A. Whether the protocol of interrogation prepared by an investigative agency other than the prosecutor of the defendant who was the suspect in a case entirely separate from Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act is applicable

B. Where the defendant denies the contents of the protocol of interrogation prepared by a judicial police officer in a separate case, whether the testimony of the investigative police officer who stated the defendant's confession background is admissible as evidence

A. Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that an interrogation of a suspect conducted by an investigative agency other than a public prosecutor shall be deemed imminent guarantee of credit, and even if a authenticity and arbitability are recognized in a public trial or its preparation procedure, the admissibility of evidence is denied unless the defendant or defense counsel who made the original statement in the public trial or its preparation procedure recognizes its contents. In light of the legislative intent and the text of the law, it is not applicable only to the interrogation protocol prepared by the investigative agency other than the public prosecutor of the accused in the case in question, but also to the interrogation protocol prepared by the investigative agency other than the public prosecutor of the accused in all separate cases.

B. As long as the Defendant denies the contents of the statement before a judicial police officer, the police officer who investigated the Defendant as a witness, and the testimony made by the Defendant during the investigation process as a witness is inadmissible in light of the provisions of Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act and its purport. This conclusion also applies to the case where the Defendant was investigated as a suspect in a case entirely separate from the pertinent Defendant case, as long as Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act applies to the interrogation protocol of suspect suspect in all separate cases, as long as Article 312(2) of the same Act applies.

Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act

A. (B) Supreme Court Decision 82Do385 delivered on July 26, 1983 (Gong1983,1367) b. Supreme Court Decision 83Do101 delivered on June 14, 1983 (Gong1983,1127) 83Do323,83Do538 delivered on February 28, 1984 (Gong1984,652) 84Do2897 delivered on February 13, 1985 (Gong1985,455)

Defendant

Prosecutor

Incheon District Court Decision 93No1243 delivered on July 7, 1994

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, in judging the defendant not guilty of the facts charged in this case, the court below held that all the interrogation protocol of the defendant as to the defendant in the process of handling affairs of judicial police officers and the testimony of the witness at the court of first instance, which are pointed out in the ground of appeal, cannot be evidence of conviction. According to the records, the copy of the interrogation protocol is a copy of the suspect interrogation protocol prepared by the judicial police officer when investigating the defendant as the defendant in the case subject to violation of the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Real Estate Ownership Transfer against the defendant, which is entirely separate from the case in this case, and contains a statement that corresponds to the facts charged in this case. In this case, the defendant in this case acknowledged the authenticity and voluntariness, but the testimony of the witness at the court of first instance is denied, and it is a statement that the defendant prepared the interrogation protocol as stated by the defendant in the investigation process

However, Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that suspect interrogation protocol prepared by an investigative agency other than the prosecutor shall be admitted as evidence only when the defendant who was a suspect or defense counsel admitted the contents thereof at a preparatory hearing or during a public trial. Thus, even if authenticity and voluntariness are acknowledged in the interrogation of suspect, it was legislated to the effect that admissibility of evidence is denied unless it is admitted by the defendant or defense counsel who made the original statement in the trial or the preparation procedure (see Supreme Court Decision 82Do385 delivered on July 26, 1983). In light of the legislative purpose and the text of the law, it is not applicable only to the interrogation protocol prepared by an investigative agency other than the prosecutor of the defendant who made the suspect in the case in question, but also to the interrogation protocol prepared by the investigative agency other than the prosecutor of the defendant who was the suspect in all separate cases. Thus, a copy of the interrogation protocol prepared in the police investigation process that the court below did not admit as evidence of guilt was investigated in other cases but it is inadmissible in the court of this case.

In addition, as long as the defendant denies the contents of the statement made before a judicial police officer, the police officer who investigated the defendant as a witness and stated the reason why the defendant led to the confession during the investigation process is inadmissible in light of the provisions of Article 312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act and the purport thereof (see Supreme Court Decision 83Do101, Jun. 14, 1983; Supreme Court Decision 83Do323,83Do538, Feb. 28, 1984; Supreme Court Decision 84Do2897, Feb. 13, 1985; Supreme Court Decision 84Do2897, Feb. 13, 1985; Supreme Court Decision 2005Do312(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act applies to the case where the defendant was investigated as a suspect in a case entirely separate from the pertinent defendant's case, so long as the witness who made a confession during the investigation process cannot be admissible as evidence of the suspect as evidence.

Therefore, the court below's decision that the above evidence has no admissibility is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to admissibility or in violation of the rules of evidence.

All the grounds of appeal pointing this out shall not be accepted.

2. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, since the remaining evidence submitted by the prosecutor cannot be admissible as evidence as the time of the original trial, or cannot be directly proven as to the facts charged of this case, the court below's decision that acquitted the defendant on the ground that there is no proof of a crime is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the mistake of facts under the Criminal Procedure Act, and there is no legitimate ground for

3. Therefore, the prosecutor's appeal shall be dismissed, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)