(a) Whether there is a legal interest seeking the revocation of a warning disposition in the event that the vicarious execution based on the guidance and disposition is completed;

B. In a lawsuit claiming revocation of an order to pay expenses for vicarious execution, which is a subsequent disposition, whether a prior disposition can seek revocation of the order to pay expenses for vicarious execution on the ground that the prior disposition is illegal

A. There is no legal interest in seeking the revocation of a warning disposition as long as the execution of a vicarious execution based on a warning disposition is already completed as a factual act.

B. The order for the payment of expenses incurred in the notification, vicarious execution, execution, and vicarious execution by a writ of vicarious execution is to secure the performance of the administrative obligation that can be performed by another person under the burden of the obligor, and the order for the payment of expenses for vicarious execution is to be carried out in a series of procedures consecutively in order to achieve the same administrative purpose, and a single legal effect is generated by combining each other. Thus, if a prior disposition, which is a prior disposition, causes a legal effect, is illegal disposition, even though the defect is not significant and obvious, it cannot be viewed as a disposition for compulsory execution, and there is no legal interest to seek the cancellation of the prior disposition, and even if there is no defect in the order for the payment of expenses for vicarious execution itself, the order for the payment of expenses for vicarious execution, which is a subsequent disposition, is illegal as the prior disposition, which is a claim for the revocation of the order for the payment of expenses for vicarious execution, which is a subsequent disposition, and thus, is also illegal.

(a)Article 12(a) of the Administrative Litigation Act; Article 2(a) of the Administrative Vicarious Execution Act; Article 3(b) of the same Act;

A. Supreme Court Decision 75Nu230 delivered on January 27, 1976 (Gong1976, 8984), 79Nu242 delivered on November 13, 1979 (Gong1980, 12420), 93Nu6164 delivered on June 8, 1993 (Gong193Ha, 2031) B. 62Nu215 delivered on February 7, 1963 (Gong11Nu34), 75Nu123 delivered on December 9, 1975 (Gong1976, 8898), 92Nu4567 delivered on February 9, 193 (Gong193Sang, 1986)

Plaintiff

Attorney Kim Tae-tae, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 92Gu16944 delivered on May 13, 1993

1. The part of the lower judgment dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

2. The plaintiff's remaining appeal is dismissed.

3. The costs of appeal against the dismissed portion are assessed against the plaintiff.

1. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2 (the grounds of appeal stated in the briefs submitted after the lapse of the submission period are examined to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate brief).

The court below rejected the lawsuit as to the claim on the ground that there is no legal interest in seeking the revocation of the instant order, as long as the execution of vicarious execution based on the instant order was completed as a factual act, and all of the lawsuits are merely criticisming that the instant order is unlawful on the premise that the lawsuit seeking the revocation of the instant order is legitimate, and thus, it is not acceptable to accept the lawsuit.

2. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 3

The court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the order to pay the expenses for vicarious execution of this case is null and void because the order to pay the expenses for vicarious execution of this case is not null and void as it is not void as a matter of course, and even if the order to pay the expenses for vicarious execution of this case was not revoked, so the order to revoke or modify the order to pay the expenses for vicarious execution of this case, or claim damages as long as its fairness is maintained as it is not unlawful. Thus, the court below determined that the plaintiff's claim to revoke the order to pay the expenses for vicarious execution of this case on the premise that the order to pay the expenses for vicarious execution of this case is unlawful after the completion

However, the fairness of an administrative act means that even if there is a defect in an administrative act, it is only effective temporarily until the competent agency revokes the administrative act, unless the administrative act is void automatically. Thus, even if the fairness is recognized because the administrative act has not been revoked, the other party or interested person can at any time assert that the administrative act is illegal. In addition, the other party or interested person can assert that the administrative act is illegal. Furthermore, the order to pay expenses required for the notification, substitute execution, and vicarious execution by a writ of vicarious execution is carried out in a series of procedures in order to achieve the same administrative purpose. Thus, if the previous disposition causes a legal effect by combining each other. Thus, if the previous disposition, which is a defect, causes a single legal effect, it cannot be deemed that the defect is a disposition that has a defect, and thus the execution of vicarious execution has already been completed as a fact, and there is no legal interest to seek the cancellation of such disposition, and even if the order to pay expenses for vicarious execution itself does not exist, it shall be deemed that the previous disposition is an unlawful disposition that is a defect in the cost of vicarious execution order.

Therefore, the court below rejected the plaintiff's claim for revocation of the payment order of expenses for vicarious execution on the grounds as stated in the decision, although the court below should have judged whether the payment order of expenses for vicarious execution in this case was legitimate after examining whether there was a defect corresponding to the grounds for revocation as alleged by the plaintiff in the preceding disposition, which is the prior disposition, as well as the prior disposition,. The court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the succession of defects between the fair administrative act and the prior disposition and the subsequent disposition, and it is clear that such illegality has affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, there is a reason to point this out.

In addition, according to the records, through the preparatory brief dated March 17, 1993 as stated by the court below on the seventh day for pleading (3. 10:00 of March 25, 1993), the plaintiff did not apply for the expropriation ruling of the land and buildings in this case within the period specified by the Minister of Construction and Transportation when the defendant, who implemented the urban planning project with respect to the land and the goods of this case owned by the plaintiff, and did not apply for the expropriation ruling of the urban planning project within the period specified by the Minister of Construction and Transportation, and the authorization of the implementation plan of the urban planning project has lost its effect. Thus, the adjudication of expropriation of the land in this case is null and void and the adjudication of expropriation was made on the land in this case, and even though the order of the repair disposition of this case or the order of the payment of expenses for vicarious execution was asserted to be null and void, the court below did not

3. Therefore, among the judgment of the court below, the part of dismissing the plaintiff's claim against the plaintiff seeking revocation of the order to pay expenses for vicarious execution of this case against the plaintiff on January 31, 1992 is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The remaining appeal by the plaintiff (as to the claim to revoke the order for revocation of the order for vicarious execution of this case) is dismissed, and the costs of appeal as to this part are assessed against

Justices Ahn Yong-sik (Presiding Justice)