[1] In a case where the general meeting of shareholders for the appointment of directors was held before the enforcement of Article 380 of the Commercial Code amended by Act No. 5053 of Dec. 29, 1995, but the judgment of confirmation of the absence of the resolution of the general meeting of shareholders became final and conclusive after the enforcement of the amended Commercial Code, whether the representative director selected by the board of directors composed of appointed directors by the resolution is retroactively

[2] The case where the applicant for registration can be held liable for fraudulent registration under Article 39 of the Commercial Act even if the applicant for registration did not make a registration by himself/herself

[3] Where a person, other than a representative director, completes registration of appointment of a new representative director by creating the appearance of a resolution of a general meeting of shareholders, but it is deemed that there is no resolution of a general meeting of shareholders, whether the company can be held liable for false registration under Article 39 of the Commercial

[4] The method to determine whether an act of representation without the authority has implicitly ratified it

[5] In a case where the plaintiff denies the rights or legal status of an independent party intervenor and asserts the rights or legal relations against a third party, which are incompatible with the assertion of an independent party intervenor, whether the independent party intervenor has the benefit to seek confirmation of the rights or non-existence of legal relations against the third party alleged by the plaintiff (negative)

[6] In case where one party appeals against the judgment on the merits of an independent party intervention suit, whether the confirmation of the entire judgment is interrupted and the whole objection to the case takes effect (affirmative), and the method of determining the scope of the appellate court’s judgment in this case

[7] Requirements for participation as an independent party under Article 79(1) of the Civil Procedure Act

[1] Articles 190, 209, 380, 382(1), 389(1) and (3), and Article 2 of the Addenda to the Commercial Act / [2] Article 39 of the Commercial Act / [3] Article 39 of the Commercial Act / [4] Articles 130 of the Civil Act, Articles 209 and 389(3) of the Commercial Act / [5] Articles 79 and 250 of the Civil Procedure Act / [6] Articles 79 and 415 of the Civil Procedure Act / [7] Article 79(1) of the Civil Procedure Act

[1] [2] [3] Supreme Court Decision 2009Da85052 Decided January 26, 2012 / [2] Supreme Court Decision 2010Da70018 Decided July 28, 201 (Gong2011Ha, 1749) / [5] Supreme Court Decision 2009Da75635, 75642 Decided December 24, 2009 / [6] Supreme Court Decision 90Da19329, 19336 Decided March 22, 1991 (Gong191, 1247), Supreme Court Decision 2006Da8673, 86580 decided October 26, 2007 (Gong2007Ha, 2007Ha, 2084 decided May 28, 2005)

Shindong Marine Co., Ltd. (LLC, Kim & Kim LLC, Attorneys Shin Hyun-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Promotional mutual savings banks

Mangsan Ballast Golf Club Co., Ltd.

[Defendant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 2 others (Law Firm LLC, Attorneys Shin Sung-ki et al., Counsel for defendant-appellee)

Lao elevator limited liability company and one other

Sungwon Start-up Investment Co., Ltd. (Law Firm LLC, Attorneys Kim Byung-jin, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2007Na77271, 7728, 77301, 77295 decided August 13, 2009

1. Of the lower judgment, the part of the lower judgment regarding the Plaintiff’s claim for approval of the Plaintiff’s participation in the Plaintiff’s membership in the membership list is reversed, and the lower court’s judgment regarding that part is revoked, and the Plaintiff’s lawsuit

2. Of the judgment of the court below, the part of the claim seeking confirmation that the right to the membership (number 1 omitted) and (number 2 omitted) recorded in the attached list of the judgment of the court below of the judgment of the court below of the judgment of the court below concerning the part is not nonexistent in the plaintiff, and the judgment of the court of first instance concerning that part shall be revoked, and the lawsuit of the above independent party intervenor

3. Of the judgment of the court below, the part on the membership number (3 omitted), and (4 omitted) membership in the attached list of the judgment below is reversed. Of the part on the above membership, the part on the conjunctive claim by the independent party intervenor, the intervenor, and the defendant company, among the part on the above membership, shall be revoked, and the application for participation by the above independent party intervenor is dismissed. The plaintiff's appeal corresponding to the remaining reversed part, excluding the part on the plaintiff's claim for approval for the participation by the defendant and the part on the rejection

