(a) Whether the crime of bodily injury resulting from rape is established in the case of attempted rape;

B. Probative value of an ordinary doctor’s written appraisal

C. The court's decision on the defendant's letter of self-denunciation

(d) Crime causing rape and revocation of complaint;

(a) The establishment of the crime causing rape, even though rape was committed in the case of bodily injury resulting from rape, shall not affect the conclusion of the crime causing rape;

(b) it is not admissible as a written opinion of the general doctor who is not based on the National Institute of Scientific Investigation.

C. The number of self-denunciation is only a reason for voluntary reduction of or exemption from the punishment at the discretion of the judge. Thus, the first instance court or the lower court did not err by failing to determine the defendant's voluntary withdrawal order.

D. It does not constitute a judgment dismissing a public prosecution on the ground that the crime of bodily injury resulting from rape was not subject to a victim’s complaint, and thus the complaint was revoked.

(d)Article 301(c) of the Criminal Code; Article 52(1)(d) of the Criminal Code; Article 306(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code; Articles 313(2) and 323(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code;

C. Supreme Court Decision 80Do3042 delivered on February 26, 1980, 84Do3042 delivered on March 12, 1985, 88Do1205 delivered on August 23, 198 (Dong) (Supreme Court Decision 83Do59 delivered on May 24, 1983).

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Lee Han-han

Seoul High Court Decision 88No638 delivered on May 26, 198

The appeal is dismissed.

80 days, out of the days pending trial after appeal, shall be included in the principal sentence.

First, we examine the Defendant’s grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2 and the Defendant’s first ground of appeal.

If the original judgment and the evidence of the first instance judgment maintained by the original judgment are examined by comparing them with records, it is sufficient to recognize the facts constituting the crime, such as the statement of the first instance judgment, and there is no error of incomplete deliberation or mistake of facts as pointed out by the arguments, and it is justifiable that the first instance judgment applied Articles 301 and 297 of the Criminal Act to the crime of rape.

Furthermore, the argument that the Defendant was not planned to commit the crime of bodily injury resulting from rape in the instant case, and that the Defendant did not reach the victim’s sexual intercourse is irrelevant to the fact that there was no influence on the judgment, and that the crime of bodily injury resulting from rape in the event of rape was committed, it does not affect the establishment of the crime of bodily injury from rape in the instant case.

In addition, Article 176 of the Criminal Procedure Act does not apply to the notification and appraisal report of the result of the examination of the body of the deceased's body and the written appraisal that points out the arguments. In addition, according to the records of the first instance trial, it is clear that the above document obtained admissibility by the defendant's consent through lawful examination of evidence on the first trial date of the first instance trial. In addition, it is not admissible because it is an appraisal report by the general doctor who is not by the National Science Investigation

As to the motive for the crime of murder, the court found in the indictment that the Defendant was unaware of the fact that the Defendant was the mother of the Defendant’s pro-Japanese wound and had been aware of the fact that he was the mother of the Defendant’s pro-Japanese wound, and that the Defendant had been aware of the fact that he was the mother of the Defendant’s son’s son’s son’s son’s son’s son’s son’s son’s his son’s son’s son’s son’s son’s son’s son’s son’s son’s son’s son’s son’

In addition, according to the records, it is clear that the defendant's interrogation protocol of the defendant prepared by the prosecutor recognized the establishment and voluntariness on the first trial date of the first instance court, and each protocol of statement and seizure protocol of the court chief officer prepared by the judicial police assistant's assistant's assistant's assistant officer's assistant officer's assistant officer's assistant officer's assistant officer's assistant officer'

In the end, all the arguments are groundless.

The defendant's ground of appeal No. 3 is examined.

In the case of the crime of rape, bodily injury, or murder, a self-denunciation is only a reason for voluntary reduction of or exemption from punishment at the discretion of the judge. Thus, the first instance court or the court below's failure to judge the voluntary withdrawal order of the defendant is understood to the purport that it did not reduce or exempt self-denunciation (see Supreme Court Decision 80Do35, Feb. 26, 1980). Therefore, there is no error in law.

We examine the defendant's ground of appeal No. 4.

Since the crime of injury resulting from rape is not a crime subject to prosecution, it is not necessary to dismiss a public prosecution on the ground that it is not related to the requirement or effect of a public prosecution, and that the complaint has been revoked. The arguments are without merit on the premise that only the crime of attempted rape, not the crime of injury resulting from rape, is established against the defendant.

Next, the defendant's ground of appeal No. 5 and No. 2 are examined.

In light of the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the Defendant’s assertion that the Defendant was in a state of mental disorder under the influence of alcohol at the time of committing the instant crime in light of the following factors: (a) based on the evidence duly admitted by the court of first instance, the court below rejected the Defendant’s assertion that the Defendant was in a state of mental disorder; and (b) such determination is sufficiently acceptable; and (c) this cannot be viewed as exceeding the bounds of the principle

In addition, the argument that the defendant did not have a criminal intent or could not have predicted the occurrence of the result is that there was a mistake of facts as the above-mentioned decision, or that there is no question about this part.

Finally, the Defendant’s ground of appeal No. 3 is heavy in sentencing. However, in light of all the circumstances that form the basis for sentencing as indicated in the records of the instant case, such as the motive, means, consequence, criminal facts, the Defendant’s age, relationship with the victim, and circumstances after the crime, it cannot be deemed that the lower court’s judgment maintaining the first instance court’s judgment that sentenced the Defendant 20 years imprisonment with prison labor is extremely unfair, and therefore, the argument is groundless.

Therefore, the defendant's appeal is dismissed, and part of the days pending trial after the appeal is included in the principal sentence. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Ansan-man (Presiding Justice)