[1] The scope of the insured for acceptance under Article 11 of the General Terms and Conditions of Office Motor Vehicle Insurance

[2] In a case where a motor vehicle driver is not an insured person under the general terms and conditions of motor vehicle insurance, whether the insurer's liability for compensation is always exempted (negative)

[3] The case reversing the judgment below dismissing the claim by the victim who exercises a direct right against the insurer on the ground that the driver of the insured motor vehicle was not the insured or the insured

[1] Article 11 of the General Terms and Conditions for Business Motor Vehicle Insurance stipulates that the insured shall be the insured who is using or managing the insured motor vehicle with the consent of the named insured, i.e., the named insured, other than the named insured, as stipulated in the insurance policy. Here, the consent of the named insured is not necessarily required to be explicitly or individually, and it is possible to give implied or comprehensive consent, unless there are special circumstances, but it is required that the consent of the insured is the direct consent of the insured, and the person who has received the consent again does not constitute the insured under Article 11.

[2] According to Article 1 of the General Terms and Conditions of Office Automobile Accident Compensation Act, the insurer shall compensate for the loss suffered by the insured who died or injured by the operation of the insured automobile as stipulated in the insurance policy. Article 11 of the Terms and Conditions provides the concept of the insured as well as multiple insured persons including the consented insured, etc. As such, the insurer shall compensate for the loss of the insured if there is a person who is liable to compensate as an automobile operator under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, etc. even if the driver of the insured automobile is one of the multiple insured persons as stipulated in Article 11 of the Terms and Conditions, and the driver of the insured automobile is not the named insured or the consent of the insured. Thus, the liability for compensation is not immediately exempted.

[3] The case reversing the misapprehension of legal principles as to the insured under the comprehensive motor vehicle insurance terms and conditions, and the misapprehension of legal reasoning and inconsistent reasoning of the judgment of the court below, which dismissed the claim of the victim because the insured was aware that the insured was not an insured person, even though the victim exercised a direct right to claim for damages caused by accidents attributable

[1] Article 726-2 of the Commercial Act / [2] Articles 724(2) and 726-2 of the Commercial Act / [3] Article 726-2 of the Commercial Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 88Meu26758 delivered on November 28, 1989 (Gong1990, 124) Supreme Court Decision 92Da24127 delivered on February 23, 1993 (Gong1993Sang, 1059), Supreme Court Decision 94Da43870 delivered on April 28, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 1996)

[Defendant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 1 others (Attorney Choi Jong-soo, Counsel for defendant-appellee)

Japan Fire Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorney Soh-young, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 95Na22810 delivered on September 29, 1995

The judgment below is reversed. The case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal and supplemental appellate brief are also examined as supplement in case of supplemental appellate brief not timely filed.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined as follows: first, on June 2, 1994, that the non-party 1 operated the non-party 1's truck owned by the non-party 1, and caused the death of the plaintiff 1, who was driven by the non-party 1's drive on the non-party 1, caused the death of the same day; the plaintiff 1's wife, the plaintiff 2's wife, the plaintiff 2's wife; the defendant is the plaintiff 1's wife; and the defendant is liable for damages caused by the plaintiff 3's accident under Article 3 of the Automobile Accident Compensation Act as the insurer of the above insurance contract, who is the non-party 1, the owner of the above cargo, caused the death of the South or the damage caused by the accident caused by the death of the non-party 1 to October 6, 1993 and the legal liability of the plaintiff for damages caused by the accident.

Furthermore, the lower court rejected the Defendant’s defense that the instant truck was not liable for compensation because it was caused by the loss of operating control of the right to operate the truck. The lower court, on September 27, 1993, purchased the instant truck from Nonparty 1 Industrial Co., Ltd. for 36 months, and completed the registration in its name on October 6 of the same year. The right to use the instant truck after the fact that, around March 10, 1994, the right to use the instant truck was paid KRW 1,00,000 to Nonparty 1 through Nonparty 1, who was in a private money relationship, and the right to use the instant truck was paid in installments to Nonparty 1, who was only 6,00,000, and was paid in installments to Nonparty 1, who was not liable for compensation. The lower court rejected that Nonparty 1 purchased the instant truck in the name of Nonparty 1’s right to use the instant truck under the name of Nonparty 4, which was the owner of the foregoing right to use the instant truck under the name of Kim Jong and its name.

