[1] Whether Article 26 of the former Petroleum Business Act is excluded from the application of Article 26 of the former Petroleum Business Act on the sole basis of the fact that pseudo petroleum products under Article 26 of the former Petroleum Business Act are determined to meet the manufacturing standards of additives under the Clean Air Conservation Act (negative)

[2] The case affirming the court below's measure that the defendant's ELP manufactured by mixing petroleum products and petrochemicals, etc. constitutes pseudo petroleum products under Article 26 of the former Petroleum Business Act

[3] The purport of Article 16 of the Criminal Code concerning mistake of law

[1] Article 26 of the former Petroleum Business Act (amended by Act No. 7209 of Mar. 22, 2004) (see current Article 29 of the Petroleum and Petroleum Substitute Fuel Business Act), Article 30 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Petroleum Business Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 18473 of Jul. 20, 2004) (see current Article 2 subparagraph 10 of the Petroleum and Petroleum Substitute Fuel Business Act) / [2] Article 26 of the former Petroleum Business Act (amended by Act No. 7209 of Mar. 22, 2004) (see current Article 29 of the Petroleum and Petroleum Substitute Fuel Business Act), Article 30 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Petroleum Business Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 18473 of Jul. 20, 2004) (see current Article 2 subparagraph 10 of the Petroleum and Petroleum Substitute Fuel Business Act) / [3] Article 16 of the Criminal Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2004Do5529 Decided December 8, 2005 (Gong2006Sang, 136) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 2003Do6282 Decided February 12, 2004 (Gong2004Sang, 503) Supreme Court Decision 2005Do4592 Decided September 29, 2005 (Gong2005Ha, 1744)

Defendant

Defendant

Daejeon District Court Decision 2003No2032 delivered on October 30, 2003

The appeal is dismissed.

1. On the violation of the Petroleum Business Act

Article 26 of the former Petroleum Business Act (amended by Act No. 7209, Mar. 22, 2004; hereinafter the same) prohibits the production, sale, etc. of pseudo petroleum products by mixing petroleum products with other petroleum products, mixing petrochemicals with other petrochemicals. Article 30 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 18473, Jul. 20, 2004; hereinafter the same shall apply) provides that the use of gasoline or light oil as fuel under subparagraph 1 of Article 2 of the Automobile Management Act and the use of machinery and vehicles under subparagraphs of Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (hereinafter “automobile, etc.”) shall not be limited to the use of pseudo petroleum products for fuel in order to protect the quality of pseudo petroleum products under Article 20 of the former Enforcement Decree of the same Act (excluding energy under each subparagraph), and the purpose of Article 26 of the former Petroleum Business Act is to protect the development of the national economy and to improve the quality of petroleum products by securing the quality of petroleum products, etc.

According to the evidence adopted by the court below, the defendant sold the instant LP-PPPPP (L-PPPPPPP) for the purpose of using gasoline or light oil as fuel for automobiles, etc., and pseudo petroleum products manufactured by mixing softs, which are petroleum products, with Toluene and ethyl alcohol which are petrochemicals, and can be recognized as having low quality compared to gasoline in terms of its constituent components or the function of automobile fuel. Thus, in light of the aforementioned legal principles, even if the above LPP was determined to meet the manufacturing standards of additives stipulated in the Clean Air Conservation Act, the above LPPP is deemed to constitute pseudo petroleum products stipulated in Article 26 of the former Petroleum Business Act.

Although the reasoning of the court below is somewhat insufficient, it is just to find the defendant guilty by applying Article 26 of the former Petroleum Business Act to the defendant's act of selling ELP, and there is no error of law such as misconception of facts against the rules of evidence or misunderstanding of legal principles as to Article 26 of the former Petroleum Business Act, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

On the other hand, Article 16 of the Criminal Act provides that the act of misunderstanding that one's act does not constitute a crime under the laws and regulations does not mean merely a site of law, but it does not mean that the act of misunderstanding that one's act constitutes a general crime, but it is generally known that it does not constitute a crime under the laws and regulations in his special circumstances, and it is not punishable if there is a justifiable reason to mislead misunderstanding (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Do6282, Feb. 12, 2004, etc.). Thus, even though the defendant knew that he was a pseudo petroleum product as provided in Article 26 of the former Petroleum Business Act, it is merely a site of law and it does not mean that the defendant had no criminal intent or there was no awareness of illegality. Accordingly, this part of the grounds for appeal cannot be accepted.

2. As to the violation of the Fire Services Act

In light of the records, the court below's adopted evidence can sufficiently recognize the defendant's criminal facts of the violation of the Fire Services Act, and there is no evidence that the defendant applied to the chief of the competent fire station for permission for the installation of dangerous goods handling facilities, or the chief of the competent fire station rejected the permission for the installation of dangerous goods handling facilities on the ground that the defendant's above application is a similar petroleum product, and even if the chief of the competent fire station rejected the above application, it cannot affect the establishment of the crime of violation of the Fire Services Act as long as the defendant handled ELP, which is a dangerous substance, unless the defendant handled it. Thus, the court below's judgment did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the violation of

3. On the issue of unfair sentencing

In this case where a fine of KRW 3,00,000 was imposed against the defendant, the reason that the sentence of the court below is excessive shall not be a legitimate ground for appeal.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Si-hwan (Presiding Justice)