(a) In cases where 20 years have elapsed since the total period of occupation of the former occupant after the change of the landowner, whether the owner may use the time of change as the new starting point for the acquisition by prescription;

B. Whether the interruption of prescription naturally takes effect on the part of the Defendant’s responding act in a case where a person who asserts prescription becomes the Plaintiff and brought a lawsuit,

A. A person who asserts the prescriptive acquisition may arbitrarily choose the starting point of the prescriptive acquisition as to the land for which the owner does not change during the period of possession. The prescriptive acquisition can be recognized unless it is found that it has been 20 years or more retroactively from the date on which the person asserts the prescriptive acquisition, and that it is not an independent possession. This is also reasonable even in cases where, after the completion of the prescriptive acquisition, the original possessor occupies the land for 20 consecutive years, or succeeds to the possession of the former occupant for 20 years, even if there is a change in the landowner after the completion of the prescriptive acquisition, and the period of one’s own possession does not reach 20 years, but it is also reasonable in cases where the change of the owner

B. In a case where a person who claims extinctive prescription files a lawsuit as the Plaintiff, the Defendant’s act of responding to an action that constitutes the cause of extinctive prescription does not immediately bring about the effect of interrupting prescription, but in principle, the Defendant, who wishes to have the effect of interrupting prescription, does not assert that the prescription has been interrupted as an act of responding to the pertinent lawsuit or another lawsuit, and unless the Defendant asserts that the interruption of prescription was interrupted or that such intent was included in the pleading, the mere fact that the Defendant’s act of responding to the lawsuit was committed does not necessarily mean that the

A. Article 245(1) of the Civil Act; Article 188 of the Civil Procedure Act; Article 168 subparag. 1 of the Civil Act; Article 170 of the Civil Act

A. Supreme Court en banc Decision 92Da47861 delivered on Apr. 12, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 131) 92Da41054 delivered on Apr. 12, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 487)

Plaintiff 2 and 21 others

Plaintiff 13 et al.

Plaintiff 1 et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee

Hyundai Construction Co., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellant and 16 others

Seoul High Court Decision 92Na14832 delivered on February 16, 1994

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against each appellant.

1. We examine the Plaintiffs’ grounds of appeal listed in the Attachment No. 4 of the lower judgment.

In light of the records, we affirm the decision of the court below that there is no evidence to acknowledge that the buyer of the apartment building of this case purchased the share corresponding to the whole area ratio of the apartment building of this case among the land of this case, and there is no error of law as to violation of the rules of evidence, omission of judgment, omission of contract interpretation, and omission of customs, which are facts, such as the theory of lawsuit, and omission of the rules of evidence, and omission of customs

2. We examine the Defendant’s grounds of appeal.

(1) A person who asserts the acquisition by prescription may arbitrarily choose the starting point of the acquisition by prescription for the land without any change of the owner during the period of possession, and the party member’s established view that the acquisition by prescription may be recognized unless it is found that it has been for 20 years or more retroactively from the date on which he asserts the acquisition by prescription, and that it can be recognized unless it is found that it has been not an independent possession. This is also reasonable in cases where the original possessor continues to occupy for 20 years after the completion of the acquisition by prescription, or succeeds to the possession of the former possessor for 20 years, and the period of one’s possession does not reach 20 years after the expiration of the acquisition by adding the period of possession by the former possessor to the total period of possession by 20 years after the change of the owner, even if the change occurs (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 93Ra46360, Mar. 22, 1994; 92Da41054, Apr. 12, 1994

The decision of the court below, which accepted the plaintiffs' letter of prescription acquisition as shown in the attached Table 3 of the judgment of the court below, is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the period of possession and its starting point, or in the incomplete hearing, since the decision of the court below, which received the plaintiffs' letter of prescription acquisition as shown in the attached Table 3 of the judgment of the court below, shall not be deemed to be erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the period of possession and its starting point, or in the incomplete hearing, as to the issue in this case, since the ownership of the site was transferred from Seoul Special Metropolitan City to the defendant company after the lapse of 20 years after the acquisition date again from the acquisition date of the ownership of the site in this case by the defendant company. It is not proper to invoke the issue in this case. The argument is without merit.

(2) In light of the records, since it is difficult to view the possession of the share in the site of this case according to the ratio of the size of possession of the building owned by the plaintiffs as stated in the attached Table 3 list of the judgment below or all of them, and there is a lack of evidence to acknowledge it otherwise, the above possession is presumed to be an independent possession, barring any special circumstance. Therefore, the court below is just in its decision that the above plaintiffs' possession is dismissed as the defendant company's assertion that it is an exclusive possession, and there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the acquisition by prescription, the presumption of possession, the incomplete hearing

The presumption of possession with autonomy is not reversed merely because the defendant company concluded a lease contract with a third party on the site of this case or paid property tax. The arguments are without merit.

(3) A judicial claim under Article 168 subparagraph 1 of the Civil Act and Article 170 (1) of the Civil Act provides that one of the causes for interruption of prescription shall not only be the case where the right holder claims as the defendant the right holder who asserts the prescription as the plaintiff, but also include the case where the defendant has responded to the lawsuit and actively claims the right in the lawsuit and has accepted it (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 92Da47861, Dec. 21, 1993).

However, in a case where a person who claims prescription has filed a lawsuit as the Plaintiff, the Defendant’s act of responding to an action that serves as the cause of interruption of prescription does not immediately bring about the effect of interruption of prescription, but rather, the Defendant, who wants to have the effect of interruption of prescription pursuant to the principle of pleading, does not assert that the prescription has been interrupted as an act of responding to the pertinent lawsuit or another lawsuit. Unless the Defendant asserts that the interruption of prescription was asserted in pleading or that such intent was included, the mere fact that the Defendant’s act of responding to the lawsuit

The court's exercise of the right to ask for the statement is to supplement the statement of the party when it is impossible to know the purport of the statement due to the inconsistency, defect or omission, and to make it clear or to urge the party who has the burden of proof to prove the purport of the statement. Thus, the submission of the statement by suggesting facts concerning the legal effect which the party did not assert, or the method of attack and defense, and the act as such cannot be permitted in violation of the principle of pleading. Thus, in this case where the defendant company did not make any assertion as to the interruption of prescription, the court below did not examine whether the act of the defendant company's response of this case constitutes the cause of interruption of prescription, and it cannot be said that there is an error of incomplete deliberation due to the failure to exercise of the right to ask for the statement, such as the theory, and the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the interruption of prescription, or the omission of judgment, etc.

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Don-hee (Presiding Justice)