(a) Whether the content and scope of the act of vicarious execution should be specified only by the letter of guidance for vicarious execution in the case of vicarious dismissal;

(b) Whether the second and third measures are an administrative disposition, in case of non-compliance with the order to remove or the second and third measures against the illegal building;

(c) Whether the appeal against one of the co-owners of the illegal building is effective as against the other co-owners;

A. In the case of an administrative agency’s order for vicarious execution under Article 3(1) of the Administrative Vicarious Execution Act, the contents and scope of the act of vicarious execution should be specified in detail in the case of failure of the person liable for performance by himself. However, the contents and scope of the act of vicarious execution should not be specified only by a written order for vicarious execution, but it is sufficient to specify the contents of the act by taking into account the documents served before

B. If the owner of a building ordered the removal of the building for a certain period of time and notified the owner of the order to remove the building for a certain period of time, and in the event of the non-performance, the second and the third order to send the second order to remove the building again and urged the voluntary removal by a certain period of time, and notified the owner of the non-performance, the obligation to remove the building under the Administrative Vicarious Execution Act occurred as the first order to remove the building and the second and third order to remove the building, and the second and third order to remove the building is not a new obligation to remove the building, but a new administrative disposition is not an administrative disposition,

(c) Any height disposition against one of the co-owners of the illegal building shall not be effective against the other co-owners.

(a)(b) Article 3 of the Administrative Vicarious Execution Act, Article 42 of the former Building Act (see current Article 68 of the Building Act), Article 2 and Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act;

A. Supreme Court Decision 85Nu314 delivered on December 24, 1985 (Gong1986,345) 89Nu4543 delivered on January 25, 1990 (Gong1990,561) 91Nu13564 delivered on June 12, 1992 (Gong1992,2162) 83Nu1 delivered on July 26, 1983 (Gong1983,1357), Supreme Court Decision 90Nu5962 delivered on January 25, 1991 (Gong191,878) 93Nu211566 delivered on February 22, 194 (Gong1166)

Plaintiff 1 et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant Kim Dong-do, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Attorney Im Chang-won, Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellant

Gwangju High Court Decision 93Gu2451 delivered on March 24, 1994

The judgment of the court below against the plaintiff 1 is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Gwangju High Court.

Plaintiff 2’s appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal by Plaintiff 2 are assessed against the same Plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Judgment of the court below on the facts charged

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the above 1 and 2 stories were constructed as a ice factory in 1970 by the non-party 1, the non-party 2, who was the owner of the building at the time of 1985 to 181.32 square meters of the previous 2 stories without permission under the Building Act, and 60 square meters of the previous 2 stories as residential facilities for the purpose of factory use 85.32 square meters of the previous 2 stories were to be used by the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 2, the non-party 3, the non-party 4, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 4, the non-party 1, the non-party 2, the non-party 9, the non-party 1, the non-party 2, the non-party 9, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 2, the non-party 1, the plaintiff 1 and the non-party 2.

2. As to Plaintiff 2

In the vicarious execution order under Article 3 (1) of the Administrative Vicarious Execution Act, the contents and scope of the act of vicarious execution should be specified in detail where the person liable to perform the act by proxy fails to perform the act by proxy. However, the contents and scope of the act of vicarious execution does not necessarily have to be specified only by a written request for vicarious execution, but it is sufficient to specify the act when the contents of the act are specified by considering the documents or other circumstances delivered before and after the disposition (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 89Nu4543, Jan. 25, 1990; Supreme Court Decision 85Nu314, Dec. 24, 1985). In light of the above facts established by the court below, the plaintiff 2, the person liable to perform the vicarious execution, can sufficiently know the contents and scope of the act of vicarious execution. Thus, the disposition of this case cannot be said to be specified in detail.

Meanwhile, in a case where the defendant ordered the plaintiff 2, a co-owner of the building of this case to remove the building of this case by a certain period of time, and notified the plaintiffs of the order to remove the building of this case to the plaintiff 2, a co-owner of the building of this case, and notified that if the plaintiffs refuse to comply with the order to remove the building of this case by sending the second and the third order to remove the building of this case and urge the voluntary removal for a certain period of time, the above plaintiff's obligation to remove the building of this case occurred through the first and the third order to remove the building of this case, and the second and third order to remove the building of this case was not a new obligation to remove the building of this case by the above plaintiff, but it is merely a notification of the extension of the period of vicarious execution (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Nu5962, Jan. 25, 191; 83Nu1

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles or misunderstanding of reasoning. There is no ground for argument.

3. As to the plaintiff 1

According to the facts established by the court below, the first and second measures against the co-owners of the illegal building shall not be effective as against the other co-owners. The first and second measures against the plaintiff 1 among the co-owners of the building of this case shall not be effective as against the plaintiff 1. Therefore, the above measures for the first measures against the plaintiff 1 shall be deemed to be the first measures against the plaintiff 1. Therefore, the court below should have deliberated and judged the legality of the first measures against the plaintiff 2 as well as the first measures against the plaintiff 1. Thus, the court below dismissed the lawsuit of this case as a whole on the ground that the first measures against the plaintiff 2 shall be effective as against the plaintiff 1 as a matter of course, and it erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the counter-party which affected the validity of the first measures against the plaintiff 1 as to the part of this case, and there is a ground for pointing this out.

4. Therefore, of the judgment below, the appeal against the plaintiff 1 is with merit, and the judgment of the court below is reversed and remanded to the court below. The appeal against the plaintiff 2 is without merit, and this part of the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)