Part of the evidence which is rejected at the time of fact-finding based on comprehensive evidence

In a case where a court determines multiple evidences comprehensively, the contradictory and unnecessary parts of each evidence are removed, and the common parts are required, and they are offered for the judgment materials. Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the parts in each of the evidence contents conflict with or contradictory to the recognized facts are not adopted even if there is no express evidence, and therefore, it cannot be said that there is an error of law since the court did not specify the rejection of evidence inconsistent with the facts admitted.

Article 187 of the Civil Procedure Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Park Jae-soo and 1 other, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant-appellee-appellant-appellee-appellant-appellant-Appellee-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-

Plaintiff Kim Dong-young et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Defendant 1 and two others

Seoul High Court Decision 92Na47276 delivered on November 24, 1993

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The Plaintiff’s attorney’s ground of appeal is examined.

1. According to the records, it is reasonable that the court below's finding that Defendant 1, Nonparty 1, and Defendant 3, who had constructed and resided in the land of this case since the registration of initial ownership was made on September 26, 1967, received usage fees from the persons who had resided in the building of this case on the land of this case, and occupied them from November 21, 1983, and that he had occupied the land listed in the annexed Table 1 of the judgment of the court below among them, and that Defendant 3, who is his other children, occupied each of the land listed in the annexed Table 2 of the judgment of the court below. There is no error of law such as misconception of facts, lack of reasons, incomplete deliberation, or misunderstanding of legal principles due to the violation of the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit, and there is no error of law such as misconception of facts against the rules of evidence, and it is justified in the judgment of the court below to deem that Defendant 1, Defendant 1, and Defendant 3 had occupied the land of this case in a public performance.

In a case where the court determines multiple evidences comprehensively, it is reasonable to view that the contradictory and unnecessary parts of each evidence are removed, and the common parts are collected, and they are offered for the judgment materials. Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the part in each evidence among the contents of evidence is not adopted even if there is no express statement (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da18129 delivered on Nov. 12, 1993). Therefore, it cannot be said that the court below erred in the misapprehension of the evidence inconsistent with the above facts.

2. Examining the relevant evidence in light of the records, it cannot be deemed that Defendant 1 managed the instant land upon delegation by the deceased non-party 2, who is the deceased non-party 2, who is the deceased's decedent. Thus, even though the court below did not explicitly reject the witness's testimony, etc. pointing out in conformity with the above plaintiff's assertion, it is not appropriate for the court below to accept the plaintiff's above assertion, and therefore, the court below's above error does not affect the conclusion of the judgment.

3. In addition, according to the records, Defendant 1 was aware that prior to September 26, 1967, Defendant 1 received usage fees from users of the instant land prior to the registration of preservation of ownership on the instant land, barring any other special circumstances, Defendant 1 was indirectly occupying the instant land prior to the aforementioned date, and Nonparty 1 and Defendant 3, who is his own child, has been occupied as above. In this case where there is no change in the owner of the instant land during the occupancy period, which is the basis for the acquisition by prescription, the lower court deemed the commencement date of possession of the instant land as the date of September 26, 1967, and recognized the expiration date as the expiration date of twenty years from that date, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the acquisition by prescription or calculating the period, such as the theory of lawsuit, or in so doing.

Since the court below is clear in view of the reasoning of the judgment that Defendant 1’s possession of the instant land was commenced through the registration of preservation, and that it was not recognized that the possession of the instant land was converted into the possession with intention to hold the ownership, the theory against the judgment of the court below cannot be accepted in the opposite position.

4. All of the arguments are without merit, and all of the appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Cho Chang-tae (Presiding Justice)