(1) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse, which is a provision that punishs the act of arranging sexual traffic.

In light of the aforementioned legal principles, Defendant C’s period for submitting the grounds of appeal should start from December 28, 2015, when Defendant C and his/her public defender received the notification of the receipt of the notification of the receipt of the trial records. However, Defendant C’s public defender’s public defender submitted the summary of the oral argument, stating the grounds for appeal on March 3, 2016, when the period for submitting the grounds of appeal set forth in Article 361-3(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act was 20 days from the initial date of the foregoing public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public defender’s public

2) Ex officio determination

According to the records, Defendant C appealed on March 6, 2015, who was sentenced to a suspended sentence of two years for injury, etc. in the Daegu District Court and racing support for the Daegu District Court on August 6, 2015, but the appeal was withdrawn on December 14, 2015 and the above judgment became final and conclusive on the same day. Defendant C’s crime of this case is in the concurrent relationship between the crime for which judgment became final and the latter part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, and the crime of this case is concurrently in accordance with Article 39(1) of the Criminal Act, and thus, Defendant C was sentenced to punishment in consideration of equity with the case where judgment is to be rendered simultaneously.

B. Regarding the assertion of mistake of fact

1) Whether the instant arrangement of commercial sex acts constitutes an act of arranging commercial sex acts

A) Relevant legal principles

“A certain day” means continuing to repeat the same act. Determination of whether an act constitutes the same ought to be made in accordance with social norms by comprehensively taking into account various circumstances, such as repetition and continuity of the act, existence of business nature, etc., purpose and scale, frequency, period, mode, etc. of the act, and such act constitutes a single act where an act is performed with intent to continue repeated (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2003Do935, Jun. 13, 2003; 2012Do4390, Jul. 12, 2012);

B) Determination

Defendant D also presented the same argument as the reasons for appeal in this part of the judgment below, and the court below rejected the above argument in detail by providing a detailed judgment on the above argument in Section 2(a). In light of the records, the above recognition and judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no error of law of misunderstanding of facts as alleged by Defendant D. Accordingly, this part of the argument by Defendant D cannot be accepted.

On the other hand, Defendant A asserted the above in the trial only, and in light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly admitted and investigated by the court below, Defendant A had an intention to continue to engage in the act of arranging sexual traffic at the time of arranging the act of arranging sexual traffic, and Defendant A was deemed to have engaged in the act of arranging sexual traffic, taking into account the background leading up to the act of arranging sexual traffic, the frequency and duration of arranging sexual traffic, and the amount of profits from the act of arranging sexual traffic, Defendant A was deemed to have engaged in the act of arranging sexual traffic. Thus, Defendant A's assertion on this part is not accepted.

① Defendant A puts his writing on AB to seek a female to engage in sexual traffic, and the contact was made from H. After which, Defendant B offered a proposal to Defendant B to arrange sexual traffic, Defendant A was able to engage in sexual traffic, and later H was able to combine with G by introducing G.

② Defendant A and B proposed to demand KRW 50,00,00 from among the money received as a sex relationship to solve the day, when Defendant A and B got sexual intercourses with male and female, and Defendant A and H accepted such demand and conducted sexual intercourses with many unspecified male and female in her mother, etc. for about two weeks under the above conditions.

③ 그로부터 약 2주가 지난 후 피고인 A, B 사이의 다툼 등으로 불화가 생겨 피고인 A은 단독으로 G에 대한 성매매알선을 하였고, G는 약 2주 동안 피고인 A의 지인인 L이 거주하는 경주 | 소재 원룸에서 다수의 불특정 남성과 성매매를 하여 기존과 마찬가지로 성관계로 받은 돈 중 5만 원을 피고인 A에게 교부하였다.

④ Defendant A, solely or jointly with Defendant B, took profits of KRW 2,250,00 (i.e., KRW 1.5 million + KRW 7,500,000 during a joint period + one hundred and fifty hundred and fifty thousand won for a single period) (i.e., half of the profits during a joint period with Defendant B, which Defendant A acquired ultimately KRW 1.5 million (= KRW 750,000 + KRW 750,00).

2) Whether Defendant D is not a joint principal offender but a joint principal offender

A) This part of the facts charged

Defendant C, while acting as a broker by himself from the beginning of May 2015, 2015, he saw Defendant C to have Defendant D for the first day of May 2015, 2015 as 'I will give 50,000 won per day to Defendant D for the first day of May, 2015', and G (the age 16) helps Defendant D to receive money from G for the purpose of protecting a dispute between male and female purchase.