4. Of the judgment of the court below, the part concerning the membership number (5 omitted), (6 omitted), (7 omitted), (8 omitted), and (15 omitted) in the attached list of the judgment below is reversed. Of the part concerning the above membership, among the part concerning the above membership, the part concerning the conjunctive claim of Pung Mutual Savings Bank Co., Ltd. which is an independent party intervenor in the judgment of the court of first instance shall be revoked, and the part concerning the above part shall be dismissed, and the application for intervention by the above independent party intervenor in the above part shall be dismissed, and all the appeals by the plaintiff and the above independent party intervenor falling under the reversed part, excluding the part concerning the plaintiff's claim for approval of the participation by the

5. The plaintiff's appeal as to the remainder of the judgment of the court below with the exception of the above reversed part and all of the appeals by Sungwon Investment Company as an independent party intervenor are dismissed.

6. Among the total costs of the lawsuit, the part resulting from the participation of the intervenor in the lawsuit by the intervenor is borne by the intervenor, and the remainder is borne by the plaintiff, and the part resulting from the participation by the independent party shall be borne by the independent party intervenor.

1. Determination on the grounds of appeal by the Plaintiff and the Intervenor, the Intervenor, and the Defendant, the Intervenor, the Defendant, and the Defendant, the Defendant, the Defendant, and the Defendant.

A. As to the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal No. 1

Where a judgment of confirmation of non-existence of a resolution of the general meeting of shareholders becomes final and conclusive, the representative director selected by the board of directors composed of the directors appointed by the resolution shall retroactively lose qualification, and the representative director’s act committed before the judgment of confirmation of non-existence of the resolution of the general meeting of shareholders becomes final and conclusive shall be null and void as an act committed by a person without representative authority (see Articles 380 and 190 main text of the Commercial Act). This legal doctrine applies to a case where a judgment of confirmation of non-existence of a resolution of the general meeting of shareholders becomes final and conclusive prior to the enforcement of Article 380 of the amended Commercial Act (amended by Act No. 5053, Dec. 29, 1995; hereinafter “amended Commercial Act”).

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the interpretation and application of Articles 380 and 190 of the former Commercial Act (amended by Act No. 5053, Dec. 29, 195) and Article 2 of the Addenda of the amended Commercial Act.

B. As to ground of appeal No. 2 by the Plaintiff

Even if the party's assertion is not actually determined, if it is obvious that such assertion will be rejected, it shall not affect the conclusion of the judgment and shall not have any error of omission of judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da218, Jul. 10, 2008, etc.).

According to the records, although the plaintiff asserted the defendant's liability for the issuance of non-party 1's attached list 4 through 20 memberships (hereinafter "part of memberships of this case") by applying or applying Article 395 of the Commercial Act by analogy, the court below did not determine whether the defendant's liability under Article 395 of the Commercial Act was established, as alleged in the ground of appeal.

However, as revealed by the record, insofar as the approval of the defendant is necessary for the admission of the golf club by the defendant who operated the golf club, so long as it is necessary to obtain the defendant's membership status from the defendant for the admission of the golf club, the defendant should have paid membership fees with the defendant's admission approval (see Supreme Court Decision 88Meu19606, Nov. 10, 1989). Meanwhile, the defendant's participation in an auction under the Civil Execution Act on June 29, 2004 by acquiring essential facilities based on the facility facility standards from the defendant through an auction under the Civil Execution Act (amended by Act No. 7428, Mar. 31, 2005). The defendant's participation in the golf club cannot be viewed as valid for the purpose of acquiring some membership rights and obligations under the business plan approval of the defendant, as well as the status under the contract, and the status under Article 30 of the former Installation and Utilization of Sports Facilities Act (amended by Act No. 979, Jun. 16, 20096).

However, in light of the following circumstances revealed by the record, it appears that the issuance of part of the instant membership to a golf club by the Defendant without undergoing the procedures for acquiring membership status, such as the payment of membership fees, was conducted in order to secure loan obligations, etc., or to allow a golf club with loans secured by membership to use funds for construction costs of the instant golf club without undergoing the procedures for acquiring membership status.

