A. The nature of the possession of the property devolving upon the State (=the possession of the property devolving upon the State) and whether the possession of the land is presumed to be possession with the intention to hold the land independently after the land which belongs to the State was sold

B. Whether the court can recognize the time and title of real possession without asking the party's assertion in acquiring the prescription of real estate (affirmative)

A. In light of the relevant provisions of the Act on the Disposal of Property Belonging to Jurisdiction, the possession of the property devolving upon the State falls under the possession of the property devolving upon the nature of the source of title, and if the land which is the property devolving upon the State loses the nature of the property devolving upon the State, it shall be presumed that the possession

B. As for the prescriptive acquisition of real estate, the timing for the commencement of possession, the title, etc., which serves as the basis for calculating the period of possession, is an indirect fact regarding the period of possession or the presumption of the autonomous possession, the court may determine whether to complete the prescriptive acquisition by examining the time and title of the real possession as recognized by the litigation data, without seeking the

(a)Article 245(1)(a) of the Civil Code; Article 4 and Article 22 of the Act on the Disposal of Property Belonging to Ownership;

A. Supreme Court Decision 88Meu24622 delivered on January 12, 1990 (Gong1990, 451) (Gong1990, 2269) decided October 12, 1990 (Gong1990, 2269) 92Da37284 delivered on December 11, 198, Supreme Court Decision 87Da2733 delivered on December 6, 198 (Gong1989, 82), Supreme Court Decision 92Da20774 delivered on November 10, 1992 (Gong193, 76)

[Judgment of the court below]

Defendant

Suwon District Court Decision 91Na7658 delivered on August 18, 1992

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

In light of the relevant provisions of the Act on the Disposal of Property Belonging to Jurisdiction, the possession of the property devolving upon the State is deemed to fall under the possession of the property devolving upon the nature of the title. Thus, if the land which is the property devolving upon the State loses the character of the property devolving upon the other party, the possession of the land thereafter shall be presumed to be possession independently (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 90Meu24359, Oct. 12, 1990; 88Meu24622, Jan. 12, 1990; 87Meu2176, Dec. 26, 1989).

As duly determined by the court below, if the defendant constructed a house on the land of this case, which is the property devolving upon the original state in 1955 and occupied the above land since then, and if the registration of ownership transfer was made on November 11, 1963 with respect to the above land on the ground that it was not made in the future of the plaintiff on November 11, 1963, the defendant shall be presumed to have occupied the above land as the owner's intention from November 11, 1963, for which the registration of ownership transfer was made in the future of the plaintiff on the land of this case. The judgment below to the same purport is correct, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the prescription for the possession of the property devolving upon the original state, or as to the presumption of the possessor'

As for the prescriptive acquisition of real estate, the time of commencement of possession or the title, etc., which serves as the basis for calculating the period of possession, is an indirect fact that estimates the period of possession or the possession independently, the court may examine the time and title of the real possession and determine the completion of the prescriptive acquisition by examining the time and title of the real possession as recognized by the litigation data without seeking a party’s assertion (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 80Da2671, Jun. 22, 1982; 82Da565, Nov. 9, 1982; 87Meu2733, Dec. 6, 198).

The court below did not err in the misapprehension of the principle of pleading on the ground that the defendant's possession of the land in this case was commenced or the title was recognized as stated in its holding.

All arguments are without merit.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.