Accordingly, from May 2015 to May 2015, Defendant C and D: (a) recruited gender-purchasing men by using smartphone display "M" or "N" as if they were women; (b) had G enter into sexual intercourse with men and receive KRW 1,50,000 for each time of sexual intercourse at 0 times located in the port of port and near P; and (c) received KRW 60,000,000 from the method of receiving KRW 30,000 for protection expenses, whichever is 1,80,000,000 from among them.

As a result, Defendant C and D conspired with businesses to arrange for unspecified men to purchase sex of juveniles.

B) Determination as to whether a co-principal is established

(1) Relevant legal principles

The co-principal in Article 30 of the Criminal Code is a co-principal who commits a crime jointly by two or more persons.

In order to establish the same offense, it is necessary to implement a crime through the functional control of a criminal act by a joint doctor, which is a subjective element, with the intention of co-processing and an objective requirement, and the intention of co-processing shall be integrated for the purpose of committing a specific criminal act with a common intent, and shall be to shift one’s own intent to practice by using another person’s act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2001Do4792, Nov. 9, 2001). Meanwhile, since the essence of a co-principal is in functional control by division of roles, the co-principal is in functional control by a joint doctor, while the co-principal is distinguishable from each other in that it has no control over such act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 88Do1247, Apr. 11, 1989).

(2) Determination

In light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly admitted and examined by the court below, it is difficult to view that Defendant D had an intent to jointly process that Defendant D shift his intent to practice by using Defendant C’s act or has functional control over his act. Therefore, the court below erred by misapprehending the facts that Defendant D was liable to commit the instant act of arranging sexual traffic, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment. As such, Defendant D’s above assertion is with merit.

① Defendant C unilaterally asked Defendant D to assist in doing sexual traffic while arranging G’s sexual traffic.

② As to the relationship with Defendant D, Defendant C stated, “I would like to give 50,000 won per day to Defendant D because I would not work with Kwikset service, not with Defendant D.” (Evidence Record 632 pages).

③ Defendant D recruited a man with sexual purchasing on behalf of Defendant C when contact was made by Defendant C (Evidence No. 345 pages, 385 pages, 632 pages, and 632 of the Evidence No. 345 pages, 632).

④ Defendant C acquired KRW 60,00,000 among the 1.50,000 won per sexual traffic case, and again, Defendant D paid KRW 50,000 per day to Defendant D instead of paying a certain amount to Defendant D. In such a case, Defendant D directly received KRW 60,00,000 from G, not directly obtaining the said KRW 60,00 per sex trade case, or acquiring a certain amount per sex trade, but granted KRW 50,00 per day from Defendant C (Evidence No. 647 of the evidence record). Defendant D was paid KRW 50,00 per day by Defendant C to Defendant C (Evidence No. 649 of the evidence record). Defendant D was able to arrange sexual traffic only through contact with Defendant C, and not arranging sexual traffic after May 20, 2015, because Defendant C did not do so (Evidence No. 6499 of the evidence record).

C) Ex officio determination as to whether an aiding and abetting crime is established

In a case where a court recognizes a criminal facts that have been prosecuted for a minor offense within the scope recognized as identical to the facts charged, if it does not give substantial disadvantage to the defendant's defense in light of the process of the trial, etc., it can recognize a minor criminal facts ex officio without changing the indictment, and thus, it can be recognized as an aiding and abetting the criminal facts prosecuted for a co-principal (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Do995, Jun. 24, 2004).

Comprehensively taking account of the above circumstances, although it is difficult to see Defendant D as a co-principal, the fact that the execution of Defendant C was easy, and such recognition does not give substantial disadvantages to the defense of Defendant D. Thus, this part of the facts charged against Defendant D is recognized as a crime of aiding and abetting in Violation of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (Good Offices, etc.).

Therefore, this part of the judgment of the court below cannot be maintained. Meanwhile, the court below rendered a single sentence by deeming that the facts constituting the crime and the remaining facts constituting the crime against Defendant D constitute concurrent crimes under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act. Thus, the court below should reverse this part of the facts constituting the crime and the remaining parts

C. As to the assertion of unfair sentencing by Defendant A, B, and the prosecutor, Defendant A and B engaged in an act mediating sexual traffic of female juveniles as a business, and the nature of the crime is very good in light of the background, mode, period, frequency, and gains acquired of the crime. Defendant B had a record of being subject to juvenile protective disposition due to conflict, etc., and was subject to the suspension of indictment several times due to fraud, etc.

