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(영문) 대법원 1983. 7. 26. 선고 82도385 판결
[살인][집31(4)형,29;공1983.10.1.(713),1367]
Main Issues

A. Admissibility of evidence of the suspect's written statement prepared during the police investigation process

B. Admissibility of evidence of witness testimony made by the defendant at the time of the police investigation

Summary of Judgment

A. If the document or document recording or recording the suspect's statement is prepared in the investigation process of the investigative agency, it shall be deemed an interrogation protocol of suspect even if it is prepared in the form of statement, written statement, written statement, written statement, etc., and if it is denied in the court

B. The witness's testimony at the time of the police investigation of the defendant is inadmissible as long as the defendant denies the contents of the statement at the police court.

[Reference Provisions]

A. Articles 312, 313(b) and 316 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 72Do1479 delivered on September 14, 1982, 79Do493 delivered on May 8, 1979

Escopics

Defendant

upper and high-ranking persons

Prosecutor

Defense Counsel

Attorney Park Jin-han, Gyeong-han

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 81No2457 delivered on January 7, 1982

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the records, if the evidence cited by the theory of theory is examined, the statement prepared by the defendant is prepared in the process of investigation by the police, and the defendant denies its contents.

Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a suspect interrogation protocol prepared by an investigative agency other than a public prosecutor may be used only when the defendant who was a suspect or defense counsel admitted the contents thereof at a preparatory hearing or during a public trial. In the past, the provision of the Criminal Procedure Act was enacted to deny admissibility of evidence unless the defendant who is the original person, or defense counsel admitted the contents thereof in a public trial or during the preparation procedure, even if voluntartariness is acknowledged in the interrogation of a suspect.

Therefore, if the document or document recording or recording the suspect's statement is prepared in the investigation process of this investigation agency, it is not reasonable to view it differently from the suspect's interrogation protocol even if it takes the form of statement, written statement and written statement. (See Supreme Court Decision 82Do1479 delivered on September 14, 1982) The written statement of the defendant's written statement in the police investigation process is inadmissible as long as the defendant denies its contents in the court room. In this regard, the court below's decision denying admissibility of evidence is justified.

(2) In addition, each testimony of the witness Lee Jae-young and Kim Young-young made by the defendant at the time of the police investigation. As long as the defendant denies the contents of the statement made by the police in the court, the above testimony is inadmissible (see Supreme Court Decision 79Do493, May 8, 1979). If the defendant denies the contents of the statement made by the police in the court (see Supreme Court Decision 79Do493, May 8, 1979), as in the theory of the lawsuit, if it is admissible as evidence, the police statement of the defendant would not be admissible, but the hearsay evidence that the statement made by the defendant would be admissible as evidence, and the provisions of Article 312(2) of the above Criminal Procedure Act Article 312(2) will not be a private culture and they cannot be taken. If the purpose of the theory is to prove the voluntariness of the above statement prepared by the defendant at the police, it is not necessary to explain the reasons why the defendant denies the contents of the statement in the above court.

(c) The judgment of the court below that supported the judgment of the court of first instance that acquitted on the ground that there is no proof of criminal facts and there is no evidence to prove the facts charged. The court below's decision is just and there is no error of law of evidence such as the theory of lawsuit, and it is not reasonable to conclude that there is no error of law of evidence such as the theory of lawsuit.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Jeon Soo-hee (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1982.1.7선고 81노2457
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