[1] The method of exercising the lessee's right to demand purchase of existing buildings where the lease of land for the purpose of owning the building terminates

[2] Whether the objective economic value of a building on the ground or the utility of a lessor is the requirement to exercise a lessee's right to demand purchase under Article 643 of the Civil Code (negative)

[3] The validity of an agreement under which a lessee of the land for the possession of a building gives up all of the buildings and other ground facilities with the lessor before the lease is terminated

[4] The case concerning the measures to be taken by the court in a case where a deposit statement to the effect that the amount was deposited is not explicitly stated in the evidence

[1] Where a lease of land has been terminated for the purpose of owning a building, the lessee’s right to purchase the existing building on the ground requires not only a specific method but also a judicial exercise, and there is no limit to the time of the exercise of the right. Therefore, the lessee is not allowed to exercise the right to purchase the building on the ground that the lessee exercised his right to purchase the building at the first instance but also exercised it again at the appellate court after the lessee has withdrawn it from the first instance.

[2] The lessee’s right to purchase under Articles 643 and 283 of the Civil Act is a right granted to the lessee in the event that a building exists on the ground and the lessor does not want to renew the contract due to the expiration of the lease period of the land for the purpose of owning the building, and whether the ground is objectively economic value of the building or whether the building is used by the lessor is an exercise requirement.

[3] Even if a lessee of land, the object of which is to own a building, agreed with a lessor to waive all of the buildings and other ground facilities before the lease is terminated, barring special circumstances deemed to be disadvantageous to the lessee, such agreement is unfavorable to the lessee under Article 652 of the Civil Act, unless special circumstances are acknowledged, such as the terms and conditions of the lease agreement, the developments leading up to the conclusion of the contract, etc.

[4] The case holding that the court should make a decision by clarifying the party's genuine intent by presenting the statement of deposit to the effect that the amount has been deposited as evidence, as long as it is obvious that the submission of the certificate of deposit as evidence was made to the extent equivalent to the amount, even though the party only submitted the certificate of deposit and did not explicitly express his/her claim for repayment of the amount equivalent to the amount stated therein, since it is obvious that the submission of the certificate of deposit as evidence was made to the extent equivalent to the amount amount.

[1] Articles 283 and 643 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 283 and 643 of the Civil Act / [3] Articles 643 and 652 of the Civil Act / [4] Articles 126 and 393 of the Civil Procedure Act

[3] Supreme Court Decision 93Da16130 delivered on June 22, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 2096), Supreme Court Decision 93Da6386 delivered on July 27, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 2400), Supreme Court Decision 96Da4543 delivered on April 8, 1997 (Gong197Sang, 1380) / [4] Supreme Court Decision 67Da1742 delivered on September 26, 1967 (No15-3, 161), Supreme Court Decision 94Da3711 delivered on October 25, 1994 (Gong194, 3083)

Plaintiff 1 and one other (Attorney Kang-ho, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant 1 and nine others (Law Firm Maok, Attorneys Go Sung-sung et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Gwangju High Court Decision 2000Na562 delivered on June 1, 2001

Of the part of the judgment below against the defendants, the part concerning the amount of money equivalent to each rent from February 1, 200 to January 31, 2001 is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Gwangju High Court. The plaintiffs' appeals and the remaining appeals by the defendants are dismissed.

1. Summary of the judgment of the court below

A. The lower court acknowledged the following facts based on the evidence produced therefrom.

(1) In Jeju-do, Dong-do-dong 1257’s 4 large 706 square meters are owned by the Plaintiffs. 8 large 165 square meters in the same 1257, and 9 large 330 square meters in the same 1257 are owned by Plaintiff 2.

(2) On December 30, 1968, the deceased non-party 1 (the deceased on August 4, 1995) who was the deceased's decedents of the plaintiffs leased the lease period of 1257 to 363 4, Dongdo-dong 1257 to December 30, 1968, which was the land before the division of each of the above lands owned by the plaintiffs to non-party 2 and non-party 3, for the purpose of owning five judice judles set forth from December 30, 1968 to December 30, 1974. Accordingly, the above non-party 2 and non-party 3 sold the above previous buildings to others, and as a result of the sale of each of the above buildings listed in the attached list in the judgment of the court below, each of the above buildings was owned and used by the Defendants by registering each of the above buildings listed in the same list as of December 30, 1968.

(3) On the other hand, even after the expiration of the first lease term, the deceased non-party 1 did not require the removal of the building or the delivery of each of the instant lands even after the expiration of the lease term, and the buyer who purchased each of the instant buildings before the lease period and the buyer who purchased each of the instant buildings continuously renewed the lease contract by setting the lease period from the end of January of each year to the end of January of the following year. The Defendants paid the rent for the year 199 minutes (from February 1, 1999 to January 31, 200).

(4) However, on January 22, 1997, the plaintiffs notified the defendants by content-certified mail that the lease contract will be terminated at the end of January 1998, and at that time the above notification reached the defendants.

(5) The defendants exercised their right to purchase the building of this case at the court below on October 16, 200 and delivered its declaration to the plaintiffs.

