[1] The scope of farmland exempted from gift tax pursuant to Article 67-7 (1) of the former Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act

[2] The case holding that a donee of farmland, etc. under Article 67-6 (3) of the former Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act is deemed not to engage directly in farming in the pertinent farmland, etc.

[3] Whether the partial expropriation of farmland, etc. that can not be engaged in farming in the remaining part constitutes justifiable grounds under Article 55-5 (2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (negative)

[1] Under Article 67-7 (1) of the former Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (amended by Act No. 4451 of Dec. 27, 1991), a person who is donated to a self-employed farmer and is exempted from the gift tax shall be limited to farmland, grassland, and forest land under Article 11-3 (1) of the former Inheritance Tax and Exemption Act (amended by Act No. 4283 of Dec. 31, 1990).

[2] The case holding that if a self-employed farmer received 1/2 shares of forest on June 15, 1990 from a gift of 1/2 shares of forest on June 15, 199, received a report of the closure of dairy business on January 17, 191, raised 20 miline 20 miline 10,000, and suspended horse cultivation on March 12, 1995, raised 5 miline at a corner of the above grassland on March 12, 1995, and cultivated dry field only thereafter on September 1 of the same year, the above self-employed farmer did not directly cultivate 1/2 shares of the above forest within 5 years after the donation of 1/2 shares of dairy business and suspended miline breeding, and thus, he did not directly cultivate the above dry field or otherwise engage in dry field farming within the above dry field under Article 67-6 (3) of the former Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (amended by Act No. 4451 of December 27, 27, 19)

[3] The case holding that since Article 55-5 (2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14084 of Dec. 31, 1993) provides for "justifiable cause as prescribed by Presidential Decree" under Article 67-6 (3) of the former Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (amended by Act No. 4451 of Dec. 27, 1991), "in case of expropriation under Land Expropriation Act and other Acts" under subparagraph 1, "in case of land expropriation" under subparagraph 3, "in case of change of land category to another land category that can not be used as farmland due to the expropriation or change of land category, and "in case of change of land category" under subparagraph 3 or "in case of change of land category that can not be used as farmland, etc. due to the expropriation of part of farmland, etc., and the circumstance that no direct farming in the remaining part of the farmland, etc. except for the expropriated part cannot be seen as a case where the remaining part of forest noise cannot be continued due to the land area.

[1] Articles 67-6(1) and 67-7(1) of the former Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (Amended by Act No. 4451, Dec. 27, 1991; see current Article 55(1)); Article 58(1) of the former Inheritance Tax and Exemption Act (Amended by Act No. 4283, Dec. 31, 1990; see current Article 58(1)); Article 11-3(1) of the former Inheritance Tax and Exemption Act / [2] Articles 67-6(3) and 67-7(3) of the former Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (Amended by Act No. 4451, Dec. 27, 1991; see current Article 58(2)) / [3] Article 67-6(3) of the former Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (Amended by Act No. 4451, Dec. 27, 1991);

Plaintiff

Head of Pyeongtaek Tax Office

Seoul High Court Decision 96Gu3700 delivered on January 28, 1997

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. On the second ground for appeal

Article 67-7 (1) of the former Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (amended by Act No. 4451 of Dec. 27, 1991; hereinafter referred to as the "Misco Act") which provides for exemption of gift tax on farmland, etc. donated by a self-employed farmer, provides that "farmland, etc. falling under any subparagraph of Article 67-6 (1)" shall be "farmland, etc. falling under any subparagraph of Article 67-6 (1)", and Article 67-6 (1) of the Early Reduction and Exemption Act provides that "farmland, etc. falling under any of the following subparagraphs shall be deemed farmland, grassland, and forest land, etc. which are newly exempted from a forest management plan under the provisions of subparagraph 1 of Article 11-3 (1) of the Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act (including farmland, etc. falling under any subparagraph 1 of the above Article 11-3 (1) of the Grassland Act, which is newly designated within the scope of "the period of conservation of farmland under the provisions of paragraph 1 of the same Article 5 of the Grassland Act".

In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that the part of the forest land of this case, other than grassland, shall not constitute farmland exempt from gift tax pursuant to Article 67-7 (1) of the Lighting Act, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal. The ground of appeal pointing this out shall not be accepted.

2. On the first ground for appeal

The provisions of Article 67-7 (3) of the Early Reduction Act provide that the provisions of Article 67-6 (3) shall apply mutatis mutandis to the collection of the amount of exempted gift tax on the farmland, etc. donated to the self-employed farmer, and Article 67-6 (3) of the Early Reduction Act provides that if the self-employed farmer who has acquired the farmland, etc. exempted from the capital gains tax transfers the farmland, etc. within five years from the date of the transfer thereof or he is not directly engaged in farming in such farmland, etc. without any justifiable reason as prescribed by the Presidential Decree, the amount equivalent to the amount of exempted tax on the capital

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found that the plaintiff was not directly engaged in farming in the relevant farmland, etc., by making a report on the closure of dairy business on June 15, 1990 and after making a report on the closure of dairy business on January 17, 1991, raising 20000000000000000000, which was employed in its judgment. On March 12, 1995, the plaintiff raised 5 000 000,00000,0000,00000,000000,0000000,0000,00000,0000,00000,0000,000,0000,000,000,0000,000,0000,000,000,000,000.

3. On the third ground for appeal

Under the principle of no taxation without law, the interpretation of tax laws and regulations shall be interpreted in accordance with the text of the law unless there are special circumstances, and it shall not be extensively interpreted or analogically interpreted without reasonable grounds (see Supreme Court Decision 95Nu1491, Dec. 6, 1996, etc.). Under Article 55-5 (2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Lighting (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14084, Dec. 31, 1993, Article 67-6 (3) of the same Act) of the former Enforcement Decree of this Article, Article 55-5 (2) of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14084, Dec. 31, 1993), and under subparagraph 1, "land expropriation under the Land Expropriation Act or other Acts," and under subparagraph 3, "other cases where farmland, etc. can not be used as farmland, etc. by replotting under the Land Expropriation Act or the Rural Community Modernization Promotion Act, and there are no unavoidable reasons for expropriation of the remaining portion of farmland under subparagraph 5 of Article 7.

In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that even if the farming cannot continue in the remaining part of the forest of this case due to the shortage of grassland area, traffic noise, etc. due to the expropriation of the central part of the forest of this case and the construction of the road, such circumstance does not constitute a justifiable ground under Article 55-5 (2) of the Enforcement Decree, and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal. The ground of appeal

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff-Appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all Justices who reviewed the appeal.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)