A. Whether it constitutes a ground for judicial divorce under Article 840(1)6 of the Civil Act only by agreement on divorce and giving and receiving consolation money (negative)

B. Whether a judicial divorce claim may be filed on the ground of a mistake committed by the other party in the course of resolving the conflict (negative)

A. Unless there exist special circumstances, such as that even if the husband and wife agreed to divorce at once in the marital life and gave and receives consolation money, the marital relationship has been broken down to the extent that it is impossible for both husband and wife to observe the substance of the marital relationship with the intention of divorce, and that both husband and wife have lived with the intention of divorce, the existence of such agreement alone does not constitute a serious reason that makes it impossible to continue the marriage, which is a cause of judicial divorce under Article 840(1)6 of the Civil Act.

B. Even though the other party has committed a mistake in the process of resolving the conflict after the failure of the marital life was caused by a cause attributable to the other party’s fault, barring special circumstances, such as the failure of the marriage caused by the other party’s cause attributable to the other party’s fault regardless of the failure of the marriage caused by the other party’s fault, or the degree of the failure is considerably liable compared to the other party’s cause attributable to the other party’s fault, a spouse cannot file a claim for divorce by taking such cause. Even if the conflict has been accumulated and the other party’s marital relationship has reached the degree that it is impossible to lead to the other party’s divorce, barring special circumstances such as the other party’s failure to comply with divorce only on the face of the intention to attract the spouse without the intention to continue the marriage, the spouse originally responsible for the failure of the marriage may not file a claim for divorce on the ground of Article 840(1)6 of the Civil Act.

Article 840(1)6 of the Civil Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 82Meu54 delivered on December 28, 1982 (Gong1983, 424)

[Defendant-Appellant] Defendant 1

[Defendant-Appellant] Defendant 1

Gwangju High Court Decision 88Reu22 delivered on January 17, 1989

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the appellant.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate brief dated April 4, 1989).

1. As to the assertion of denial of judgment:

Unless there exist special circumstances, such as that husband and wife have reached an agreement on temporary divorce and that both husband and wife have been living without resolving the substance of the marital relationship with the intention of divorce, as it is necessary to maintain a smooth marital life by understanding and cooperating with each other, barring special circumstances, the existence of such agreement on divorce does not constitute a serious reason that makes it impossible to continue marriage, which is a judicial divorce under Article 840(1)6 of the Civil Act (see Supreme Court Decision 82Meu54, Dec. 28, 1982). Examining the records of this case, the claimant and the respondent did not appear to have reached an agreement on solatium 60,000 won on April 1986, and the court below did not have reached an agreement on divorce and submitted evidence to the effect that the claimant did not have reached an agreement on divorce and that the claimant did not have reached an agreement on divorce as it did not appear to have reached an agreement on divorce before the court below's first time and the court below's decision on divorce. However, the court below's decision that the claimant did not have been independent from the first time to 8 months of marriage.

In addition, since the contents of Gap evidence No. 15-1 and No. 2 15-2, which points out the issue, are not contrary to the fact-finding of the court below, even though the court below did not make a clear judgment, it cannot be said that the judgment was affected by the judgment.

The issue is groundless.

2. As to the assertion of misapprehension of the legal principle

Under our legal system that adopts the so-called principle of liability with respect to judicial divorce, even if the other party's fault in the course of resolving the conflict after one's spouse's failure of marriage due to any cause attributable to the other party's spouse, barring special circumstances such as the failure of marriage due to the other party's cause for judicial divorce, or the degree of the failure of marriage caused by the other party's failure of marriage may not be claimed for divorce on the ground of such cause, unless there are special circumstances such as the other party's failure of marriage due to the other party's cause for liability, or the other party's failure of marriage is considerably liable compared to the other party's cause for liability. Even if the conflict has been accumulated so that the other party's marriage cannot be caused by the other party's failure of marriage, the other party's fact may not be claimed for divorce on the ground of Article 840 (1) 6 of the Civil Act, unless there are special circumstances such as the other party's failure of marriage without the intention to continue the marriage.

In the same purport, the court below recognized that the marital life of this case was caused by the claimant's malicious abandonment of the respondent in bad faith, and determined that the respondent cannot file a claim for divorce as a claimant who is a more responsible spouse than the claimant's act of abandonment of the respondent's marital life, which is larger than the claimant's act of abandonment of the respondent's marital life, is justified in accordance with the legal principles mentioned above, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to judicial divorce grounds. It is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to judicial divorce grounds.

The precedents of party members pointing out arguments are different from those of this case, and are not appropriate in this case. The arguments are groundless.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Chang-chul (Presiding Justice)