On the other hand, Defendant A and B are primary offenders who had no criminal record. Defendant A and B are at the time of committing the crime, and Defendant A are also at the time of committing the crime, but they are not at the time of committing the act of arranging sexual traffic. Defendant A and B are against mistake and are in a future social life in the future. Above all, Defendant A and B were juveniles subject to the Juvenile Act at the time of committing the crime, and Defendant B are currently juveniles. In full view of all the circumstances that form the conditions for sentencing specified in the records of this case, including the following circumstances: Defendant A and B’s character and behavior, environment, motive, means and consequence of the crime, the punishment imposed by the court below is too unreasonable. Accordingly, Defendant A and B’s assertion of unfair sentencing is justified, and the Prosecutor’s assertion that the sentence of the court below is too unjustifiable, and thus unfair is not acceptable.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed under Article 364(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act without examining the defendant D's assertion of mistake of facts and the argument of unreasonable sentencing in the grounds for appeal, and the judgment below is reversed under Article 364(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act and it is again decided as follows.

[Grounds for final judgment]

The facts constituting the crime acknowledged by this court are as follows: "The defendant C was sentenced to two years of suspension of execution on March 6, 2015, and the judgment on December 14, 2015, which became final and conclusive on December 14, 2015, for the crime of injury, etc. on March 6, 2015," between the 15th and 16th of the judgment of the court below and the 16th of the judgment of the court below." The facts constituting the crime are identical to each corresponding column of the judgment of the court below, except for the 4th to 5th of the 4th sentence and 3

4. Defendant C. On May 2015, Defendant C. suggested that Defendant A would have contacted G with the knowledge that Defendant A would arrange for G sexual traffic, and, from around that time to around May 2015, Defendant C would have recruited sexual men by using “M” or “N” as if he was a female, and had G buy sexual men at 0 times in port and in the nearby Pelel where Posium located, and received KRW 60,000,000 from G to receive KRW 3.6 million in terms of protection expenses. As a result, Defendant C arranged sexual purchase for sexual men to purchase sexual intercourse and received KRW 3.6 million in terms of protection expenses.

5. Defendant D

Defendant D, on May 2015, 2015, received a proposal from Defendant C to assist Defendant C in committing a crime by facilitating the commission of Defendant C by, on behalf of Defendant C, either inviting a man to purchase sex on behalf of Defendant C, or by using Defendant C’s vehicle or one’s own urbane to receive money from Defendant C for the protection expenses. The summary of the evidence of the evidence is as follows: (a) by facilitating the commission of the crime of Defendant C, such as: (b) raising a man to sexual intercourse on behalf of Defendant C; or (c) raising a man to a place where Defendant C is a sexual purchaser; or (d) receiving money from Defendant C for the protection expenses.

The gist of the evidence of the above facts constituting the crime is as stated in the summary of the evidence in the judgment below, except for adding the following in the last part of [2015Gohap87] of the evidence column of the court below, and thus, it is also cited in accordance with Article 369 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

1. Previous convictions in judgment: Investigation report (Attachment to judgment of stay of execution of C by a suspect);

Application of Statutes

1. Article relevant to the facts constituting an offense and the selection of punishment;

(a) Defendant A and B: Article 15(1)2 of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse and Article 30 of the Criminal Act

B. Defendant C: Article 15(1)2(b) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse; Defendant D

1) Aiding and abetting arranging sexual traffic for children and juveniles for business purposes: Article 15(1)2 of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse, and Article 32(1) of the Criminal Act (generality)

2. Injury caused by occupational negligence: Article 3(1) and proviso of Article 3(2)7 of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents, and Article 268 of the Criminal Act

(c) Unlicensed driving: Subparagraph 2 of Article 154 and Article 43 of the Road Traffic Act;

2. Statutory mitigation;

A. Defendant A and B: Articles 2 and 60(2) of the Juvenile Act, Article 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act (the above Defendants are deemed to be juveniles in light of their characteristics)

(b) Defendant D: Articles 32(2) and 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act (as to the crime of aiding and abetting a person in violation of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles from Sexual Abuse)

3. Handling concurrent crimes and legal mitigation;

Defendant C: the latter part of Article 37, the main sentence of Article 39(1), and Article 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act

4. Aggravation for concurrent crimes; and

Defendant D: the former part of Article 37, and Articles 38(1)2, 38(2), and 50 of the Criminal Act [Concurrent punishment of imprisonment with prison labor for concurrent crimes and fines for violation of the Road Traffic Act (unlicensed Driving) within the scope of adding up the long-term punishment of two crimes prescribed by the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse, the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents, and the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (Concurrent Punishment within the scope of adding up the punishment prescribed by the crime of aiding and abetting Business, etc.)];

5. Discretionary mitigation;

A. Defendant A, B, and C: Articles 53 and 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act;

(b) Defendant D: Articles 53 and 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act [the crime of aiding and abetting a violation of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (Good Offices, etc.)]

