Scope of State property subject to prescriptive acquisition

Article 5 (2) of the State Property Act that the state property shall not be an object of prescriptive acquisition shall apply only after the enactment and enforcement of Act No. 2950 on December 31, 1976, and in the previous case, even if the state property is a state property, the land whose public use for administrative purpose is abolished shall be considered as an object of prescriptive acquisition.

Article 5 of the State Property Act, Article 245 of the Civil Act

Supreme Court Decision 79Da1080 delivered on September 25, 1979 (Daad 12248 delivered on September 25, 197, Supreme Court Decision 27Noh 50 delivered on June 27, 200, Supreme Court Decision 5(1)15, Court Gazette 621 delivered on September 262)

Korea

Defendant 1 and two others

Busan District Court (77Gahap484)

Of the original judgment, the part against Defendant 2’s land in the annexed list (1) shall be revoked and the Plaintiff’s claim for the part shall be dismissed.

All appeals by Defendant 1 and 3 are dismissed.

The total cost of the lawsuit on the above (1) between the plaintiff and defendant 2 shall be borne by the plaintiff, and the total cost of the lawsuit incurred after the appeal between the plaintiff, defendant 1 and defendant 3 shall be borne by the above defendants.

Defendant 1 performed the procedure for cancellation registration of transfer of ownership as of June 13, 1961, which was received on the land in the annexed list (1), (3) through (6) as of the Busan District Court's dong registry office, which was received on June 13, 1961, Defendant 2 performed the procedure for cancellation registration of transfer of ownership as of June 14, 1961, which was received on the land in the annexed list (1). Defendant 3 performed the procedure for cancellation registration of transfer of ownership as of June 14, 1961, which was received on the land in the annexed list (2). Defendant 3 performed the procedure for cancellation registration of transfer of ownership as of January 19, 1976.

The original judgment is revoked.The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

The contents of the lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff in both the first and second instances.

(1) On December 31, 1953, the registration of ownership transfer based on the annexed list (1) and (3) through (6) was made in order with Defendant 1 to the above land on the ground of the completion of repayment on December 31, 1953, and the registration of ownership transfer based on the annexed list (1) was made in the name of Defendant 2 with respect to the land on June 13, 1961, and the registration of ownership transfer based on the annexed list (2) was made in the name of Nonparty 1 with respect to the land on July 31, 1960, and the registration of ownership transfer based on the annexed list (2) was made in order of Nonparty 2, Sejong Trade Co., Ltd., Korea Commercial Bank, and Busan P&T Co., Ltd., Ltd., Ltd., to the above land on the ground of the above completion of payment on January 16, 1976, and there was no dispute between the parties to the above land and the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry on the annexed list (1) through 37).

Therefore, since the above farmland distribution to Defendant 1 and Nonparty 1 was made without the above procedure of transferring state-owned property, it is null and void as a matter of course. Therefore, the above registration made by Defendant 1 and Nonparty 1 on the ground of the completion of the repayment and the above registration made by Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 on the basis of the above registration are all null and void.

Defendant 1 and 2, even if the farmland distribution on the land of this case was made without being transferred to the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, and thus is null and void, the Minister of Finance and Economy concerned defense that he ratified the farmland distribution disposition on September 12, 1962 by the public abolition of the land of this case and the new procedure of transfer thereafter. Thus, although the land of this case was closed for public use on September 12, 1962, the plaintiff also recognized it, the fact that the land of this case was closed for public use on September 12, 1962 is insufficient to recognize that the plaintiff ratified the farmland distribution disposition of this case through a new procedure of transfer, and there is no other evidence to recognize this, and the legal principle itself that the farmland distribution disposition which was null and void without going through the procedure of transfer can be ratified after the fact by the agreement of the Minister concerned cannot be accepted.

Next, Defendant 2 purchased the above (1) land from September 12, 1962 to Defendant 1, and Defendant 3 succeeded to each of the above (2) land from October 31, 1962 to Defendant 1, Defendant 1, who acquired the above (3) and (4) land, from August 5, 1965 to Defendant 1, and from October 6, 1965 to the above (5) land, the same owner of the above (6) land was owned by Defendant 1 and owned by Defendant 2 for 16 years from September 12, 1962 to his own intention and without negligence. Accordingly, the court below's decision that the above land was owned by Defendant 1 and was owned by Defendant 1 and thus, it cannot be viewed that the above land was owned by Defendant 1 and thus, it conforms to the substantive relation of rights and obligations of Defendant 1 and thus, it cannot be viewed that the ownership of the land was owned by Defendant 2 prior to the expiration of prescription period of 16 years from September 16, 197.

Thus, the plaintiff's claim against the defendant 3 concerning the above (2) land and the above (3) through (6) against the defendant 1 is justified, and therefore, the claim against the defendant 2 concerning the above (1) land shall be accepted, and the claim against the defendant 2 concerning the above (1) shall be dismissed as it is without merit.

Therefore, the above (1) portion of the original judgment against Defendant 2 is unfair in its conclusion and thus, it is so revoked and the plaintiff's claim against Defendant 1 and 3 is dismissed. The above Defendants' appeal against Defendant 1 and 3 is just and just in its conclusion, and the above Defendants' appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the application of Articles 96, 89, 92, and 93 of the Civil Procedure Act to the burden of litigation costs.

Judges fixed ticket (Presiding Judge) Mobile Engines