(a) Whether to acquire prescription of the property devolvingd upon farmland (affirmative);

(b) Scope of State property eligible for prescriptive acquisition;

C. Whether real estate can be acquired by prescription even by indirect possession (affirmative)

(a) Even the property devolving upon the State shall be subject to prescriptive acquisition when the period for prescriptive acquisition expires after the repayment thereof is believed to have been received in an effective manner and the repayment thereof has been completed;

(b) Before the enforcement of the State Property Act (No. 2950 of December 31, 1976), it shall be subject to prescriptive acquisition as long as it is not an administrative property.

(c)a real estate may be acquired by prescription even by indirect possession;

Article 245 of the Civil Act; Article 5 of the State Property Act; Article 33 of the Maritime Affairs and Security Act of the Republic of Korea; Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Maritime Affairs and Security Act of the Republic of Korea concerning the acquisition of the personal property right within shipbuilding;

1. Supreme Court Decision 80Da3121 Decided September 22, 1981 (Article 2451(20) of the Civil Code, Gong668No14376 Decided August 30, 1968 (Article 245-1(5) of the Civil Code), Supreme Court Decision 79Da1080 Decided September 25, 1979 (Article 245-1(18) of the Civil Code) (Article 245-1(18) of the Civil Code), Article 247Da715, Article 716 (Article 2525 of the Civil Code) Decided October 30, 1970

Korea

Stib Corbs

Seoul District Court Branch of Seoul District Court (87Gahap139)

1. The judgment of the court below is revoked.

2. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

3. All the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff in the first and second instances.

On January 27, 1987, the defendant filed for the registration of ownership transfer with the Seoul District Court No. 3024, Jan. 27, 1987, and the registration procedure for cancellation of ownership transfer registration with the Seoul District Court No. 10856, Jul. 3, 1959, as to 26 to 216 to 216 to the plaintiff (717 square meters).

The judgment that the lawsuit costs shall be borne by the defendant.

The same shall apply to the order.

In light of Gap evidence 1-1, 2 (No. 3 (Certificate), Gap evidence 4-1, 5 (No. 10), Gap evidence 10 (Urban Planning Confirmation Board), Gap evidence 11, and 12 (No. 12) without dispute over each establishment: The land indicated in the purport of the claim (hereinafter "land of this case") is owned by Japan as of August 9, 1945 and reverted to the plaintiff as of July 3, 195, and the above 10856 (No. 10856), and the registration of the ownership transfer in the name of the non-party 4-1, 3, 196-1, 3, 196-1, 3, 4, 196-1, 3, 9, 4, 196, 1, 3, 195, 4, 3, 196, 4, 1, 1987, 3, 196, 4, 1, 194, 1,2, 3,2, 3, 3, 196, 1, 1,2,2, 3.

According to the above facts, the land of this case is already made a site formation at the time of completion of public notification and registration pursuant to Article 43(2) of the former Joseon City Planning Decree and Article 24 of the former Joseon City Land Improvement Decree before the Farmland Reform Act enters into force, and the land of this case has already been completed at the time of completion of registration. Therefore, even in the present case on June 21, 1949 when the Farmland Reform Act enters into force, the current status of the land of this case shall be deemed to be the agent in this case unless there are any special circumstances that can be recognized as being converted into farmland in the present time. Thus, since the land of this case cannot be deemed to be the farmland subject to distribution under the Farmland Reform Act, the farmland distribution to the same way to the non-party joint roads on the premise that the land of this case is farmland, and all the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the above two-way and the transfer of ownership

Even if the above distribution of farmland was null and void, the defendant cultivated the above land from the non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 9's non-party 9's non-party 9's non-party 9's non-party 1's non-party 9's non-party 9's non-party 1's non-party 9's non-party 9's non-party 1's non-party 9's non-party 9's non-party 9's non-party 1's non-party 9's non-party 9's non-party 9's non-party 9's non-party 1's non-party 9's non-party 9's non-party 1's non-party 9's non-party 9's non-party 1's non-party 9's non-party 1's non-party 9's non-party 1's non-party 9's non-party 1's non-party 9's non-party 9's non-party 1's counter-party 9's non-party

The plaintiff alleged that the land in this case was owned by Japan as of August 9, 1945, and since the possession of the land in this case belongs to the State pursuant to the military law No. 33 and the agreement on the property concluded between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America as of May 29, 195, since possession of the land in this case belongs to the State pursuant to the nature of the title, it cannot be acquired by prescription. Since the possessor of the land in this case is obligated to keep the land in the state pursuant to the military law No. 33, the possession of the land in this case is equivalent to the plaintiff's assertion, and even in this case, it shall be converted to the possession in this case with the intention to own the land in this case as of June 29, 1959, the above two roads succeeded to the possession of the land in this case from the Chinese non-party's name in this case from the non-party's name in this case to the non-party's name in this case and completed the sale of the land in this case's name.

The plaintiff also asserts that the land of this case is not subject to prescriptive acquisition, notwithstanding Article 245 of the Civil Act, since the state property cannot be subject to prescriptive acquisition. Thus, Article 5 (2) of the State Property Act, which provides that state property shall not be subject to prescriptive acquisition, applies only after it was enacted by Act No. 2950 of December 31, 1976, which is not subject to prescriptive acquisition, notwithstanding the provision of Article 245 of the Civil Act, and even before that, it shall not be subject to prescriptive acquisition unless it is an asset for public use, even if it is a state property, it shall not be subject to prescriptive acquisition unless it is an asset for public use. Thus, the above two paths shall not be subject to prescriptive acquisition. Since the land of this case which was originally owned by Japan was distributed from the plaintiff on May 29, 195 to the non-party's name, it shall not be subject to the non-party 2's ownership transfer registration after the expiration of the prescription period from the non-party 1's possession of the land of this case.

The plaintiff did not reside in the land of this case at the time when the land of this case was distributed, and when the registration of transfer of ownership was made on the ground of the completion of the above repayment, it cannot be deemed that he occupied the land of this case in good faith and without negligence, even if he did not have occupied the land of this case in good faith and without negligence, even though he did not have resided in the land of this case at the time when he was distributed the land of this case, he cannot be deemed to have occupied the land of this case at least since the farmland distribution on the land of this case was confirmed to be null and void by the Supreme Court Decision 69Da922 delivered on December 30, 1969, and it cannot be deemed that the land of this case was occupied in good faith and without negligence and cannot be deemed to have acquired the land of this case after the expiration of prescription. However, the plaintiff's assertion that the above land of this case cannot be viewed to have been occupied by the court below without negligence, and it cannot be viewed that the above land of this case had no effect of the prescription acquisition of the land of this case.

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case seeking the registration of ownership transfer in the name of the above two-way and the cancellation of the ownership transfer registration in the name of the defendant, based on the premise that the registration of ownership transfer in the above two-way name of the above two-way road is invalid without any cause, shall be dismissed, and it is clear that there is no reason to judge the remainder of the defendant's claim. Thus, the decision of the court below is unfair in conclusion, and the defendant's appeal is reasonable, and the judgment of the court below is dismissed, and the costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff who has lost all the first and second trials.

Judges Kim Jong-sung (Presiding Judge)