Cases where possession is not presumed as possession independently in the nature of the source.

"A" purchased a building on this site from the owner of the building on this site at the end of the end of 1952 for the purpose of the Gucheon-do Office, and the Gucheon-do Office used the building site as the site and used it as the site, and the above ○○ Ri was incorporated into the defendant city due to the change of administrative district on January 1, 1963, and possessed the market and reached the present market. Meanwhile, considering that the committee of promoters for securing the building site for the building site for the Ycheon-dong Office purchased the building site at January 12, 1965, it is not presumed that the above Gucheon-do Office established possession as the intention of ownership in view of the nature of the title at the time of commencement of the possession.

Article 245 of the Civil Act

Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) 1 and 8 others, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

[Judgment of the court below]

Seoul High Court Decision 76Na1717,1718 delivered on October 21, 1976

1. Each of the claims filed by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) 1 and 2 in the original judgment and the part against the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) among the counterclaim claims filed by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) and the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) against the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) shall be reversed, and the case shall be remanded to the Seoul High Court.

2. All appeals filed by the remainder of the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) except the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) 1 and the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant 2) are dismissed. The costs of appeal regarding the dismissal of the appeal shall be borne by the said Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant).

First of all, we examine the grounds of appeal No. 2 by the plaintiffs' attorney.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, in order for Dongcheon-dong residents of Seongdong-gu to secure the site of this case as the site for the Docheon-dong Office around January 1965, the court below held that the committee constituted a committee for promotion of securing new building site at the same office and that the committee for promotion purchased the same site from the deceased non-party 2, the original owner of the building and paid the same price to 50,000 won from the deceased non-party 1, the co-inheritors of the deceased non-party 1, the original owner of the building, and that the same site was registered as the ownership of the above deceased non-party 1 at the time, which was registered as the ownership of the above deceased non-party 1, the resident representative of Jun. 2, 1952, which was before the death of the deceased non-party 3, the sale contract was prepared from the above non-party 2, who was the day before the death of the above non-party 1, and thereafter received a copy and a copy of the register, and a copy of the above donation.

The grounds of appeal No. 1 by the attorney are examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, as long as the non-party 4 purchased the building on this site from the non-party 5, the owner of the building on this site at the end of 1952 for the purpose of the Gucheon-do Office, and the Gucheon-do Office used it as the site, and the above ○○ Ri was incorporated into the defendant at the time of the change of administrative district on January 1, 1963, and recognized the fact that the above ○○ Ri had reached the present age, and the above ○○ Ri did not seem to possess the building site at the time of the commencement of the possession of the above ○cheon-do Office, the defendant's claim for the transfer registration against the non-party 1 was dismissed for the reason that the defendant's ownership transfer registration against the non-party 21 had the obligation to each of the above 1,2197.

However, as seen above and in the ground of appeal No. 2 above, considering the fact that the committee for the promotion of the acquisition of a site purchased this site on January 12, 1965, the above old-cheon-si does not mean that the possession of the site was commenced with the intention of possession in the nature of the title at the time of commencement of the possession on June 2, 1952, and therefore, even though the possession of the above old-cheon-si and the defendant Si cannot be deemed to have met the requirements for the acquisition of prescription, the court below determined that the above period of prescription has expired, which affected the conclusion of the judgment by misapprehending the legal principles on the acquisition of prescription, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, the argument on this point is reasonable. Thus, the part against the plaintiff 1 and the plaintiff 2 on the premise that the defendant's argument on the acquisition of prescription among the original judgment is well-grounded.

Therefore, since the appeals by Plaintiffs 1 and 2 are with merit, they are reversed and remanded to the Seoul High Court, which is the lower court, for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion, the part against the plaintiffs in the principal lawsuit against the plaintiffs and the defendant's counterclaim against the same plaintiffs. The remaining plaintiffs' appeals are without merit, and all of them are dismissed, and the costs of appeal against this part are assessed against the losing parties. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Young-young (Presiding Justice)