B. Furthermore, according to the above facts, the court below rejected the defendants' right to purchase each of the buildings of this case since the lease contract with the defendants reached the notification of termination or the termination of the lease term on January 31, 1998, and the defendants are obligated to return the benefits obtained by occupying and using the site to the plaintiffs. (2) The plaintiffs' right to claim restitution of unjust enrichment is reasonable. (3) The defendants who are legitimate lessees of each of the buildings of this case for the purpose of owning the building of this case and the right to claim the purchase of each of the buildings of this case are located at the expiration of the lease term. Since the defendants' expression of intent to exercise their right to claim purchase of each of the buildings of this case reached the plaintiffs, they cannot seek removal of each of the buildings of this case and delivery of each of the land owned by them, and they cannot exercise their right to purchase again at the court of first instance, and they cannot exercise their right to purchase again, and they cannot exercise their right to purchase after the lapse of 30 years.

2. Judgment on the plaintiffs' grounds of appeal

A. Legal principles concerning the purchase right and the withdrawal thereof, violation of the principle of good faith and abuse of rights

In the event that the lease of land is terminated for the purpose of owning a building, the lessee's right to purchase the existing building on the ground does not require a specific method to exercise the right, and there is no restriction on the time of exercise. Therefore, since the Defendants exercised their right to purchase the building at the court of first instance and subsequently exercised their right to purchase at the court of first instance, there is no reason for not allowing the Defendants to exercise their right to purchase (when the purchase is established due to the effect of the exercise of the right to purchase, the Plaintiffs cannot withdraw their right to purchase only one of the subsequent intent. However, according to the purport of oral argument, the Plaintiffs in this case are not allowed to withdraw their right to purchase at the court of first instance on the premise that the exercise of the right to purchase the building by the lessee is litigation, or the exercise of the right to purchase is equivalent to a counterclaim, and thus the exercise of the right to purchase requires consent of the other party in the appellate court, and such assertion cannot be accepted as its independent opinion, and it does not affect the conclusion of the judgment of the court below by misapprehending legal principles as to the right to purchase and withdrawal as alleged in the ground for appeal.

In addition, the lessee's right to demand purchase under Articles 643 and 283 of the Civil Act is not a requirement to exercise the right granted to the lessee in the event that the building exists and the lessor does not want the renewal of the contract because the period of the lease of the land for the purpose of owning the building expires, and there is no evidence to deem the Defendants' right to demand purchase of this case as a breach of the good faith principle or an abuse of rights. Accordingly, the grounds of appeal on this point are without merit.

B. The point of denial of judgment

In light of the records, there is no evidence suggesting that the Defendants agreed to remove each building of this case from the plaintiffs around March 1997 by the time of the closing of argument in the court below. Furthermore, even if the lessee of the land for the purpose of ownership agreed to waive all of the buildings and other ground facilities with the lessor before the termination of the lease agreement, unless special circumstances are acknowledged that are not substantially unfavorable to the lessee, such agreement is unfavorable to the lessee, and is not effective under Article 652 of the Civil Act (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da16130 delivered on June 22, 1993). Thus, even if there was an agreement as alleged by the plaintiffs in this case, data on the special circumstances as seen above cannot be found in the records, and the determination of the plaintiffs' above assertion is not affected by the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, the argument in the grounds of appeal on this point is without merit.

In addition, the court below's acceptance of the defendants' claim for purchase contains the purport of rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed as a means of real-time attack and defense. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was an error of omission of judgment, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. Judgment on the Defendants’ grounds of appeal

A. Violation of the disposition right principle

According to the records, even though the term of lease for each of the lands of this case owned by the plaintiffs expired, it is clear that the defendants continue to possess and use them. The plaintiffs' above assertion includes not only the purport of claiming damages equivalent to the rent for the possessor without title, but also the purport of seeking unjust enrichment equivalent to the rent for the lessee who continuously occupies and uses the leased object even after the termination of the lease as a lessor. Thus, the judgment of the court below regarding the plaintiffs' claim of this case as unjust enrichment claim is just and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of the principle of disposition right as argued in the Grounds for Appeal.

B. The fact that there was an incomplete hearing due to the omission of judgment and the non-exercise of the right to ask for name.

According to the records, the defendants submitted Nos. 2 and 3 (Deposit) to the effect that they deposited money equivalent to the rent of the year 1998 (from February 1, 1998 to January 31, 199) and the year 199 portion (from February 1, 199 to January 31, 200), and that they deposited money equivalent to the rent of the land of this case, and that they deposited money equivalent to the rent of the year 200 portion (from February 1, 200 to January 31, 201). However, the court below ordered the defendants to find that they paid money equivalent to the amount of the rent of the year 199 portion (from February 1, 199 to January 31, 200), and the court below ordered the defendants to find that they paid money equivalent to the amount of unjust enrichment from February 1, 199 to January 31, 200).

Although the Defendants submitted the evidence No. 3 and did not explicitly state the claim for repayment of the amount equivalent to the amount stated therein, it is clear that the Defendants submitted the evidence No. 3 to the extent corresponding to that amount. Therefore, the court below should have determined the propriety of the evidence, and should have determined the Defendants' truth by seeking explanation of the purport of the assertion. Thus, the judgment of the court below which did not reach this point is erroneous in the incomplete hearing due to the omission of judgment or the non-exercise of the right to ask for explanation. The grounds of appeal on this point are with merit.

4. Therefore, among the part against the defendants in the judgment of the court below, the part concerning the amount of money equivalent to each fee from February 1, 2000 to January 31, 2001 is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The plaintiffs' appeal and the remaining appeals by the defendants are all dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Ji-dam (Presiding Justice)