In other words, the court below acknowledged the defendant's assertion that the non-party 1, the driver of the above truck driver's of the above truck, was not liable for compensation, and dismissed the plaintiffs' claim on the ground that Article 11 of the General Terms and Conditions of Business-of-the-job Motor Vehicle Insurance, which is the contents of the above insurance contract of this case, provides that the insured shall be limited to the person who has entered in the insurance policy as the insured (the named insured) or the person who is using or managing the insured motor vehicle with the consent of the named insured (the named insured). According to the above facts, the non-party 1 cannot be viewed as the insured who has obtained a direct consent from the rupture, the non-party 1 is not the insured under Article 11 of the above Terms and Conditions, and therefore, the defendant cannot be viewed as the

2. Article 11 of the General Terms and Conditions for Business Motor Vehicle Insurance, which is the contents of the insurance contract of this case, specifies the insured as the insured the person who uses or manages the insured motor vehicle with the consent of the named insured other than the named insured as stated in the insurance policy. The consent of the named insured mentioned in this case is not necessarily required to be explicitly or individually, and it is possible to give implied or comprehensive consent, unless there are special circumstances, but the person who has received the consent again from the person who received the consent does not constitute the insured mentioned in the above provision (see Supreme Court Decisions 88Da26758, Nov. 28, 1989; 92Da24127, Feb. 23, 1993; 94Da43870, Apr. 28, 1995, etc.).

Therefore, the court below's decision that the Kim Ba, which purchased the above truck from the right heat, constitutes the approved insured with the consent of re-rupture, but is even door-to-door with the consent from Kim Ba, the approved insured, and that the non-party 1, who received another consent, cannot be deemed the approved insured with the direct consent from the right heat as the registered insured. It cannot be said that there was an error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles of the approved insured.

However, according to Article 1 of the above General Terms and Conditions of Business-of-the-job Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation Act, the insured is liable for damages caused by the insured's death or injury caused by the operation of the insured motor vehicle as stipulated in the insurance policy. Article 11 of the above Terms and Conditions provides for the concept of the insured and lists multiple insured persons, including the named insured and the consented insured. As such, the insurer should compensate for the insured's damages even if the driver of the insured motor vehicle is one of more than one insured as stipulated in Article 11 of the above Terms and Conditions, and the insured is not exempted from the liability for compensation just because the driver of the insured motor vehicle is not the named insured or the insured. This legal principle applies to cases where the victim claims direct compensation to the insurer for the damages caused by the accident attributable to the insured pursuant to Article 724 (2) of the Commercial Act.

However, according to the records, it is clear that the plaintiffs exercise their direct right to claim damages incurred by the accident in this case, in which re-rupture, the registered insured, is responsible, and therefore, the court below should have judged the legitimacy of the plaintiffs' claim in this case (it should be further examined whether the re-rupture has the operating control and operating profit in accordance with the facts acknowledged by the original court, and whether the re-rupture has the operating control and operating profit in the above trucks).

Nevertheless, while the court below determined that the registered owner of the above truck was liable for damages suffered by the deceased and the plaintiffs due to the accident of this case as a person who operated the automobile for himself as stipulated in Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act because the registered owner of the above truck did not lose the status as the operator of the above truck, it cannot be said that the rejection of the plaintiffs' claim on the ground that the non-party 1, the driver of the above truck, was not the insured, was erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the insured under the General Terms and Conditions for Business Use Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance and in the misapprehension of the reasoning of the judgment, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

3. Therefore, the judgment of the court below shall be reversed, and the case shall be remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition with the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)