1) When it was difficult for the Defendant to continue the construction of a golf course in June 1994 due to the shortage of funds. On July 22, 1994, the Defendant: (a) borrowed 4 billion won from the construction fund of a golf course; (b) issued a promissory note with the amount of KRW 4 billion at the face value to the golf club as security for the loan repayment obligation; and (c) set up a mortgage on the site of a golf course; and (d) transferred 10,200 out of the Defendant’s shares owned by Nonparty 2 and Nonparty 2. However, if the Defendant repaid the loan within the due date, the number of golf clubs shall be returned, and if the Defendant is unable to repay the loan within the due date, it shall be 300 members of a golf course with the approval of the Korea golf club business association; and (b) the number of neglected golf clubs shall be appropriated for the loan by arbitrarily disposing of 10,200 shares of the Defendant’s stocks.

2) Nonparty 2, the Defendant’s representative director, issued 300 golf club membership rights and entered into a contract on the transfer of 10,200 golf club membership rights among the Defendant’s shares held by himself/herself for the purpose of securing the loan repayment obligation pursuant to the above agreement. While the Defendant’s board of directors held on April 15, 1996 without obtaining approval for the sale of 300 golf club membership rights, there was a resolution that the Defendant’s board of directors held on April 15, 1996 would return 300 golf club membership rights and issue 20 million won fake golf club membership rights instead of 300 golf club membership rights and instead, 50 million won golf club membership rights were issued.

3) On January 8, 1997, the Defendant’s board of directors held on January 8, 1997 resolved that part of the membership of a golf club approved as a four-lane so that it can be held in title trust to a golf club and offered it as security to the construction business operator. Accordingly, a golf club for an elderly person was issued

4) The current status of the use of membership security, etc. (No. 6-9 of the disease) states that most of the golf club membership rights were issued to a golf club for an alone and offered as security. The current status of the golf club membership (No. 8-6 of the disease) also states that the golf club membership was issued to an alone golf club, but the present status of the golf club membership was recorded as being owned by another person. However, the Chungcheong City Mayor respondeded that the alone golf club did not pay acquisition tax when it was issued a part of the instant membership from the Defendant through fact inquiry.

5) In the prosecution investigation process of the relevant criminal case, Nonparty 1 stated to the effect that “the golf club membership was transferred to a senior golf club to sell it in the name of the senior golf club because it would have been done by paying the construction cost to the Defendant’s construction business operator,” and in other criminal cases, Nonparty 1 appeared as a witness and stated to the effect that “the senior golf club was sold by the defendant’s golf club as security and used as the construction cost upon receiving the loan from the financial institution.” In addition, Nonparty 3, the wife Nonparty 1, as a witness, was present in the stock ownership confirmation lawsuit filed against Nonparty 1 against the Defendant 2, etc., and stated to the effect that “the senior golf club was offered to the financial institution as security at least KRW 2.6 billion, and it was offered to the constructor or bond business operator as security at a level of KRW 10 billion.”

6) On the other hand, despite the fact that a golf club has been issued by the Defendant for multiple times, there is no material that the Defendant and the Defendant agreed on payment in kind by specifying the specific number and value of the membership to be issued between the golf club and the Defendant at the time of the issuance of the golf club membership or by specifying the claims subject to offset and the claims subject to offset.

If the facts are identical, in light of the above legal principles, the alone golf club did not acquire the membership status from the Defendant based on the part of the instant membership, and therefore, the Plaintiff, who acquired part of the instant membership from the alone golf club, cannot assert the effective membership status against the Defendant, and the Plaintiff cannot assert not only the acquisition of the membership status in force against the Defendant, but also the status under the membership recruitment contract, along with the rights and obligations under the approval of the business plan, cannot be asserted for the acquisition of the valid membership status against the Intervenor succeeded to.

If so, even though the court below omitted the judgment on the establishment of defendant's liability due to the act of the representative director under Article 395 of the Commercial Act, it cannot be viewed that the omission of judgment by the court below had influenced the judgment. The plaintiff's ground of appeal on this part is not accepted.

