(a) Requirements for accidents in transit to constitute “occupational accidents” under Article 3(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act;

(b)the case holding that it does not constitute the "occupational Accident" solely on the ground that the police assigned for special guard was absent from ordinary workers and commuting and it was employed in the course of performing their duties, and that it does not constitute the "occupational Accident" merely because the employer was fit to provide the fuel;

A. Even though workers’ commuting activities are closely indivisible with the business of providing labor, they cannot be said to be under the control and management of the business owner because the choice of the route is reserved to the workers, and therefore, the worker’s commuting process should be deemed to be under the control and management of the business owner, such as the worker’s use of the means of transportation provided by the business owner, or the business owner’s use of the means of transportation corresponding thereto, to be recognized as occupational accidents.

(b)the case holding that the registered security guard's commuting to and from work is not a "occupational Accident" solely on the ground that he was unable to use a bus provided by the employer due to different time from ordinary workers and commuting to and from work, and it was used not only at the time of work but also at the time of business performance, and that there was a shortage of fuel provided by the business owner;

Article 3(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Domin, Attorneys Park Jae-soo and 1 other, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

[Judgment of the court below]

The head of the Taebag Regional Labor Office

Seoul High Court Decision 92Gu26835 delivered on February 5, 1993

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The Plaintiff’s attorney’s ground of appeal is examined.

In light of the records, the court below is justified in finding that the plaintiff was to work simply at the workplace and judged that the plaintiff did not assert and prove that the plaintiff was to work specially assigned by the employer at the time of the accident, and there is no error of law such as the theory of lawsuit.

The term "occupational accidents" in Article 3 (1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act refers to occupational accidents caused by an employee's performance of duties under the control and management of the employer under an employment contract with the employer and resulting in the worker's performance of duties. Thus, even if the worker's commuting activity is closely indivisible with the business of providing labor, it cannot be deemed that the worker's commuting process is under the control and management of the employer because the method of commuting and the selection of the route is reserved to the worker, and therefore, it cannot be said that the worker's commuting process is under the control and management of the employer, such as the worker's use of the means of transportation provided by the employer to be recognized as occupational accidents or the employer's use of the means of transportation corresponding thereto (see Supreme Court Decision 92Nu16805 delivered on May 11, 1993).

In this case, the plaintiff is a registered security guard and the non-party company, a business owner, could not use the bus provided by the non-party company due to different time of commuting to and from work, and even if the plaintiff was commuting to and from work for the last three years, the above Oba, used the above Oba, and there was not only the above Oba but also the fuel provided by the above company, such circumstance alone does not lead to the above company's failure to deem that the above company had the plaintiff commute to and from work via Oba or that the plaintiff's commuting process was under the control and management of the business owner. Therefore, the court below's judgment is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Yong-ju (Presiding Justice)