The method of denying the parent-child relationship of a child born by a father where it is apparent that the wife is unable to capture the child of the father.

Article 844 of the Civil Act applies to cases where the wife was born while living together and the wife was able to capture the father while living together, and where one side of the married couple remains in a foreign country over a long-term period of time or the married couple is living separately due to de facto divorce, etc., if it is apparent that the wife is unable to capture the father due to lack of the attached document, there is no presumption, and if the wife was living together and gave birth of a child about 2 years and 2 months after the birth of the father in this case, the father may file a lawsuit to confirm the existence of the father-child relationship without action of denial of paternity, since the presumption of the said provision does not extend to the presumption of paternity.

(Dissenting Opinion)

Article 844 of the Civil Act, along with the provision as to the action of denial of paternity under Article 846 of the same Act, sets forth the general principle to uniformly presume the person who has born during the marriage as the father of the child, and, in exceptional cases to deny this, it may be reversed by proving the facts by the action of denial of paternity in accordance with the general principle. Thus, an exceptional case contrary to the general principle is contrary to the fundamental purport of the above Article 844 of the same Act, and a limited interpretation of the presumption is contrary to the above Article 844 of the same Act. Since the marriage means all legal confusion, the restriction on the case where the husband and wife engages in a normal marital life refers to the case where the husband and the husband are engaged in the normal marital life, and further, the restriction on the period of time-limit of the action of denial of paternity is for the prompt confirmation of the father's marital relationship

Articles 844, 846, and 847 of the Civil Act

Claimant

appellees

Seoul High Court Decision 82Reu21 delivered on October 4, 1982

Suwon District Court Decision 81D388 delivered on December 30, 1981

The judgment of the court below is reversed.

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked, and the case shall be remanded to the Suwon District Court Panel Division.

We examine the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal No. 1.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the fact that the claimant and the non-party 1 were legal couples who completed the marriage report on May 30, 1931, and the divorce report was filed on March 11 each year at the Suwon District Court on February 29, 1980 in accordance with the confirmation of divorce judgment at the Suwon District Court on February 29, 1980, and the claimant is the primary claim, and the non-party 1, the plaintiff, who left the court around October 15, 194 and delivered the respondent on January 15, 194. Thus, the respondent asserted that the non-party 1, the non-party 1, while the non-party 1 was born in the marital relationship with the claimant, which is presumed to be the natural father's husband's husband's husband's husband's husband's husband's husband's husband's husband's husband's husband's husband's husband's husband's husband's husband's wife's claim. In order to deny the child's claim, the claimant's claim can be dismissed.

As to the presumption of paternity, Article 844 of the Civil Act provides that a child born within 300 days from the date of marriage or from the expiration of marriage shall be presumed to have been born during marriage, and Article 846 of the Civil Act provides for a lawsuit of denial of paternity in a case where the presumption is received within 300 days from the date of marriage, but Article 844 provides that the above presumption shall apply to a case where the wife was born while living together with the father (hereinafter the same shall apply) is able to capture the child under the condition where the wife becomes able to capture the father (hereinafter the same shall apply), and where one spouse goes abroad for a long time or where the father is in de facto divorce, such presumption shall not be deemed to have been made if it is apparent that the wife is unable to capture the father's child within 7 months from the time of marriage, and it is contrary to the above legal principle as to the presumption of paternity of paternity as stated above. This is because the above Article 844 of the Civil Act provides that the presumption of paternity may be established within 75 months from the premise that the marital relationship was established.

Accordingly, without examining the grounds of appeal as to the remaining conjunctive claims, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the members are decided by themselves. According to the records, the court of first instance dismissed the lawsuit on the ground that the appeal of this case seeking confirmation of absence of parental relation is unlawful as at the time of the above original judgment, but this cannot be maintained as there is any error in law as above. Thus, the judgment of the court of first instance shall be revoked, and the case shall be remanded to the Panel Division of Suwon District Court which is the

In this decision, all of the participating judges except the dissenting opinions as follows, among the participating judges, interesting of the Supreme Court judges, interesting of the Supreme Court judges, understanding of the Supreme Court judges, Kim Jung-soo, and the position of the Supreme Court judges.

The dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court Justices is as follows. He is interesting of the Supreme Court judges, Lee Il-il of the Supreme Court judges, Kim Jung-soo of the Supreme Court judges.

Article 844(1) of the Civil Act provides that a person who was born within 200 days from the date of the marriage or from the date of the termination of marriage shall be presumed to have been born during the marriage by the father (the father and the father; the same shall apply hereinafter). Article 844(2) of the Civil Act provides that a person who was born within 300 days from the date of the marriage formation or from the date of the termination of marriage shall be presumed to have been born within the marriage shall be presumed to have been born naturally on the basis of the spirit of the law which expects peace between husband and wife and the peace between families, and shall be bound by the Korean identification system, including marriage. The obligation between husband and wife is essential for the maintenance of peace and family system. Therefore, a person who was born during marriage is naturally presumed to be his father’s husband’s husband’s husband’s husband’s husband’s husband’s husband’s husband’s husband’s husband’s husband’s husband’s failure and thus, the presumption of denial of paternity by the action of paternity can be interpreted by Article 8486(4) of the Civil Act.

In addition, since the legal system of our country provides that the effect of the presumption of paternity as a report of a family register shall be established, it is clear that the marriage during the marriage under Article 844 of the Civil Act is legally effective, and that it is not a de facto marital relationship, and even if it is not a de facto marital relationship, the child born during the absence of a report of marriage cannot be said to be a child born after 200 days have passed since the establishment of the marital relationship, and even if the marital relationship is terminated, the child born within 300 days after the establishment of the legal relationship can not be deemed to have been born during the marriage. Thus, it is unreasonable to interpret that there is an exceptional circumstance that is contrary to the above legal principle of presumption of marital relationship, such as the provision on the presumption of paternity, which is contrary to the general principles of presumption of marital relationship, even if there is no reason to deny the marital relationship by reporting the marital relationship as well as the exceptional situation that is contrary to the above legal principle of presumption of marital relationship.

The Majority Opinion, based on the provision of Article 847 of the Civil Act, which provides for the limitation period of the action of denial of paternity, provides for the peace of the family on the premise that the couple’s normal marital life is in operation, and thus, the requirement of the action of denial of paternity may be applied to the case where the couple lacks normal marital life, which is contrary to the purport of the strict provision on the presumption of paternity. However, the provision that the action of denial of paternity may be brought within one year from the day on which the father’s birth becomes aware of the child’s birth, which is the strict reason for the strict requirement, intends to be interpreted in a limited manner on the ground that the provision on the presumption of paternity goes against the stability of the order of the presumption of paternity by limiting the period of action and allowing the father’s family relationship to be promptly decided. If the application of the provision on the presumption of paternity is cancelled by the interpretation of strict provision on the presumption of paternity, it is difficult to reverse the principle of denial of paternity under Article 86 of the Civil Act.

The provision on the presumption of paternity provides that the presumption of paternity shall be based on the presumption of good faith and the net conclusion of the family shall be maintained by the division of the husband and wife. In light of the fact that the provision on the presumption of paternity is based on the iron and the limitation of the interpretation, we can say that the consistent view of the party members based on the previous unlimited theory should be maintained, and that it is reasonable at the time of the original adjudication, and that it is not possible to agree with the majority opinion.

Justices Park So-young (Presiding Justice) Lee So-young (Presiding Justice) Lee So-young, Kim So-young, Lee So-young, Lee So-young, Lee So-young, Lee So-young, Lee So-young, Lee So-young