[1] The meaning of delegation of authority under Article 95 (1) of the Local Autonomy Act

[2] In a case where the head of a Gun delegates the administrative affairs for removal of unauthorized buildings to an Eup/Myeon under the Ordinance on Entrustment of Administrative Affairs, whether the head of Eup/Myeon has the right to take measures for removal of unauthorized buildings by proxy (affirmative)

[3] Whether the content and scope of the act of vicarious execution must be specified only by a letter of guidance for vicarious execution (negative)

[4] Whether a prior disposition, which is a procedure, is unlawful for a vicarious execution, shall be deemed unlawful (negative)

[1] The delegation of authority under Article 95(1) of the Local Autonomy Act constitutes a so-called delegation of external authority rather than delegation of internal enforcement affairs only.

[2] In a case where the head of a Gun delegated the administrative affairs for removal of unauthorized buildings to Eup/Myeon, a subordinate administrative agency, pursuant to the provisions of the Military Delegation Ordinance, the head of an Eup/Myeon has the authority to guide the removal of unauthorized buildings within his/her jurisdiction to execute the removal of unauthorized buildings.

[3] In the case of an administrative agency's order for vicarious execution under Article 3 (1) of the Administrative Vicarious Execution Act, if the obligor fails to perform by itself, the contents and scope of the act of vicarious execution should be specified. However, the contents and scope of the act of vicarious execution should not be specified only by a written order for vicarious execution, but it is sufficient if the content of the act of vicarious execution is specified, or if the obligor knows the scope of the obligation of vicarious execution, by taking into account the documents served before

[4] Even if there is an error in the process of vicarious execution, which is a subsequent procedure for an appeal, it cannot be deemed unlawful as a ground for appeal on the ground that such subsequent procedure is unlawful.

[1] Article 95 (1) of the Local Autonomy Act / [2] Article 95 (1) of the Local Autonomy Act, Article 3 (1) of the Administrative Vicarious Execution Act / [3] Article 3 (1) of the Administrative Vicarious Execution Act / [4] Article 3 (1) of the Administrative Vicarious Execution

[1] Supreme Court Decision 77Nu4 delivered on April 12, 197 (Gong1977, 10042) Supreme Court Decision 93Nu18754 delivered on May 27, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 1851) Supreme Court Decision 96Nu114 delivered on December 23, 1996 (Gong197Sang, 547) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 89Nu4543 delivered on January 25, 1990 (Gong190, 561) Supreme Court Decision 94Nu514 delivered on October 28, 1994 (Gong194Ha, 3142), Supreme Court Decision 90Nu189637 delivered on October 11, 196 (Gong1994Ha, 3142).

Masung Co., Ltd. (Attorney Im Im-soo et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Large-scale Eup/Myeon

Gwangju High Court Decision 96Gu22 delivered on September 6, 1996

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The Plaintiff’s attorney’s ground of appeal is examined.

1. Delegation of authority pursuant to Article 95(1) of the Local Autonomy Act is rather than delegated internally (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 77Nu4, Apr. 12, 1977; 93Nu18754, May 27, 1994; 93Nu18754, Apr. 27, 1994). According to the records, the head of Nam Jeju-gu delegated the affairs of removal and vicarious execution of unauthorized buildings to Eup/Myeon, which is an administrative agency under his jurisdiction (Records No. 80, Sept. 8, 200), and the defendant has the authority to dispose of the buildings of this case, which are unauthorized buildings within his jurisdiction, for the purpose of vicarious execution of removal. The judgment of the court below is justifiable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the disposal authority as pointed out in the lawsuit. It is without merit.

2. In giving an order for vicarious execution under Article 3 (1) of the Administrative Vicarious Execution Act, the contents and scope of the act of vicarious execution should be specified if the obligor fails to perform it by himself. However, the contents and scope of the act of vicarious execution should not be specified only by the order for vicarious execution, but only by taking into account the documents delivered before and after the order for vicarious execution or other circumstances, it is sufficient to determine the contents of the act of vicarious execution or if the obligor is able to know the scope of the obligation of vicarious execution (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Nu514, Oct. 28, 1994; 96Nu8086, Oct. 11, 1996; 96Nu3086, Oct. 11, 1996; 2000Da1333499, Apr. 19, 199).

3. As pointed out in the theory, even if there is an error of law in the vicarious execution, which is a subsequent procedure of the instant order disposition, as a matter of course, it cannot be viewed as an unlawful ground for the instant order disposition, which is a prior procedure, on the ground that it is unlawful in the subsequent procedure. Thus, the argument about this point cannot be accepted without need to further examine.

4. The court below held that the disposition of this case which forced removal of the building of this case by the procedure of vicarious execution is legitimate on the premise that the plaintiff's voluntary removal of the building of this case by the procedure of vicarious execution is extremely detrimental to the public interest, on the ground that the plaintiff's voluntary removal of the building of this case by any other means would result in a loss as pointed out by the plaintiff's theory as a result of the removal of the building of this case by the voluntary removal of the building of this case, even though the plaintiff's voluntary removal of the building of this case by the voluntary removal of the building of this case by the voluntary removal of the building of this case by the voluntary removal of the building of this case, and above all, on the premise that the removal of the building of this case by the above circumstance would seriously undermine the public interest. In light of the records and relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error of law

5. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed, and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Cho Chang-tae (Presiding Justice)