(a) Where the cause for revocation was a defect in the procedure or form of an administrative disposition, the effect of the final and conclusive judgment binding on the administrative agency;

(b) Whether the cancellation of a license for manufacturing becomes unusable as a factory site due to the revocation thereof and the lease of the land to the same business operator in accordance with the instructions of the competent administrative agency becomes a justifiable ground for non-business land subject to heavy taxation;

A. In a case where a judgment revoking an administrative disposition has become final and conclusive on the ground of an illegal defect in a certain administrative disposition, the administrative agency may not be allowed to take any administrative disposition that conflicts with the final and conclusive judgment on the grounds prior to the closing of arguments in the fact-finding proceedings of the administrative litigation. However, in a case where the grounds for revocation of the final and conclusive judgment were found in the procedure or form of the administrative disposition, the effect of the final and conclusive judgment binding on the administrative agency shall extend only to the procedure or form of illegality as the grounds for revocation, and thus, the administrative

B. The purport of Article 188 (1) 1 Item 3 of the Local Tax Act and Article 142 (1) 1 Item 7 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act is to impose heavy taxation on non-business land of a corporation, because the corporation neglects its own purpose despite its use for other benefits. Thus, if a snow corporation has justifiable grounds for not using it directly even if it is not used for its own proper purpose, it shall not be a non-business land subject to heavy taxation. Therefore, if the plaintiff company, upon revocation of a manufacture license, set a liquor factory including the land in this case, including the land in this case, can not be used for its own purpose, and if it leases the factory to another business operator having the same kind of license under the direction of the administrative agency, it shall be deemed that there is justifiable grounds for not using it for its own purpose.

(a) Article 1(b) of the Administrative Litigation Act; Article 188(1)3 of the Local Tax Act; Article 142(1)1 and 7 of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act;

A. Supreme Court Decision 84Nu406 delivered on October 23, 1984, 82Nu202 delivered on December 13, 1983

Attorney Jeon Jong-gu, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Egye Market

Gwangju High Court Decision 83Gu38 delivered on April 24, 1984

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Gwangju High Court.

The Plaintiff’s attorney’s ground of appeal is examined.

With respect to No. 1:

In a case where a judgment revoking an administrative disposition has become final and conclusive in an administrative litigation demanding the revocation of a certain administrative disposition on the grounds that there is an illegal defect, the fact that it is not permissible for the administrative disposition administrative agency to take another administrative disposition inconsistent with the final and conclusive judgment on the grounds prior to the closing of arguments in the fact-finding proceedings in the administrative litigation is identical with the party members' theory (see Supreme Court Decision 80Nu104 delivered on May 11, 1982). However, in a case where the grounds for revocation of such final and conclusive judgment were a defect in the procedure or form of the administrative disposition, the effect of the final and conclusive judgment binding on the administrative agency shall be limited to the procedure or form of illegality in the grounds for revocation, and therefore, the administrative agency may re-

According to the facts established by the court below, since the defendant regarded the land, etc. in this case as non-business land of the plaintiff company and made a high rate of property tax and defense tax disposition (the amount of tax almost the same as the tax in this case) according to the related provisions of the Local Tax Act, the plaintiff filed an administrative lawsuit to seek revocation of the tax disposition, which led to the plaintiff's decision that revoked the tax disposition on the ground that there was procedural defect in the procedure that did not specify the basis for calculation of the tax amount (the Gwangju High Court Decision 81Gu44 delivered on October 12, 1982). The defendant revoked the above tax disposition on December 10 of the same year and issued the tax disposition in this case with the same fact as the tax ground at the same time (the procedural defect has been supplemented). Thus, the defendant's decision is justified and there is no error of law in the final judgment as to the above final judgment by supplementing procedural defect in the tax disposition in this case. Thus, the judgment below is without merit.

With respect to the second ground:

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found that the plaintiff company was a corporation established for the purpose of manufacturing and selling spirits and its incidental businesses, and used the land of this case as a factory site, and did not carry out its target business thereafter due to the violation of the Grain Management Act on June 16, 1978. However, in accordance with the plan for utilization of idle Facilities by the National Tax Service, the head of the Ri District Tax Office ordered to lease the factory including the land of this case to Kim Jong-he, who was ordered by the Commissioner of the Gwangju District National Tax Service in accordance with the plan for utilization of alcoholic facilities by the National Tax Service to recommend that the factory of this case be leased to the above Kim Jong-he, and the defendant was engaged in the alcoholic manufacturing business by using the aforementioned factories since June 1, 1979, and the defendant did not directly use the land of this case for non-business purpose of the corporation under Article 142 (1) 1 Item 7 of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act. The court below determined that the above disposition of this case was justified for the plaintiff company's own purpose of taxation.

However, Article 18 (1) 1 Item 3 of the Local Tax Act and Article 142 (1) 1 Item 7 of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act, the purpose of heavy taxation is to punish a corporation as land for non-business purpose without any justifiable reason as of the date of commencement of the property tax payment period by deeming the land which is not directly used for its own proper purpose (the purpose stipulated in the laws or the articles of incorporation of a corporation) as the date of the commencement of the property tax payment period to be land for non-business purpose. Thus, in a case where there is a justifiable reason for not using the land directly even if it is not directly used for its own proper purpose, it shall not be a land for non-business purpose subject to heavy taxation (see Supreme Court Decision 82Nu202 delivered on December 13, 1983). Thus, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the land for non-business purpose in this case, and thus, it is reasonable to view the plaintiff corporation to use the land for non-business purpose under the jurisdiction of the competent administrative agency.

Therefore, the second ground for appeal is with merit, and the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Yoon Il-young (Presiding Justice) Gangwon-young Kim Young-ju