C. As to the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal No. 3

In principle, in order to hold the applicant for registration liable for fraudulent registration under Article 39 of the Commercial Act, registration is required to be completed by the applicant for registration by intention or negligence. Where the applicant for registration fails to make a registration by himself/herself, registration is required due to the reason attributable to him/her, or where there are special circumstances that can be deemed the same as the registration made by the applicant for registration by intention or negligence, such as neglecting the registration without correcting the fact that the applicant for registration is aware of the existence of such fraudulent registration even though he/she is responsible, the applicant for registration may be held liable for such fraudulent registration under Article 39 of the Commercial Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da7018, Jul. 28, 201, etc.).

On the other hand, in the case of a corporation, the existence of intention or negligence on the above improper registration shall be determined on the basis of representative director (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2010Da70018, supra); where a person, other than the representative director, has made the appearance of the resolution of the general meeting of shareholders and the resolution of the board of directors, and completed the registration of the appointment of a new representative director, and where it is deemed that there is no resolution because there is a serious defect to the extent that the resolution of the general meeting cannot be seen as having been reached, unlike the existence of the resolution and resolution of the general meeting of shareholders, the company which is the applicant for registration could not participate in the registration due to the absence of internal decision-making of the company concerning the appointment of the new representative director, and thus, it cannot be involved in the registration of the company because the legitimate representative director of the company was involved in the method of cooperation and implied, or neglected without correction even though he was aware of the existence of the defective registration, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2008Da52620200.).

According to the records, there is no evidence to prove that Nonparty 2, a legitimate representative of the defendant, was either at the resolution of a temporary general meeting or the resolution of the board of directors on March 13, 1996 regarding the appointment of Nonparty 1 as the defendant's representative director, or at the meeting of the non-party 1's representative director with knowledge of the existence of the registration of appointment of the non-party 1's representative director, or there is no other special circumstance that the defendant would be the same as the registration of the non-party 1's representative director intentionally or by negligence during the registration of appointment of the above representative director. Thus, it cannot

In the same purport, the lower court’s rejection of the Plaintiff’s assertion of liability for false registration under Article 39 of the Commercial Act is justifiable. In so doing, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine as to the company’

D. As to the ground of appeal No. 4

The ratification of an act of representation without authority is a single act with the knowledge of the act of representation with no authority and the effect of the act is not required to vest in the person in question, and it does not require a certain method with respect to the method of expressing his/her intent explicitly or implicitly. However, to acknowledge an implied ratification, there must be circumstances to deem that the person in question fully understand the legal status faced by the act and that the result of the act is attributed to him/her based on his/her intention. Thus, in determining this, various circumstances should be carefully examined (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da37831, Sept. 24, 2009).

According to the records, in light of the above legal principles, in light of the contents of the notification of settlement sent by Nonparty 1 and a senior golf club on February 28, 2000 to Nonparty 2, the contents of the response to the notification of settlement sent by Nonparty 1 and a senior golf club on July 3, 2000, and the circumstances of various disputes arising between Nonparty 2 and Nonparty 1 thereafter, it is difficult to view that Nonparty 2, who was appointed as a legitimate representative director of the defendant, had an intention to identify the details of golf club membership issued without the power of representation and to vest the legal effect of the issuance of membership rights to the defendant, and it is difficult to view that Nonparty 2 ratified Nonparty 1’s act of non-party 1’s act of representing the right of representation.

Although the reasoning of the lower court is somewhat insufficient, it is justifiable to have rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion of ratification of the act of unauthorized representation. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on ratification of the act of unauthorized representation, contrary to what is alleged in

E. As to the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal No. 5 and the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal on the Intervenor’s Sungwon Investment

The ground of appeal by the Plaintiff and the Intervenor to the purport that a golf club has obtained effective membership based on Nos. 1 through 3 of the attached list of the lower judgment by filing an application for membership membership with the Defendant and paying membership fees in accordance with the membership membership membership agreement, cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal, as it is erroneous in the examination of evidence preparation and fact-finding, which are the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court, and cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal. Furthermore, even in light of the record, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the logical and empirical rules

2. Ex officio determination

A. As to the Plaintiff’s claim for approval of the Plaintiff’s participation against the Intervenor

According to the records, it is revealed that the golf club rules of this case stipulate that the transfer and acquisition of membership shall obtain approval from the company. Therefore, in order for the plaintiff who acquired membership to claim the acquisition of membership, the company's approval shall be obtained in accordance with the above rules, and the company's approval shall be deemed as a final and conclusive indication by the change of the name of the member in the membership list (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Da36344, Sept. 6, 2002).

