Main Issues
[1] The purport of the proviso of Article 3 subparag. 4 of the former Trade Union Act
[2] Requirements for establishing unfair labor practices as control and intervention
[3] The case holding that an act of requesting a company to make a request for a lump sum deduction of union expenses, etc. in the name of another member, not the head of the partnership disputing the validity of dismissal, constitutes unfair labor practices as control and intervention
Summary of Judgment
[1] Article 3 subparag. 4 proviso of the former Trade Union Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda of Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996) provides that the establishment and continuation of a trade union shall be protected and that the activities of a trade union shall not be interfered with by the employer’s unfair exercise of personnel rights. Thus, only the establishment and continuation of a trade union shall not be deemed to be a provision for the protection of only the establishment and existence of a trade union.
[2] The establishment of unfair labor practices under Article 39 subparag. 4 of the former Trade Union Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda to Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996) does not necessarily require the result of infringing the workers' right to organize.
[3] The case holding that the company's return notice of dismissal to the president of the partnership and the request for a lump sum deduction of union dues, etc. in the name of other union members than the president of the partnership was made on the intent to obstruct the union activities of the president of the partnership, and thus, even if the result of infringing the workers' right to organize did not occur, it constitutes unfair labor practices as control and intervention.
[Reference Provisions]
[1] Article 3 subparagraph 4 of the former Trade Union Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda of Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996) (see Article 2 subparagraph 3 of the current Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act) / [2] Article 39 subparagraph 4 of the former Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda of Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996) (see Article 81 subparagraph 4 of the current Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act) / [3] Article 3 subparagraph 4 of the former Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda of Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996) (see Article 2 subparagraph 3 of the current Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act) and Article 39 subparagraph 4 of the former Trade Union
Reference Cases
[1] Supreme Court en banc Decision 89Do1579 delivered on November 27, 1990 (Gong1991, 272), Supreme Court Decision 92Da42354 delivered on June 8, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 1998), Supreme Court Decision 92Da26496 delivered on September 30, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2820) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 91Nu636 delivered on December 10, 1991 (Gong192, 529), Supreme Court Decision 92Nu3496 delivered on June 23, 1992 (Gong192, 2294), Supreme Court Decision 193Da19834 delivered on December 14, 1993 (Gong1994).
Plaintiff, Appellee
Plaintiff Trade Union
Defendant, Appellant
The Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission
Defendant Intervenor, Appellant
Defendant Intervenor Limited Partnership Company
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul High Court Decision 95Gu18064 delivered on December 21, 1995
Text
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Intervenor joining the Defendant, and the remainder are assessed against the Defendant.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal by the Defendant and the Intervenor (hereinafter referred to as the “ Intervenor”) are also examined.
1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the non-party 1 was dismissed on August 19, 194 while serving as the intervenor's driver on April 29, 193, and the non-party 1 was appointed as the plaintiff's full-time officer on August 19, 194, and the non-party 1 was appointed as the non-party 1's deputy head of the Daejeon District Court on September 9, 199, when he filed a lawsuit seeking nullification of dismissal against the intervenor on September 26, 199, and the non-party 1 was appointed as the representative of the union head on the same day and the next day, and the intervenor rejected the request by the plaintiff on December 1, 199, but the intervenor rejected the request by the non-party 1 as the non-party 1's internal member's agent's agent's non-party 1's non-party 1's employer's non-party 1's non-party 1's employer's request the plaintiff's non-1's remaining.
2. The proviso of Article 3 subparag. 4 of the former Trade Union Act is to protect the establishment and existence of a trade union and to ensure that the activities of a trade union are not interfered with by the employer’s unfair exercise of personnel rights (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da42354, Jun. 8, 1993). Thus, the above provision is not a provision for protecting only the establishment and existence of a trade union, and it does not necessarily require the result that the establishment of an unfair labor practice as an occupation and intervention of a trade union under Article 39 subparag. 4 of the former Trade Union Act is a violation of the worker’s right to organize.
If the facts are as established by the court below, even if the intervenor dismissed the non-party 1, the non-party 1 filed a lawsuit seeking nullification of dismissal within a considerable period of time, and the non-party 1 maintains the status of the union member as well as the establishment and existence of the union and the activities as a union member. However, the plaintiff's notification of return to the union head as the time of the original adjudication shall be returned, and the plaintiff's request for a lump sum deduction of union expenses, etc. in the name of non-party 1, the union head's trade union activity is intended to interfere with the labor union activity of non-party 1, the union head, and even if the result did not result in the infringement of the workers' right to organize, it constitutes an unfair labor activity as a control and intervention.
The judgment below to the same purport is correct, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the establishment of unfair labor practices under Article 3 subparag. 4 of the former Trade Union Act and as otherwise alleged in the
3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the Intervenor and the remainder are assessed against the Defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Lee Don-hee (Presiding Justice)