6. Invitation of a workhouse;

Defendant D: Articles 70(1) and 69(2) of the Criminal Act

7. Suspension of execution;

A. Defendant A and B: Article 62(1) of the Criminal Act, Article 60(3) of the Juvenile Act

B. Defendant D: Article 62(1) of the Criminal Act

8. Probation and community service order;

Defendant A, B, and D: Article 62-2 of the Criminal Act

9. Order to attend lectures;

Defendant A, B, and D: the main sentence of Article 21(2) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse

10. Order to complete programs;

Defendant C: the main sentence of Article 21(2) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse

11. Additional collection:

Defendant A, B, and C: Articles 10(1) and 8(1)1 of the Act on Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment

As to the application of Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act to Defendant A

1. Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act provides that "if it is deemed reasonable in light of the characteristics of the juvenile, the punishment may be mitigated."

However, Defendant A was a juvenile under Article 2 of the Juvenile Act on April 2015, which was the time when the instant crime was committed by Defendant A, but was not a juvenile over 19 years of age on the date the judgment of the court was rendered.

2. In such a case, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “A juvenile under Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act refers to a juvenile under Article 2 of the Juvenile Act unless otherwise specified, and a juvenile under Article 2 of the Juvenile Act refers to a person under the age of 19 (or 20 years prior to the amendment of the Juvenile Act), who is under the age of 19 (or 20 years prior to the amendment of the Juvenile Act), and as such, it should continue to exist not only at the time of committing a crime but until the time of judgment. Therefore, the determination of whether a juvenile is a juvenile under Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act shall be based on the time when the judgment of fact-finding is rendered (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Do2393, Dec. 10, 1991; 96Do1241, Feb. 14, 1997; 200Do2709, Aug. 18, 2000).

In light of the provisions of Article 38(1), Article 7(2), and Article 51 of the Juvenile Act, it is clear that a juvenile under 19 years of age should continue not only in the time of crime but also in the time of judgment as he/she is under the condition of a trial. Since the character of a juvenile is highly likely to be improved in the course of formation and is placed in a special mental and physical condition due to the mental development of the juvenile, the character of the juvenile is likely to be improved and is placed in a special mental and physical condition due to the characteristics of the juvenile, and Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act is also intended to promote the sound fostering of the juvenile by emphasizing the condition of the juvenile.

3. However, the language and text of Article 2 of the Juvenile Act alone, in order to apply the provisions of the Juvenile Act as well as the definition of the juvenile, it cannot be deemed that not only the crime but also the juvenile should be a juvenile until the judgment is rendered. In addition, the provisions of Articles 38(1), 7(2), and 51 of the Juvenile Act concerning juvenile protection cases are the provisions concerning juvenile protection cases, and the protection order for juvenile protection cases is conducted environmental adjustment and character correction for the juvenile under the age of 19 years and it is inappropriate to implement such protection order for the adult under the age of 19 years, and there is a fundamental difference from the criminal case in that it is inappropriate for the juvenile protection case to be conducted. Thus, it cannot be readily concluded that the person under the age of 19 is the condition for the judgment of the juvenile criminal case, and it is more accurate

And above all, Article 60 (2) of the Juvenile Act is deemed to be reasonable in light of the characteristics of the juvenile.

When a juvenile becomes a juvenile, the sentence may be mitigated." The character of the juvenile here refers to ① characteristics that a juvenile commits a crime with mental or physical knowledge, ② characteristics that a juvenile is imprisoned to commit a crime, or includes both improved characteristics in the future. ① In order to reduce a punishment in light of the characteristics that a juvenile commits a crime with mental or physical care, it is sufficient that a juvenile is a juvenile at the time of committing a crime, ② in order to reduce a punishment in light of the characteristics that a juvenile commits a crime with no mental or physical knowledge or future improvement characteristics, and ② in order to reduce a punishment in light of the characteristics that a juvenile is unable to cope with a punishment or future improvement characteristics, it is inconsistent with the interpretation of the Criminal Act. In addition, the above provision is not inconsistent with the interpretation of the Criminal Act that a juvenile may be mitigated only when a judgment is rendered without considering the characteristics of the juvenile, but it is against the concept of the Criminal Act.