Therefore, the part of the Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant 2 as to the Plaintiff’s membership approval on the membership in the attached list of the lower judgment is unlawful as there is no benefit of lawsuit, as long as the Plaintiff separately claims against Defendant 2 to change the name of the member in the golf club to the Plaintiff.

Nevertheless, the lower court dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim based on the premise that the part requesting the Plaintiff to approve the Plaintiff’s participation in the membership in the attached list of the lower judgment was lawful. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interest of lawsuit, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, it cannot be upheld

B. As to the part of the intervenor's claim for confirmation of non-existence of the plaintiff's investment in Sungwon Start-up

A lawsuit for confirmation does not necessarily limited to a legal relationship between the parties, but can also be the object of the legal relationship between one of the parties and a third party or between third parties. However, in order to have an interest in confirmation of such legal relationship, the intervenor's rights or legal status should be present in accordance with such legal relationship, and the risk and apprehension should be caused, and it should be immediately determined by the confirmation judgment intended for confirmation of the legal relationship in order to eliminate such risk and apprehension, and it should be the most effective and appropriate means. In addition, in cases where the rights or legal status of an independent party intervenor are threatened or interfered with by denying or opposing the plaintiff's rights or legal status from or against the plaintiff, the independent party intervenor must seek confirmation of his rights or legal relations against the plaintiff. Even if an independent party intervenor in the lawsuit for confirmation is judged in favor of the plaintiff, it is not clear that the independent party's rights or legal relationship with the third party are nonexistent, and thus, the independent party intervenor's rights or legal relationship with the plaintiff cannot be confirmed (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Da5294.

In this case, the plaintiff asserted that the right of membership in the attached list of the judgment below (hereinafter referred to as "the membership in this case") was vested in the plaintiff and sought confirmation of the membership status for the defendant and the defendant's number intervenor. Accordingly, the intervenor's gender start-up investment in this case alleged that he/she has the right to membership number (number 1 omitted) and (number 2 omitted) among the membership in this case and sought confirmation that he/she does not have the right to the above membership. The plaintiff seeks confirmation that he/she has the right to the above membership with respect to the defendant's number of intervenors and sought confirmation that he/she has the right to the above membership, and at the same time, sought confirmation that he/she has the right to the above membership with respect to the defendant's number of intervenors. In light of the above legal principles, the part of the plaintiff's claim for confirmation of non-existence as to the plaintiff in the intervenor's gender start-up investment

Nevertheless, the lower court dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim based on the premise that the part of the Intervenor’s claim for confirmation of non-existence against the Plaintiff was lawful. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interest of confirmation, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, it is difficult to maintain this as it is.

C. As to the part concerning the claim by an independent party intervenor, Austria, limited liability company (hereinafter “participating”), and an independent party intervenor, Food Mutual Savings Bank, Inc., Ltd. (hereinafter “ Intervenor Food Mutual Savings Bank”).

1) As to the reversal part

In the instant case, the Plaintiff asserted that the right to the instant membership belongs to the Plaintiff as the principal lawsuit and sought confirmation of the membership status of the Defendant and the Intervenor. Accordingly, the Intervenor’s Intervenor asserted that he/she had the right to the membership number (number 3 omitted), and (number 4 omitted) among the instant membership rights, and sought confirmation of the Plaintiff and the Intervenor’s right to the membership based on Article 79 of the Civil Procedure Act from the Plaintiff and the Intervenor, and sought confirmation of his/her principal right to the said membership right to the Plaintiff and the Intervenor, and sought confirmation of the transfer of the name to the Defendant and the Intervenor’s right to the Plaintiff or the Defendant’s Intervenor on the ground that he/she did not acquire the status of the Plaintiff by illegally transferring the membership rights to the Plaintiff, and that the Intervenor’s right to the Plaintiff and the Intervenor’s preemptive right to the Plaintiff’s right to the Plaintiff and the Intervenor’s preemptive right to the Plaintiff’s right to the Plaintiff’s right to the Plaintiff and the Intervenor’s right to the Plaintiff’s right to the registration number omitted or the Defendant’s right to the Plaintiff’s right to the remainder.

