(a) Whether a letter constituting the essential part of a different trademark is similar to a trademark;

(b) Whether the trademark is similar with the trademark "Dongia" and "new display place";

A. In determining similarity of trademarks, the similarity of trademarks shall be determined depending on whether the appearance, name, and concept of trademarks are, in whole and in different degrees, likely to cause mistake or confusion as to the origin of goods in light of the common sense of trade of goods, and if the characters constituting the essential parts of trademarks are similar and are likely to be confused in terms of their names or concepts, they shall be deemed similar trademarks.

B. The term "Dong (Donghia)" and the cited trademark "new display place" mean the overall appearance of the trademark, and, in the case of title, the cited trademark is often called simply with the distinctive parts of the general trade world that respects simple speed, and in light of the common examples referred to simply simply with the distinctive parts of the general trade world that respects simple speed, and in that case, the cited trademark is similar to that of the original trademark and the meaning of "new" is similar to the cited trademark, i.e., the East Asia, and thus, it constitutes a similar trademark that is recognized similar to general consumers in the transaction of the designated goods, and thus, is likely to mislead or confuse the place of goods.

Article 9(1)7 of the Trademark Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 84Hu70 delivered on December 26, 1984; 84Hu88 delivered on February 13, 1985; 84Hu81 delivered on March 25, 1986

claimant

Patent Attorney Hong-chul et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant

Korean Intellectual Property Trial Office Decision 85 No. 194 dated December 27, 1986

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the respondent.

With respect to the ground of appeal by the respondent’s agent:

In determining similarity of a trademark, the similarity of a trademark shall be determined by observing the external appearance, name, and concept of the trademark in a general and separately, and depending on whether there is a concern to mislead or confuse the source of goods in light of the general sense of trade of goods. Even if there are different parts among trademarks, if it is similar to those which form the essential part, and it is easy to confuse them with the name or concept of the name (see Supreme Court Decision 84Hu70 delivered on December 26, 1984; Supreme Court Decision 84Hu88 delivered on February 13, 1985; Supreme Court Decision 84Hu81 delivered on March 25, 1986).

In this case, the trademark "Dongh (Donghia)" and the cited trademark "new display place" mean the trademark "Dongh (Dongh)" as a whole in its appearance, and in the case of name, in light of the common case referred to simply a specific part of the general trade world that respects simple and rapid length, the cited trademark is often called simply a new operation, and in that case, it is similar to the club of the original trademark, and in addition, the meaning "new" is similar to the cited trademark. Thus, in trade of the same designated goods, it constitutes a similar trademark that is recognized similar to general consumers and is likely to mislead or confuse the place of goods.

Therefore, the decision of the court below that the trademark of this case is invalid because it is similar to the cited trademark applied by another person and falls under Article 9 (1) 7 of the Trademark Act is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the similarity of trademark such as theory of lawsuit.

However, according to the reasoning of the original decision, it is judged that the respondent's publicity of the display site with a trademark of East Asia for a multi-year period of time, even though it is recognized that the respondent's trademark of East Asia cannot be regarded as a special trademark to the extent that it is recognized that the respondent's trademark is a shock case registered as designated goods, so there is no illegality of disregarding the original decision. The argument is groundless.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)