[1] Whether the exercise period of the right of possession protection under Articles 204(3) and 205(2) of the Civil Code constitutes the period of release (affirmative)

[2] In a case where the second purchaser of real estate actively participated in the seller's breach of trust and thus the second purchaser's transfer of ownership to the second purchaser based on a second sale contract which is null and void as an anti-social legal act, whether the first purchaser may assert the invalidity of the registration of transfer of ownership (affirmative with qualification)

[3] In a case where a second sale contract was concluded between the first seller and the second buyer as an agent of other co-inheritors after the death of the first seller, and the second buyer as to the whole real estate, and such second sale contract was null and void as an anti-social juristic act by actively participating in the act of the co-inheritors's breach of trust, whether the scope of invalidity is limited to the share of the co-inheritors who participated directly in the second sale contract (negative)

[4] Whether the registration of title trust alone can be deemed as naturally occupying real estate by the title trustee (negative), the nature of the title trustee’s possession recognized as such, and whether the title truster can be deemed as the title truster’s registration title in the acquisition of the registry by prescription when the title truster continues to possess the real estate after the registration of title trust (negative)

[1] Under Articles 204(3) and 205(2) of the Civil Act, the right to claim against the person who was deprived of, or obstructed the possession shall be exercised within one year from the date on which the possession was deprived or the interfered with the possession was terminated. Here, the right subject to the exclusion period is not the right to form a contract but the ordinary right to claim, and when the state of deprivation of, or interfered with, the possession goes beyond a certain period, it can be seen that it would be a peaceful state in society as it is, and rather, it would be deemed as a disturbance of peace. Therefore, it is reasonable to permit reinstatement after a certain period of period of time is more consistent with the occupancy system and to set a short-term exclusion period in the right to claim such as the recovery of possession or the removal of interference. In light of the above, it is reasonable to interpret the exclusion period as the so-called released period, which must be brought within the said period of time.

[2] In a case where the second purchaser of real estate actively participated in the seller's act of breach of trust and thus the second purchaser becomes null and void as it constitutes an anti-social juristic act, even if the second purchaser's registration of ownership transfer based on the second purchaser's invalid contract has been completed in accordance with a final and conclusive judgment, the first purchaser may assert the invalidity of the above transfer registration to the extent that it does not conflict with the res judicata of the final

[3] In a case where the second sale contract was concluded between the first seller and the second buyer, who referred to as an agent of other co-inheritors as one of the co-inheritors after the inheritance took place, and the second buyer actively participated in the act of the co-inheritors's breach of trust, and thus becomes null and void as it constitutes an anti-social juristic act, not only the share of the co-inheritors directly involved in the second sale contract, but also the sales contract and the registration of transfer of ownership based thereon should be deemed null and void.

[4] A person registered as an owner of a real estate through a title trust cannot be deemed to possess the real estate as a matter of course on his/her sole basis, and even if his/her possession is recognized, it cannot be deemed to be an possession with the nature of the source of possession right. Meanwhile, in cases where the title truster continues to possess and transfers the title of registration to the trustee, the title of the trustee’s registration cannot be deemed to be the same as the title of the truster

[1] Articles 204(3) and 205(2) of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 103 and 186 of the Civil Act, Articles 202 and 204 of the Civil Procedure Act / [3] Article 103 of the Civil Act / [4] Articles 103 [title trust], 197, and 245 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 71Da2641 delivered on February 22, 1972 (No. 20-1, No. 115) / [4] Supreme Court Decision 85Meu164 delivered on November 10, 1987 (Gong198, No. 7665 delivered on December 10, 1991 (Gong1992, No. 4866), Supreme Court Decision 92Da20415 delivered on August 18, 1992 (Gong192, No. 2758), Supreme Court Decision 96Da7403 delivered on June 11, 196 (Gong196Ha, No. 2132)

1. A person who has received a lawsuit in accordance with paragraph (1) of this Article; and

Yellow planting

Seoul High Court Decision 99Na55702, 2000Na51331 delivered on December 28, 2000

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against each party.

1. As to a counterclaim and a final appeal on the part relating to a claim for damages among the principal claim

The Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff; hereinafter referred to as “Defendant”) did not submit any ground of appeal on the part of the counterclaim claim within a fixed period of time. The Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant; hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff”) did not submit any ground of appeal on the part of the counterclaim claim.

2. As to the remaining grounds of appeal on the claim for main lawsuit

A. As to the plaintiffs' appeal

(1) The court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its holding, and determined that the defendant's act of denying or obstructing the defendant's possession of the land of this case as to the part of the plaintiffs' claim against the right of possession of the above 15 land by denying the plaintiffs' possession of the land of this case 15 in the plaintiffs' claim as to the transfer of the above 15 land, removal of the steel pents installed on the above land, and prohibition of obstruction of possession of the above 15 land, was terminated on March 197 by installing the steel pents on the boundary and installing the steel pents to prevent the plaintiffs' decedent's decedent's entry into the river 15 land. Since it is apparent that the defendant brought a lawsuit seeking delivery of the above 15 land of this case and removal of the above steel pents after the lapse of one year, the defendant's action against the above 15-year exclusion period of possession recovery, obstruction of possession, removal of the above 15-year suspension period of possession and removal of the above land is also unlawful.