However, with respect to the above litigation relation, the court below rejected all the remaining claims except the conjunctive claims against the defendant among the intervenor's claims, but the intervenor did not appeal against the intervenor's claim, and did not make a decision as to the intervenor's conjunctive claims, while explaining that the part was excluded from the scope of the trial. The judgment of the court of first instance dismissed all the remaining claims except the conjunctive claims against the defendant among the intervenor's claims, but the intervenor's conjunctive claims were dismissed only for the primary claims and did not appeal against the conjunctive claims. Thus, the intervenor's conjunctive claims were excluded from the scope of the trial.

However, an independent party intervention lawsuit under Article 79 of the Civil Procedure Act is a form of lawsuit in which the plaintiff, the defendant, and an independent party intervenor resolve the same legal relationship in a lump sum without contradiction. In a case where an independent party intervention is deemed lawful and a judgment on the merits of a lawsuit between the plaintiff, the defendant, and the independent party intervenor is rendered on the merits of the lawsuit between the plaintiff, the defendant, and the independent party intervenor, a final judgment shall be rendered in the name of the above three parties, thereby rendering a joint and conclusive conclusion among the above three parties. In a case where one party appeals on the merits, the final judgment of the first instance shall be interrupted and the entire case shall take effect. In such a case, the object of the appellate trial shall be limited to the scope of objection indicated in the purport of the appeal by the person who actually filed the appeal, but the scope of the trial shall be determined by taking into account the need for the combined conclusion between the above parties (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 90Da19329, Mar. 22, 1991; 2086.86.

In light of these legal principles, in the instant lawsuit, the Plaintiff filed an appeal against the part of the Plaintiff’s claim regarding membership rights asserted by the Intervenor, the Intervenor, the Intervenor, and the Intervenor, and the claim between the Plaintiff, the Intervenor, the Intervenor, and the Defendant and the Intervenor should be considered to fall under the scope of the appellate trial’s judgment. Therefore, the lower court should have also rendered judgment on the Intervenor’s claim and the conjunctive claim by the Intervenor, as well as the conjunctive claim by the Intervenor.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below which did not decide on the intervenor's claim and the conjunctive claim of the intervenor fright mutual savings bank was erroneous in interpreting and applying Article 79 of the Civil Procedure Act, and the judgment below's error constitutes a matter to be examined ex officio in accordance with the litigation requirements. Thus, the part of the judgment below on the membership number (3 omitted), (4 omitted), (5 omitted), (6 omitted), (7 omitted), (8 omitted), (8 omitted) through (15 omitted) cannot be exempted from the reversal of the part on the membership.

2) As to the rejection of the application for intervention

In the participation of an independent party, the intervention of an independent party may be permitted when the plaintiff's claim of the principal lawsuit and the claim of the independent party intervenor are deemed to be incompatible with the assertion itself, and the participation in the prevention of corruption may be allowed in cases where it is objectively recognized that the plaintiff and the defendant have the intent to harm the independent party intervenor through the lawsuit in question and it is acknowledged that the right or legal status of the independent party intervenor might be infringed upon (see Supreme Court Order 2005Ma814, Oct. 17, 2005; Supreme Court Decision 2005Da43081, 43098, Aug. 23, 2007, etc.).

In the instant case, the Plaintiff asserted that the right to the instant membership belongs to the Plaintiff and sought confirmation of the membership status against the Defendant and the Defendant’s Intervenor. Accordingly, the Intervenor’s Intervenor’s primary claim is that, if the Plaintiff did not acquire the right to the membership of the instant membership (number 3 omitted), and (number 4 omitted), the Defendant illegally transferred the membership. The Intervenor’s claim was made for compensation against the Defendant or the Defendant, and the Intervenor’s primary claim was made for compensation of damages against the Plaintiff. The Intervenor’s Pream Mutual Savings Bank also sought preliminary claim, and if the Plaintiff did not obtain the right to the membership of the instant membership (number 5 omitted), (number 6 omitted), (number 7 omitted), (number 8 omitted) through (number 15 omitted), the Defendant illegally transferred the membership. In so doing, the Defendant sought compensation for damages against the Defendant or the Defendant or sought reimbursement for the golf club membership by subrogation against the Defendant or the Defendant.

