[1] The case holding that an employee of the owner of a vehicle does not constitute the "insured liable to compensate for an accident that occurred while he/she temporarily left the route of operation after having been allowed to operate the vehicle for the performance of his/her duties and has temporarily left the route of operation," which is the subject of the comprehensive automobile insurance clause

[2] In the case of an accident caused by a third party's unauthorized driving, the standard for determining whether the owner's loss of operating control and operating profit is determined

[1] The case holding that even if an employee of the owner of a vehicle was involved in an accident when he temporarily left the course of operation after obtaining permission for the operation of the vehicle involved in the accident to perform his duties and completed his duties, the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident still has the operational control and operational benefits, and since his employee did not have any operational control and operational benefits for the vehicle involved in the accident, the owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident cannot be deemed to be the insured liable for compensation as stipulated in the General Automobile Insurance Clause.

[2] Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act provides that a person who operates an automobile for his own purpose refers to a person who is in the position of an entity responsible for controlling the operation of an automobile and enjoying the benefit therefrom. Thus, even if a third party was involved in an accident while driving the automobile without permission, the owner of the automobile who is normally recognized as in such position shall be held liable for the accident as an operator under this Act, unless there are special circumstances to deem that the owner's control of operation and the profit from operation was completely lost. Whether the operation control and the loss of profit has been lost should be determined by comprehensively assessing objective and external circumstances, such as ordinary vehicle and its key, the reason why the operation is possible regardless of the owner's intention, the personal relationship between the owner and the driver, the existence of the driver's intention to return the vehicle, the possibility of the driver's consent after the unauthorized Operation, the existence of the victim's subjective perception of the unauthorized Operation, etc.

[1] Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act / [2] Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 94Da31860 delivered on December 27, 1994 (Gong1995Sang, 664), Supreme Court Decision 96Da4613 delivered on July 25, 1997 (Gong1997Ha, 2668) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 91Da43701 delivered on March 10, 1992 (Gong1992, 1292), Supreme Court Decision 93Da47394 delivered on August 26, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2515), Supreme Court Decision 94Da9085 delivered on September 23, 1994 (Gong194, 2794, 1994), Supreme Court Decision 94Da296394 delivered on April 16, 195 (Gong94, 294, 294)

Plaintiff 1 and five others (Law Firm Ansan, Attorneys Gyeong-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee)

Dongyang Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Han-dong Law Office, Attorneys Yu-hee et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul District Court Decision 95Na17372 delivered on July 6, 1995

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Summary of the judgment below

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below citing the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance.

A. Based on the facts, at around 00:30 on January 13, 1994, the non-party 1 driven a truck of 8Du9448 owned by the non-party Taesan Alcoholic Beverages Co., Ltd. (hereinafter only referred to as Taesan Alcoholic Beverages) and operated it. The non-party 1 caused the injury to the plaintiff 1 who was on the way to the front part of the vehicle due to negligence in failing to properly operate steering gear, etc., and caused the damage to the plaintiff 1, who was on the way to the front part of the vehicle due to negligence in front of the military unit located in the Geumju-gun, Gyeonggi-gun, which was located in the Geumsan Island. At the time of the accident, the non-party 1 and the defendant suffered from the injury of the plaintiff 1, who was on the way to the front part of the vehicle. At the time of the accident, the non-party 2 and the non-party 3 concluded a comprehensive automobile insurance contract with the defendant to compensate for the damages caused by the accident under the provisions of this case.

B. As a result of the defendant's defense and its determination, (1) the accident occurred since the plaintiff 1 and the non-party 1, who was an employee of the company of the plaintiff 1, who was the employee of the company of the plaintiff 1, who was the employee of the company of the plaintiff 1, who was the employee of the plaintiff 1, who was the employee of the company of the plaintiff 1, who was the worker of the plaintiff 1, who was the worker of the company of the plaintiff 1, used the accident without permission, and even if not, the plaintiff 1 used the accident after obtaining permission from the non-party 1, the registered insured of the accident at the time of the accident, who was the plaintiff 1, who was the insured of the non-party 1, who was the insured of the accident, and therefore, the defendant is not liable to compensate the plaintiffs

(2) According to its adopted evidence, the non-party 1, the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident, was using the vehicle involved in the accident in the development of the development of the vehicle in question, where the non-party 1 and the non-party 1, the operator of the vehicle in question, used the vehicle in question. When using the vehicle in the development of the vehicle in question, the non-party 1, the operator of the vehicle in question, operated and managed the vehicle in question, and the non-party 1, the operator of the vehicle in question, was kept in the site of the development of the vehicle in question at the YY-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-ri-si.

(3) In light of the aforementioned accident’s ownership relation, the ordinary use and storage status of the vehicle, the detailed purpose and operational circumstances at the time of the accident, etc., even if Plaintiff 1’s daily driving mode was incurred while Plaintiff 1 left his/her work and went back to his/her house while drinking alcohol, the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident, still has a driving control and operational benefits, and the Plaintiff 1 et al. did not bring his/her operating control and operational benefits for the vehicle involved in the accident, and thus, Plaintiff 1 et al. cannot be deemed as the insured who was liable under the terms and conditions of automobile comprehensive insurance, and thus, Plaintiff 1 cannot be deemed as the insured at the time of the accident.

2. Judgment on the grounds of appeal

A. On the first ground for appeal

The term "person who operates an automobile for his own sake" under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act refers to a person who is in a position as a responsible subject to the control of the operation of an automobile and to enjoy the benefit therefrom. Thus, even if a third party was involved in an accident while driving the automobile without permission, the owner of the automobile who is normally in such position shall be held liable for the accident unless there are special circumstances that the owner's control of operation and the profit from operation was completely lost. Whether the operation control and the loss of the profit from operation should be determined by comprehensively assessing the objective and extra-type circumstances such as the situation in which the operation is possible regardless of the owner's intention, the personal relationship between the owner and the driver, the possibility of the driver's consent after the unauthorized Operation, the existence of the victim's subjective perception of the operation without permission, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da41232, Feb. 24, 195, etc.).

In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that it is still in the position of an operator since it cannot be deemed that Taesan Alcoholic Beverages lost their operational control over the vehicle involved in the accident and operational benefits, and there is no error of law as otherwise alleged.

B. On the second ground for appeal

According to the above facts, Plaintiff 1 cannot be deemed to be in the position of operator because it was not in the position of operator because it was not in the position of operator as to the vehicle at the time of the accident at the time of the accident, and therefore, it cannot be deemed to be in the position of liability for compensation for the accident at the time of the accident. Therefore, it is reasonable to determine that Plaintiff 1 did not constitute the "insured who is exempted from liability for compensation pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Comprehensive Insurance Clause" and there is no error of law as argued

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Cho Chang-hun (Presiding Justice)