(2) Examining the relevant evidence in light of the records, the court below's fact-finding and judgment are just and acceptable in all with respect to the possession of the 15 land of this case as to the possession of the 15 land of this case, the defendant's deprivation of possession and the termination of its obstruction. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the 15 land of this case or in the misapprehension

In addition, according to Articles 204(3) and 205(2) of the Civil Act, the right to claim against the person who was deprived of or interfered with the possession shall be exercised within one year from the date on which the possession was deprived of or the act of interference with the possession was terminated. Here, the right to claim exclusion period is not the right to form a right but the ordinary right to claim, and if the state of deprivation of or interference with the possession has passed, it can be seen that it would be a peaceful state in society as it is, and rather, it would be a disturbance of peace. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to permit reinstatement after a certain period of period of time to the right to claim recovery or interference with the right to claim the recovery or interference with the possession. In light of the above, it is reasonable to interpret the above exclusion period as the period of release, which must be filed within the said period of time, rather than the period of time sufficient to exercise the right to claim from an extra-judicial court, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the right to claim exclusion or interference with the possession.

B. As to the Defendant’s appeal

(1) Examining the relevant evidence in light of the records, the court below held that the land of this case 11 was originally owned by the non-party 1 without being unregistered as the land divided from 394 to 2,935 to 11, 1976, which was originally the previous land of this case, the land of this case, which was originally owned by the non-party 1. The non-party 1 sold the previous land to the Lee Jong-gun without being unregistered, and then delivered the land to the non-party 1, around May 1938, the plaintiff 1 was the husband of the last office and the other father Cho Chang-ho (Death on June 20, 200) who was the father of the plaintiffs and his father who was the non-party 1 and purchased it without completing the registration, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there is no violation of the rules of evidence against the rules of evidence.

(2) Examining the relevant evidence in light of the records, the court below's fact-finding and judgment as to the process of continuing the possession, notwithstanding the circumstances leading to the possession of the 11 land of this case and the defendant's obstruction, are just and acceptable, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence or misapprehension of the legal principles as to possession, and in the facts stated in its reasoning, the court below's acceptance of the claim of this case based on possession right does not violate the principles of social justice and equity.

(3) Comprehensively taking account of the evidence established, the court below rejected the registration of ownership transfer on March 12, 1976 on the premise that Nonparty 1 purchased the previous land under the name of Nonparty 1 without completing the registration of ownership transfer, and Nonparty 2 still registered Nonparty 1 as the owner on the old land land cadastre before May 1976, Nonparty 1 purchased the previous land under the name of Nonparty 1, the owner of Nonparty 1, and Nonparty 3, his heir of Australia, sold the previous land under his name after completing the registration of ownership transfer and distributed profits therefrom. The court below determined that Nonparty 2 purchased the previous land from Nonparty 3, etc., who is the owner of Nonparty 1’s property heir, on the ground that Nonparty 1 had completed the registration of ownership transfer transfer under the name of Nonparty 1’s ownership transfer under the name of Nonparty 1’s title and completed the registration of ownership transfer transfer under the above name of Nonparty 1’s ownership transfer on the ground that Nonparty 3, etc. was aware of the ownership transfer registration under the above ownership transfer registration under the name of the above 97.

In a case where the second purchaser of a real estate actively participated in the act of a seller's breach of trust and thus the second purchaser becomes null and void as it constitutes an anti-social juristic act, even if the second purchaser's ownership transfer registration based on the second purchaser's second sale contract was completed in accordance with the final and conclusive judgment, the first purchaser may assert the invalidity of the second purchaser's ownership transfer registration to the extent that it does not conflict with the res judicata effect of the final and conclusive judgment. Meanwhile, in a case where the second sale contract was concluded on the whole real estate between one co-inheritors and the second purchaser as an agent of other co-inheritors after the death of the first seller and inheritance, and the second sale contract was null and void as it constitutes an anti-social juristic act on the grounds as seen above, not only the share of the co-inheritors directly involved in the second sale contract, but also the sales contract and the ownership transfer registration based thereon shall be deemed null and void.

In light of the records on the premise of the above legal principles, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are just and acceptable. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to double selling of property and anti-social order by the act of violating the rules of evidence or by misapprehending the legal principles as to double selling of property by the act of violating the rules of evidence, as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal. Since the ownership transfer registration in the future is based on a final judgment, it cannot be denied until the new judgment is issued, or even if the double selling of property in this case is null and void as a anti-social juristic act

(4) Based on the facts duly admitted, the lower court rejected the Defendant’s defense in the Defendant’s principal lawsuit against the statute of limitations on the acquisition of the registry, on the grounds that, during the period of the prescriptive acquisition period for the Defendant’s assertion, the military house construction corporation, a title trustee of the Sung-do Housing Association, did not have occupied or continuously occupied the instant land 11 with the Defendant’s intent to own the land from around January 24, 1989 to January 24, 1989, and that the registration under the name of the title truster cannot be deemed as the registration of the title truster.

A person registered as an owner of a real estate through a title trust cannot be deemed to possess the real estate as a matter of course on the sole basis of the fact, and even if his/her possession is recognized, he/she cannot be deemed to possess the real estate independently due to the nature of the source of possession right (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 85Meu1644, Nov. 10, 1987; 91Da27655, Dec. 10, 1991). Meanwhile, in cases where the title truster continues to possess the real estate and transfers the title to the trustee, the title truster’s registration cannot be deemed to be the same as the title truster’s registration.

Upon examining the records on the premise of the above legal principles, the recognition and determination by the court below is just, and in the case of title trust, the assertion in the grounds of appeal that the title of registration and the possession of the trustee shall be deemed concurrently exist regardless of whether the truster occupies or occupies it, cannot be adopted as an independent opinion.

3. Therefore, each appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Ji-dam (Presiding Justice)