(a) Whether it is possible for an employer to cancel a disciplinary action on his own and take a new disciplinary action, if the employer recognizes the defect of disciplinary procedure;

(b) Whether a dismissal in violation of the duty of advance notice of dismissal under Article 27-2 of the Labor Standards Act does not affect the validity of private law as long as there are justifiable grounds.

(c) The validity of dismissal disposition which does not comply with the provisions of a collective agreement that requires the approval of the Labor Relations Commission for disciplinary dismissal;

A. If the employer voluntarily acknowledges that there is a defect in the disciplinary procedure, that the amount of disciplinary action is wrong, or that there is a fault in recognizing the grounds for disciplinary action, the disciplinary action may be revoked on his own without remedy order issued by the Labor Relations Commission or a judgment of nullification of the court, and it is also possible to take a new disciplinary action

B. The effects of dismissal under private law are not affected even if dismissal is in violation of the duty of pre-determination of dismissal under Article 27-2 of the Labor Standards Act, unless there is a justifiable reason for dismissal.

C. Even if the Labor Relations Commission provides that disciplinary dismissal of any member of the collective agreement shall be recognized by the Labor Relations Commission, it does not have the authority to recognize or approve the dismissal of any employee in advance under the provisions of the current Act and subordinate statutes, and such recognition or approval is merely an act of administrative supervision to prevent unfair and prompt dismissal by the employer. Thus, even if the company did not obtain the approval of the Labor Relations Commission under the provisions of the collective agreement while dismissing its employee, the validity of the dismissal shall not affect the validity thereof.

(b)Article 27(b) of the Labor Standards Act;

A. Supreme Court Decision 80Da2945 delivered on May 26, 1981 (Gong1981, 13979) 91Da4358 delivered on August 14, 1992 (Gong1992, 2654) 93Da26496 delivered on September 30, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2820). Supreme Court Decision 93Nu2015 delivered on June 14, 1994 (Gong194Ha, 1974) 93Nu4199 delivered on September 24, 1993 (Gong193Ha, 297Ha, 1977) 93Da37464 delivered on September 19, 1994 (Gong194, 194; 194Da394394 delivered on March 194, 194).

Plaintiff

The Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission

Seoul High Court Decision 93Gu25136 delivered on July 22, 1994

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

1. We examine the first ground for appeal.

The court below, based on its evidence, stated that the plaintiff was unable to take disciplinary action against the non-party 1, 50,000 won or less for the non-party 4's non-party 1's non-party 6-party 5-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 6-party 9-party 6-party 9-party 6-party 1's office to take disciplinary action against the plaintiff's non-party 1-party 5-party 1's office.

2. We examine the ground of appeal No. 2-1

If the employer voluntarily acknowledges that there is a defect in the disciplinary procedure, or the disciplinary action is erroneous or erroneous, it is possible for the non-party company to voluntarily cancel the disciplinary action without any remedy order issued by the Labor Relations Commission or the court to nullify the invalidity of the disciplinary action (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 80Da2945, May 26, 1981). In such a case, if the employer cancels the initial dismissal disposition, the disposition becomes retroactively null and void and has no initial dismissal disposition, and thus, the employer is not obligated to return the person to the original position (in this respect, the ground that the employer cannot return the person to the original position is without merit). As of this case, the non-party company, the employer, recognized the defect in the disciplinary procedure and revoked the first disciplinary action by itself, and therefore, the non-party company cannot be deemed to have used the previous vision for all the person subject to disciplinary action. Therefore, the court below's decision to the same purport cannot be justified, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to dismissal.

3. We examine the second ground for appeal (2).

Even if dismissal is in violation of the duty of pre-determination of dismissal under Article 27-2 of the Labor Standards Act, it does not affect the judicial effect of dismissal (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Nu4199, Sept. 24, 1993; 93Nu4199, Sept. 24, 199). Even if the Labor Relations Commission stipulates that dismissal of a member of a collective agreement should be subject to prior approval, there is no authority to recognize or approve dismissal of a worker under the current law, and its recognition or approval is merely an act of confirmation of administrative supervision to prevent unfair immediate dismissal by the employer. Thus, even if a company did not obtain the approval of the Labor Relations Commission under the provisions of a collective agreement while the dismissal of a worker, the validity of such dismissal shall not be affected (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Da49192, Jan. 11, 194; 90Da18463, Sept. 24, 1991).

4. We examine the ground of appeal No. 2-3

According to the facts duly admitted by the court below, it is reasonable to view that a company engaged in the tourist transportation and entertainment business has reached a situation where the labor contract relationship with the plaintiff cannot be maintained significantly in light of the type and degree of the misconduct. Thus, the company's choice of dismissal as a kind of disciplinary action against the plaintiff is justifiable and the judgment of the court below to this purport is justified, and it cannot be viewed that there was an error in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to abuse or deviation of the disciplinary right, and therefore there is no reason to discuss.

5. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)