(a) The case holding that the res judicata effect of the previous suit claiming the succession of possession A or B does not extend to the subsequent suit claiming the succession of possession B only;

(b) The register of voluntary options from the date of commencing acquisition;

A. The Plaintiff filed a lawsuit that “the Defendant filed a lawsuit against the Plaintiff who succeeded to the possession of Gap and Eul prior to the completion of the prescriptive acquisition period,” but in that lawsuit, the Plaintiff, who purchased the land from the Plaintiff, cannot directly seek implementation of the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer based on the prescriptive acquisition, on the ground that “the possessor at the time of the completion of the prescriptive acquisition period, even if the Plaintiff’s assertion is based on the Plaintiff’s assertion, and thus, cannot seek implementation of the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer based on the prescriptive acquisition.” In the event that the Plaintiff seeks implementation of the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer based on the prescriptive acquisition on the ground that he succeeded to possession after the judgment, the subsequent lawsuit is different from the subject of the above final judgment and the person to whom the ownership, which is the basis of the prescriptive acquisition, belongs, and thus, it cannot be said that it conflicts

B. In calculating the period of prescriptive acquisition, the initial date of the commencement of possession is impossible to choose at will, but in the absence of change to the actual owner, it is sufficient to determine whether the required period has expired on the basis of the time at which the actual owner can assert the completion of prescriptive acquisition.

A. Article 199 of the Civil Act, Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act. Article 245(1) of the Civil Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 91Da26577, 26584 delivered on October 22, 1991 (Gong1991, 2811). Supreme Court Decision 91Da8104 delivered on July 26, 1991 (Gong1991, 281) 92Da12377 delivered on January 15, 1993 (Gong1993Sang, 698) 93Da30013 delivered on November 26, 1993 (Gong194, 196)

[Judgment of the court below]

Attorney Lee Im-soo, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Changwon District Court Decision 92Na6703 delivered on July 8, 1993

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. On the first ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below recognized the plaintiff's claim on May 18, 193 as to the land of this case on the non-party 1, the ownership transfer registration for the non-party 2 was completed on June 30, 195, which was destroyed by the above register on the non-party 1, the non-party 1, and the non-party 1, who purchased the above land again on June 30, 1954, the ownership transfer registration for the non-party 1 was completed again on May 8, 1963, and the non-party 2, who purchased the above land on the non-party 1, on the non-party 4, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, who purchased the above ownership transfer registration for the non-party 1, the non-party 2, who purchased the above land on the non-party 9's non-party 1, who purchased the above land on the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the heir's ownership registration for the non-party 96.

There is no reason to discuss this issue.

2. On the second ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the defendant's assertion that the possession of the above non-party 3 and the non-party 2 in the land in this case is the possession of the owner, as alleged by the defendant, the evidence that the non-party 1 donated the above land to the ○○ Institute as a practical answer, and there is no evidence that the non-party 1 knowingly occupied the above land even if the non-party 1 donated the above land to the above ○ Institute, and there is no evidence that the non-party 3 knowingly occupied the above land, and even if the non-party 1 illegally occupied the above land without a title, the non-party 3 cannot be viewed as the owner's intention. In addition, in light of the records, the court below rejected the defendant's above assertion on the ground that even if it illegally occupied the above land

3. On the third ground for appeal

In calculating the period of prescriptive acquisition, the initial date of the commencement of possession can not be chosen at will, but if there is no change to the real owner (registered person), the initial date of the commencement of possession will be sufficient when the lapse of the required period is confirmed only by considering the fact at the time when the real owner can assert the completion of prescriptive acquisition (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 87Meu2733, Dec. 16, 198; 91Da8104, Jul. 26, 1991).

The court below presumed that the plaintiff succeeded to the possession of the above non-party 2 from July 23, 1963 that the plaintiff occupied the land of this case in peace and public performance with the intention to own the land of this case from July 23, 1963, and it was presumed that the non-party 2 succeeded to the possession of the above non-party 3, the decedent, and even if the time of commencement of possession of the above non-party 3 transferred to July 23, 1963, the above non-party 4 succeeded to the above non-party 1's rights and duties comprehensively succeeded to the above non-party 1's rights and duties, and the defendant also does not fall under the case where the actual owner's change as the non-party 4's sole property heir, the starting point of the prescription period is as of July 23, 1963, and therefore, the court below's decision that the prescriptive acquisition was completed on July 23, 1983 as to the land of this case, is justified, and the above decision of the court below is without merit.

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)