[1] In case of non-life insurance, only the subject matter of the insurance and the type of risk are determined, and the insured and the insured's interest are not clear, the standard of determining the insured

[2] The case holding that the fire insurance cannot be deemed as having the nature of liability insurance unless otherwise stipulated

[3] Interpretation of "damage caused by failure to return the deposit money under the special contract for security for lease on a deposit basis for non-life insurance"

[1] In case of non-life insurance, only the subject matter and risk type of the insurance are determined, and where the insured and the insurable interests are unclear, whether the insurance contract is for the policyholder itself or for the other party shall be determined by taking into account all the circumstances such as the content of the insurance contract and the terms and conditions which the parties make into account, the process and process of the conclusion of the insurance contract, and the practice of the insurance company

[2] The case holding that in case where a lessee concludes an insurance contract for the leased building and its facilities without clearly mentioning the insured and stating himself as its owner and compensating for the damage, etc. caused by fire of the object of the insurance, such insurance contract has the nature of a non-life insurance as a kind of fire insurance, and that such fire insurance has the nature of a liability insurance unless otherwise stipulated

[3] In case of non-life insurance, the term "compensation for lease on a deposit basis" is sufficient if the object of the insurance is in a situation where the lessee is not actually able to receive a refund for lease on a deposit basis (damage caused by fire, fire-fighting damage caused by fire, and escape damage caused by fire) and the contract cannot be maintained, and the special agreement provides for compensation within the limit of the amount of the lease deposit specified at the time of the lease contract where the lease contract is terminated due to fire, such as the loss of the object of the lease from the lessee, etc., it is reasonable to view that there is no effect on the exercise of the right to claim for the lease on a deposit basis.

[1] Articles 639 and 665 of the Commercial Act / [2] Articles 639, 683, and 719 of the Commercial Act / [3] Article 105 of the Civil Act, Article 683 of the Commercial Act, Article 5 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 95Da14800 delivered on May 30, 1997 (Gong1997Ha, 1992) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 2000Da29769 Delivered on November 10, 200 (Gong2001Sang, 19)

Plaintiff (Attorney Kim Jong-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Dongbu Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Vindication, Attorneys Gyeong-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2001Na57275 delivered on May 17, 2002

Each appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against each party. Of the defendant's indication in the judgment of the court of first instance, the defendant's "Dong Eastern Marine Fire Insurance Co., Ltd." and the defendant's indication in the judgment of the court of first instance shall be corrected to each Dong Dong Fire Marine Insurance Co., Ltd.

1. Plaintiff’s ground of appeal

In the case of non-life insurance, only the type of the subject matter and risk of the insurance are determined and the insured and the insured and the insured's interest are unclear, it is clear that the insurance contract has the nature of the non-life insurance as a kind of fire insurance, and it has the nature of the non-life insurance, and it is not clear that such fire insurance has the nature of the insurance contract, unless otherwise stipulated, the lessee operating a restaurant bears the liability to compensate the insured for damages incurred by the insured, who is the owner of the subject matter, due to its liability for damages (see Supreme Court Decision 9Da1905 delivered on May 30, 1997).

Based on its evidence, the lower court acknowledged the following facts based on its reasoning: (a) the details and process of the Plaintiff’s conclusion of the instant insurance contract; (b) the content of the general insurance agreement consisting of the instant insurance contract; (c) the policyholder is not the owner of the subject matter of insurance as in this case; (d) practical process of the Defendant Company in the event that the Plaintiff was not the owner of the subject matter of insurance; and (e) the content of the special agreement entered into while entering into the instant insurance contract; and (e) determined that the Plaintiff, a lessee, was not entitled to claim insurance proceeds for the part of the instant building, in light

Examining the relevant evidence in light of the records in light of the above legal principles, the above fact-finding and determination by the court below is just, and even after examining the records, it cannot be said that there was a special agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant to compensate for damages incurred by the owner of the building in the event the building of this case is lost due to a cause attributable to the plaintiff, unlike ordinary insurance liability under the terms and conditions of the contract at the time of entering into the insurance contract of this case. Thus, the court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the interpretation of the intent of the party to the terms and conditions of the insurance contract and the insurable interest, or in incomplete deliberation as to the process

2. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal

(a) Intentional assertion of an insurance accident;

Examining the relevant evidence in light of the records, we affirm the judgment of the court of first instance that the court below did not have any evidence that the plaintiff intentionally destroyed the insurance accident of this case in order to acquire insurance proceeds after entering into an insurance contract, and thereby caused the insurance accident of this case. There is no error of law by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

B. Claim for insurance contract by fraud

Examining the relevant evidence in light of the records, the court below accepted the first instance court's determination that the value of the subject matter of insurance of this case is considerably short of the amount of insurance coverage. However, in light of the process of conclusion of the insurance contract of this case, it cannot be readily concluded that the insurance contract of this case was concluded due to the plaintiff's fraud, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it. In so doing, the court below did not err by misapprehending the rules of evidence as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

C. The assertion that he/she loses his/her insurance claim in violation of Article 28 of the Insurance Clause

According to the records, the court below cited the first instance court's determination that the construction cost estimate of building that the whole building, which is the subject matter of the insurance of this case, was destroyed by fire cannot be deemed to have been falsely prepared, and even if the plaintiff submitted a rough estimate or estimate, etc. of an amount much higher than the estimated amount of the damage adjuster on the part of the defendant, this is merely the fact that the defendant had a third party prepare at the request of the damage adjuster, and without undergoing a field investigation, it was prepared as a basis for only the documents such as the building ledger, and the difference in the amount is deemed to be due to the difference in the assessment method of the subject matter of the insurance. Thus, it is just in its conclusion that the plaintiff intentionally submitted a false statement in the above estimate, etc. and submitted it to the defendant to the effect that it cannot be deemed that the plaintiff constitutes a cause for loss of insurance right under Article 28 of the insurance clause of this case, which is a ground for loss of insurance right, and there

D. The plaintiff did not own ownership of the instant facilities

In light of the records, the first instance court cited by the court below is justified in determining the facility of this case on the premise that it owned by the plaintiff, and there is no error of law as alleged in the ground of appeal.

(e) argument that no special agreement on security for lease on a deposit basis is applied.

According to the records, the contents of the special agreement on the security of the lease on a deposit basis of this case, which the Plaintiff, the lessee of the building, purchased, is "to compensate within the limit of the deposit money specified in the lease contract where the purpose of the insurance is not to maintain the lease contract by suffering damage (fire damage, fire damage, fire damage, and escape damage due to fire) stipulated in the general terms and conditions." In this case, the insurance agreement aims to ensure that if the lease contract is terminated for reasons such as the loss of the leased object due to fire, etc., the lessee is unable to receive the refund of the deposit in whole or in part from the lessor." In this case, the "the deposit is not refunded" is sufficient if the lessee is in a situation where the lessee is not actually able to receive the deposit on a deposit basis. Whether the lessee has the right to claim the return of the lease on a deposit basis against the lessor, and whether there is a possibility to receive the refund of the deposit on a deposit basis, etc. (if the Plaintiff has the right to claim the refund against the lessor, such circumstance shall be asserted by the insurer by subrogation by the Defendant.).

In the same purport, the first instance court, cited by the court below, judged that the defendant is liable to pay insurance money under the special agreement on security for lease on a deposit basis of this case, shall be justified, and there is no violation of the misapprehension of legal principles as to the special agreement on security for lease on a deposit basis, as otherwise

3. Therefore, each appeal shall be dismissed, and each part of the judgment of the court of first instance and the judgment of the court below shall be corrected ex officio. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Ji-dam (Presiding Justice)