On the other hand, the standard theory at the time of sentencing as a fact-finding court is to provide a juvenile with an opportunity to mitigate more time than discretionary mitigation in order to prevent the juvenile from being disadvantageous to adults due to the non-permanent system under Article 60(1) of the Juvenile Act. Since the standard time of the non-permanent sentence is when a fact-finding court pronounces the case, mitigation under the Juvenile Act should be equally based on the fact-finding court. However, Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act does not "the characteristics of the Juvenile Act (Article 60(1))" but only "the characteristics of the juvenile" under Article 60(3) of the Juvenile Act, but Article 60(3) of the Juvenile Act does not apply when a suspended sentence or suspended sentence is declared, it does not exclude the application of the provision under Article 60(2) of the same Act. As a result, when a suspended sentence or suspended sentence is sentenced, the standard of mitigation under the Juvenile Act does not coincide with the standard of mitigation under the Juvenile Act.

In addition, in accordance with the Supreme Court's position, when the court of first instance declares juvenile mitigation when the defendant was a juvenile and the defendant became adult when the court of first instance rendered a judgment, the appellate court cannot reduce the defendant's appeal under the Juvenile Act if the defendant became adult. In this regard, it may be said that the court of first instance limits the defendant's right to appeal, among the defendant who was subject to juvenile mitigation in the court of first instance, which is thought to be adult in the appellate court.

4. In full view of the foregoing, it is reasonable to view Defendant A of this case, which can be evaluated as having committed a crime with mental or physical distress of the juvenile, as the time of mitigation under Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act, as the time of the act. The juvenile mitigation under Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act against Defendant A is deemed as the time of the act.

Reasons for sentencing

1. Defendant A and B

In full view of the various circumstances seen above, Defendant C. The act of arranging sexual traffic by female juveniles was committed as a business, and the nature of the crime is very good in light of the background, mode, period, frequency, profit acquired, etc. of the crime. Defendant C did not know even though it was during the period of suspended execution due to fraud, which led to the instant crime without being aware of.

On the other hand, there is no criminal record related to a sex offense against Defendant C. Defendant C recognizes his mistake without submitting a legitimate statement of grounds of appeal. Defendant C’s crime of this case is one of the concurrent crimes under the latter part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act with the injury crime for which judgment became final and conclusive, and thus, it is necessary to consider equity in the case of concurrent judgment pursuant to Article 39(1

In addition to these circumstances, Defendant C’s age, character and conduct, environment, motive, means and consequence of the crime, and all the circumstances that form the conditions for sentencing as shown in the records of the instant case, including the circumstances after the crime, shall be determined as ordered.

3. Defendant D

Defendant D aided and abetted the arrangement of commercial sex acts of Defendant C, and caused a serious injury by causing an accident involving pedestrians while driving a motor vehicle on a license without license, in light of the circumstances of the crime, attitudes, period of the crime, frequency of the crime, and gains from the use of the motor vehicle. Defendant D has the power to be punished by a fine on one occasion for driving without a license.

On the other hand, the defendant D is relatively minor in the degree of participation in the arrangement of commercial sex acts compared to the other defendants, and there is no criminal conviction or fine exceeding the previous conviction or fine due to sexual crimes, and there is no violation of the mistake. The damage caused by traffic accidents seems to have been recovered from money through comprehensive insurance.

In addition to these circumstances, the punishment as ordered shall be determined by comprehensively taking into account all the circumstances, such as Defendant D’s age, character and conduct, environment, motive, means and consequence of the crime, and the circumstances after the crime.

Registration of Personal Information

In a case where the conviction of the Defendants against the Defendants is finalized on the violation of the Act on the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes (a brokerage business, etc.) or the violation of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (a brokerage business, etc.), the Defendants become a person subject to registration of personal information pursuant to Article 42(1) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes, and are obliged to submit personal information to the competent authority pursuant to

Of the facts charged in the instant case, the summary of the Defendant D’s violation of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (a brokerage business, etc.) is as stated in the foregoing 2.2. A).

As seen in the above 2.b. 2. b. b. as seen in the above, it is difficult to deem that Defendant D had reached a joint principal offender with Defendant C.

Thus, since this part of the facts charged against Defendant D constitutes a case where there is no proof of crime, it should be pronounced not guilty pursuant to the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act. However, as long as the defendant is found guilty of the crime of aiding and abetting in violation of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse as stated in this part of the facts charged,

Equal judges of the presiding judge;

Judges fixed-term

Judge Jeon Soo-soo