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(영문) 대법원 1994. 1. 25. 선고 93다37991 판결
[보험금][공1994.3.15.(964),804]
Main Issues

Whether the approval insured falls under the exemption provision from unauthorized Driving when the third party's without a license is approved.

Summary of Judgment

The term "unlicensed Driving Exemption Clause" in the General Automobile Insurance Contract shall apply only when a non-licensed driving took place under the control or management of the policyholder or the insured. Thus, the case where a non-licensed driving took place under the explicit or implied approval of the policyholder or the named insured is applicable, but it does not fall under the case where a person who uses or drives a motor vehicle with the consent of the named insured and is treated as the insured under the insurance contract.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 105 of the Civil Code, Articles 6 and 7 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act

Reference Cases

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Lee Dong-young et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Plaintiff-Appellant

[Defendant-Appellant] Chok-do Co., Ltd., Counsel for defendant-appellant-appellant-appellant]

Defendant-Appellee

Japanese Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 92Na70573 delivered on June 9, 1993

Text

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged on August 4, 1990 that the plaintiff engaged in automobile rental business as the registered insured, that the plaintiff entered into an automobile accident compensation insurance contract and a comprehensive insurance contract with the same contents as the time of original adjudication using the insured automobile as the passenger car from Incheon 1, 2714, which is owned by the plaintiff. On February 19, 191, the plaintiff entered into a lease contract with the non-party 1, and delivered the above vehicle to the non-party 1 at that time. After the above vehicle was leased, the non-party transferred the above vehicle to the non-party 1 without a driver's license, and then the non-party suffered injury to the non-party 1 while driving the above vehicle, and therefore, the "the non-party 1, 962, 563 won, and 1,000 won, which are the plaintiff's new and the non-party 1, who is the insured's insurer or the non-party 1, who is the insured's insurer's consent to the above insurance contract.

However, the exemption clause of unauthorized Driving Exemption clause of the General Automobile Insurance Contract shall apply only when a unauthorized driving was made in a situation where a policyholder or the insured is controlled or managed. Thus, if a unauthorized driving was made with the explicit or implied approval of the policyholder or the named insured, it shall be deemed to fall under the above cases. However, the case where a person who uses or drives a motor vehicle with the consent of the named insured and is treated as the insured under the insurance contract, or the so-called consent of the named acceptance insured is not applicable only. The reason to regard this is that the acceptance insured does not, in principle, have the authority to allow a third party to use or operate the motor vehicle, and it is unreasonable that the insurer is exempted from liability for the reason that the policyholder or the named insured has lost its right to claim for an insurance (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da36420, Dec. 21, 1993).

The court below's decision that the non-party 1 who caused an accident while driving the above vehicle with the consent of the above beneficiary who was the beneficiary insured constitutes a non-exclusive license clause under the above general insurance terms and conditions is erroneous in the misunderstanding of legal principles as to the interpretation of the above provision. Therefore, the ground for appeal pointing this out is with merit.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Chocheon-sik (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1993.6.9.선고 92나70573
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