However, in the instant case, the Plaintiff’s principal claim and the Intervenor’s conjunctive claim and the Plaintiff’s conjunctive claim and the Intervenor’s conjunctive claim are not incompatible with each other. Thus, the intervention in the Plaintiff’s principal claim by the Intervenor and the Intervenor P.C. cannot be permitted. In light of the record, it is difficult to find that the Plaintiff, the Defendant, and the Intervenor were objectively willing to harm the Intervenor’s or the Intervenor P.C. through the lawsuit, or that there is a risk of infringing the Intervenor’s rights or legal status as a participant or the Intervenor’s mutual savings bank as a result of the lawsuit.

Therefore, all of the intervenor's application for participation in the conjunctive claim and the intervenor's application for participation in the conjunctive claim are deemed to be unlawful, and thus, it should be dismissed.

3) As to the key part of the plate

Of the judgment below, the part on the membership number (number 3 omitted), (number 4 omitted), the membership number (number 5 omitted), (number 6 omitted), (number 7 omitted), (number 7 omitted), and (number 8 omitted) through (number 15 omitted) of the membership right to be reversed, the remainder of the judgment excluding the part on the Plaintiff’s request for approval of the Plaintiff’s participation to the Intervenor and the Plaintiff’s request for approval of the participation to the Intervenor, and the part on the application for participation to the Intervenor’s each conjunctive claim by the Intervenor and Fash Mutual Savings Bank, which are to be reversed, is sufficient for the Supreme Court to directly render a judgment, and thus, it is decided to self-determination in accordance with Article 437 of the Civil Procedure Act.

① With respect to the membership number (3 omitted), (4), as seen above, insofar as a golf club did not acquire the status of its membership with some of the instant membership rights including the above membership rights, as long as it did not obtain the status of its membership effective based on the above part of the membership rights, the Plaintiff’s remainder of the Plaintiff’s main claim as to the above membership rights premised on the opposing facts and the Intervenor’s main claim is without merit, and (2) with respect to the part of the membership rights (5 omitted), (6 omitted), (8 omitted) through (15 omitted), as seen above, the Plaintiff’s claim as to the above membership rights and the primary claim as to the Intervenor’s main claim as to the above membership rights based on the premise that it did not obtain all the remainder of the Plaintiff’s main claim as to the above membership rights, and the Plaintiff’s claim as to the remainder of the Plaintiff’s main claim as to the above membership rights and the counterclaim’s main claim as to the above part of the Plaintiff’s main claim regarding the above membership rights are without merit, as long as it did not obtain all the remainder of the Plaintiff’s main claim as to the remainder of membership rights.

3. Conclusion

(6) Of the judgment of the court below, the part of the court below regarding the plaintiff's claim for approval as to the plaintiff's participation in the attached list is reversed, and the decision of the court of first instance as to the part is rejected. (2) Of the judgment of the court below as to the part concerning the plaintiff's participation in the Intervenor's participation in the Plaintiff's membership to claim confirmation that there is no right to participate in the plaintiff's membership number (registration number 1 omitted) and (registration number 2 omitted), the judgment of the court of first instance as to the part concerning the plaintiff's participation in the Plaintiff's membership. (3) The part concerning the plaintiff's participation in the plaintiff's participation in the above part concerning the plaintiff's membership rights (registration number 3 omitted), (registration number 4 omitted), the part concerning the plaintiff's participation in the plaintiff's participation in the plaintiff's participation in the plaintiff's membership rights, and all of the part concerning the plaintiff's participation in the plaintiff's participation in the plaintiff's participation in the plaintiff's participation in the plaintiff's membership rights are reversed to the part concerning the plaintiff's participation rights. (7).

Justices Park Poe-young (Presiding Justice)