[1] The time when damages for delay due to a tort occurred

[2] In exceptional cases where damages for delay of compensation liability due to tort should be calculated from the date of the conclusion of fact-finding proceedings, whether the principal of compensation can be increased at the time of the conclusion of arguments (affirmative), and matters to be considered when calculating compensation in cases where a systematic and intentional act of violation of human rights was committed by public officials

[3] The method of deducting criminal compensation first received under the former Criminal Compensation Act in the course of calculating the amount of damages for illegal confinement, etc.

[1] In principle, liability for damages arising from a tort does not have a separate notice of performance, and damages for delay occur at the same time as the liability is established. However, if the national income level at the time of the conclusion of arguments, which is the basis for the calculation of damages, and the circumstances such as monetary value, etc., are significantly changed compared to the time of the tort as a result of the conclusion of arguments, which are the basis for the calculation of damages, and the amount of damages for delay that reflects the above consideration is inevitable, it shall be exceptionally deemed that damages for delay

[2] In exceptional cases where damages for delay due to tort liability should be calculated from the date of closing argument in fact-finding proceedings, it is necessary to appropriately increase the principal of consolation money at the time of closing argument in consideration of the circumstances where compensation for consolation money in the amount deemed appropriate to be paid immediately as of the time of the establishment of the liability until the time of closing argument. Furthermore, in cases where a public official’s organized and intentional act of violation of human rights was committed, the necessity to prevent and prevent recurrence of similar cases should also be considered as important reasons.

[3] Article 5(1) of the former Criminal Compensation Act (wholly amended by Act No. 10698, May 23, 201) provides that “this Act shall not prohibit a person entitled to compensation from claiming compensation pursuant to the provisions of other Acts.” Article 5(3) provides that “When a person entitled to compensation under the provisions of other Acts has received compensation for the same cause, the amount of compensation shall be determined after deducting the amount of compensation from the amount of compensation.” Article 6(1) and (3) of the current Criminal Compensation and Restoration of Honor Act also provides for the same purport. However, a person who has been detained or sentenced to punishment in a criminal procedure can receive compensation by proving a cause attributable to a public official. In light of the purport of the Criminal Compensation Act, it is reasonable to first receive compensation from a person who has already received compensation before receiving compensation from a fact-finding court in the order of liability for tort compensation and damages from the date of receiving compensation from the original amount of compensation for which the compensation for delayed payment should be calculated based on the principle of statutory appropriation.

[1] Article 751 of the Civil Act / [2] Article 751 of the Civil Act / [3] Article 5 (1) of the former Criminal Compensation Act (wholly amended by Act No. 10698, May 23, 2011) (see current Article 6 (1) and (3) (see current Article 6 (3) of the Criminal Compensation and Restoration of Honor Act)

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2009Da103950 Decided January 13, 201 (Gong2011Sang, 319), Supreme Court en banc Decision 2011Da199 Decided July 21, 201 (Gong2011Ha, 1709) / [2/3] Supreme Court Decision 2010Da53419 Decided January 13, 201 / [2] Supreme Court Decision 2010Da12344 Decided January 27, 2011

Plaintiff 1 and six others (Attorney Kim Jong-sung, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Republic of Korea (Government Law Firm, Attorneys Kim Jong-hwan et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2010Na69331 decided April 13, 2011

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against each appellant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Regarding the plaintiffs' grounds of appeal

In principle, liability for damages arising from a tort does not have a separate peremptory notice of performance, and damages for delay occur at the same time as the performance of the obligation is established. However, in cases where the amount of consolation money which reflects the amount of consolation money as a result of considerable changes in the national income level at the time of the conclusion of arguments at the time of the conclusion of arguments at the time of the tort and the time of the conclusion of arguments at the time of the conclusion of arguments at the time of the conclusion of arguments at the time of the tort and the time of the conclusion of arguments at the time of the conclusion of arguments at the time of the tort, and where a significant increase in the amount of consolation money is inevitable, the damages for delay of the compensation liability due to the tort shall be deemed to have occurred from the date of the conclusion of arguments at the time of the conclusion of the fact-finding court, which is the basis of

In light of the facts duly admitted by the court below, we affirm the judgment of the court below that the damages for delay should be exceptionally the date of commencing the damages for delay due to the tort in this case as the date of closing argument at the court of fact-finding. There is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the initial date of claiming damages

2. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal

A. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 through 4

With respect to the amount of consolation money for non-property damage caused by a tort, a fact-finding court may determine it at its own discretion, taking into account various circumstances, and the court does not have to clearly state all the circumstances based on which the amount of consolation money is determined in its own discretion (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 428Da529, Mar. 3, 1956; 2002Da43165, Nov. 26, 2002). Meanwhile, in exceptional cases where damages for delay of consolation money liability for tort should be calculated from the date of the closing of argument in the fact-finding court, it is necessary to appropriately increase the principal amount of consolation money at the time of the closing of argument in consideration of the circumstances where compensation for consolation money in the amount deemed appropriate as at the time of the tort committed is prolonged until the time of the closing of argument. Furthermore, in cases where a public official’s organized and gross human rights violation was committed by intention as in this case, the necessity to restrain and prevent recurrence of similar cases should also be considered as important reasons such as the above.

In light of the above legal principles, reasoning of the judgment below, and records, the amount of consolation money of this case acknowledged by the court below cannot be deemed to be excessive against the principle of equity, and further, there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles or law as alleged in the ground of appeal by the defendant.

B. Ground of appeal No. 5

Article 5(1) of the former Criminal Compensation Act (wholly amended by Act No. 10698, May 23, 2011) provides that “this Act shall not prohibit any person entitled to compensation from claiming compensation pursuant to the provisions of other Acts.” Article 5(3) provides that “When a person entitled to compensation under other Acts has received compensation for the same cause, the amount of compensation shall be determined after deducting the amount of compensation from the amount of compensation.” Article 6(1) and (3) of the current Criminal Compensation and Restoration of Honor Act also provides that the same purport shall be prescribed in the same Act. However, if a person who has been detained or sentenced to punishment is not confined in criminal proceedings, he/she may receive compensation by proving the cause of the public official’s fault, and if the person has already received compensation from a public official without any need to prove the cause attributable to the public official, then he/she may receive compensation from a fact-finding court by deducting compensation from the original amount of compensation for tort liability at the time of receiving compensation from the same amount of compensation for delay as that at the time of the same criminal compensation.

In light of the above legal principles, it is just that the court below, in accordance with the legal principles as seen earlier, appropriated the criminal compensation payment received by Plaintiff 1 in accordance with the above plaintiff's compensation for actual income and the compensation for delay in the order of the principal and the damages for delay in the payment of the compensation for actual income of the above plaintiff 1, and then deducted the remaining compensation payment from the compensation for delay in the order of the principal and the compensation for delay. It is reasonable that the court below did not err in violating the provisions of Article 5 (3) of the Criminal Compensation Act concerning the deduction of the payment for appropriation of criminal compensation. From other perspective, the defendant's ground for

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Poe-young (Presiding Justice)