(a) The case affirming the court below's decision that although the act of borrowing funds from the credit union's federation is null and void due to the lack of a resolution of the board of directors, the repayment agreement made by the union members is valid;

(b) the meaning of “act within the scope of purposes under the law and the articles of incorporation that limits the legal capacity of a corporation;

C. Whether the repayment agreement between the National Credit Union Federation of Korea and the union members as referred to in the above "A" falls within the scope of the purpose of the above legal entity at the time of the enforcement of the former Credit Union Act (amended by Act No. 4070 of Dec. 31, 1988) (affirmative)

A. The case affirming the judgment of the court below which held that although a credit union borrowed Track purchase fund from its Federation without a resolution of the board of directors, a member who is the actual user of Trackter's Track's Track's Track's Track's Track

(b) capacity of a juridical person is limited by the law and the purposes of its articles of incorporation that are the basis for the establishment of the juridical person, but acts within the scope of that purpose are not limited to the purposes per se specified in the law or articles of incorporation, but to all necessary acts directly and indirectly in the fulfillment of that purpose;

C. Even if the scope of business of the credit cooperative under Article 70 of the former Credit Cooperatives Act (amended by Act No. 4070 of Dec. 31, 198) does not include transactions with members, the credit cooperative is able to provide loans, etc. to the cooperative under the above Act, so it can be deemed that the transactions with members through the cooperative are naturally anticipated. In addition, since the act of securing loans to the cooperative is necessary to achieve its purpose, the repayment agreement under the above Paragraph (a) belongs to acts within the scope of its purpose.

A. Article 29 of the Credit Unions Act, Article 105 of the Civil Act, Article 34 of the Civil Act. Article 70 of the former Credit Unions Act (amended by Act No. 4070 of Dec. 31, 198)

B. Supreme Court Decision 86Meu1522 decided Oct. 13, 1987 (Gong1987, 1699) (Gong1987, 1699) 86Meu1230 decided Dec. 8, 1987 (Gong1988, 256) (Gong198, 445)

[Plaintiff-Appellee] National Credit Union Federation of Korea

Defendant

Seoul High Court Decision 90Na27964 delivered on January 24, 1991

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed) are examined as follows.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found on June 1, 1984 that the non-party Pungyang Credit Union (hereinafter referred to as the "non-party union") borrowed 14,758,000 won from the plaintiff with the bitr purchase fund and agreed to repay the above principal and interest after June 1, 1985 because the plaintiff failed to pay the interest after June 1, 1985, and the defendant urged the plaintiff to pay the above loan to the plaintiff, and the loan from the non-party union was made without a resolution of the board of directors and thus null and void, but the above repayment agreement of the defendant decided that the non-party union decided to pay the above loan solely without relation to the non-party union, and rejected the defendant's claim that the non-party union was liable to pay the above loan with the plaintiff. In light of the records, the court below's fact-finding and decision is justified and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles or misapprehension of legal principles as to the above process.

2. The legal capacity of a juristic person is limited by the law that is the basis of the establishment of a juristic person and the purpose of its articles of incorporation, but acts within the scope of its purpose is not limited to the purpose itself specified in the law or articles of incorporation, but also includes all necessary acts directly and indirectly in the performance of its purpose. Thus, even if the plaintiff's business scope is not included in the plaintiff's business scope under Article 70 of the former Credit Union Act (amended by Act No. 4070 of Dec. 31, 198), it can be deemed that the plaintiff is able to make a loan to a union pursuant to the above Article 70 of the former Credit Union Act, so the plaintiff is able to expect a transaction with a union members through the union, so it is necessary for the achievement of the plaintiff's purpose, and thus, the act of securing a loan claim, such as this case, belongs to the scope of the plaintiff's purpose, and thus,

3. In addition, since the Track price claimed by the Plaintiff is higher than the case of purchasing via a city or agricultural cooperative, the Defendant’s assertion that the Plaintiff’s claim for the full payment of the purchase price is unreasonable is merely to criticize the lower court’s finding of facts as to the existence of an agreement for full payment of the purchase price, and even if the Plaintiff reduced or exempted part of the purchase price to the purchaser of other agricultural machinery than the Defendant, the mere fact cited by the lawsuit cannot be deemed to be against the principle of equity. All arguments are without merit.

Therefore, the appeal is without merit, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Sang-won (Presiding Justice)