[1] The requirements for the State or a local government to be liable for damages against a public official's occupational violation

[2] The case holding that in light of the relevant provisions of the River Act, the duty of a public official in charge of local government who is in charge of the work related to the maintenance and management of a river and permission for occupation and use of a river is set to protect the safety and interests of individual members

[3] The criteria for determining the proximate causal relationship between a public official's violation of official duties and a citizen's loss

[4] The case holding that in light of the provisions of Article 17 (3) of the Parking Lot Act, the phrase "the damage or theft of a vehicle is not a civil or criminal liability on the back side of the "motor vehicle parking fee agreement" that the off-road parking lot manager issued and delivered to the user in the meaning of the parking right, the terms of the contract which is unreasonably unfavorable to the customer, or the parking lot manager's compensation for the damage caused by failing to fulfill his/her duty of due care as a good manager intentionally or by gross negligence, are null and void as a standardized contract that excludes the damage without justifiable reasons

[1] In general, when the State or a local government exercises its authority, it must prevent damage to the citizens, take into account the safety of the citizens, and even if a public official belonging to the State or a local government wholly or incidentally causes damage to the citizens in violation of his/her official duties as prescribed by Acts and subordinate statutes to protect the safety and interests of the citizens, the State or a local government shall be liable to compensate for damage to the citizens within the extent that proximate causal relation is acknowledged. However, even if a public official was specifically obligated under the provisions of the Acts and subordinate statutes based on which he/she performs his/her duties in the course of performing his/her duties, if it is aimed at maintaining the internal order of an administrative agency, regardless of the interests of the citizens, or if it

[2] The case holding that in light of the relevant provisions of the River Act, the duty of the public officials in charge of local government who are in charge of the affairs related to the maintenance and management of rivers and permission for occupation and use shall be set up in order to protect individual safety and interests of members of society

[3] In determining the existence of proximate causal relationship between a public official’s act of violation of official duty and a citizen’s loss, specific circumstances should be comprehensively taken into account as well as the probability of the occurrence of a general result, such as the purpose of Acts and subordinate statutes and other rules of conduct imposing official duty or the form and degree of damage.

[4] The case holding that in light of the provisions of Article 17 (3) of the Parking Lot Act, the phrase "the damage or theft of a vehicle is not a civil or criminal liability on the back side of the "motor vehicle parking fee agreement" that the off-road parking lot manager issued and delivered to the user in the meaning of the parking right, it is invalid as a terms and conditions that unfairly disadvantage the customer, or that the parking lot manager does not fulfill his/her duty of due care as a good manager intentionally or by gross negligence and thereby exclude compensation for damages caused by the non-performance of the duty of care as a good manager

[1] Article 2 of the State Compensation Act, Article 750 of the Civil Act / [2] Article 2 of the State Compensation Act, Article 15 (1), Articles 28 (1), 64 (1), and 68 (1) of the River Act / [3] Article 2 of the State Compensation Act, Article 750 of the Civil Act / [4] Article 17 (3) of the Parking Lot Act, Article 6 (2) 1 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act, Article 7 subparagraph 1 of the same Article

［1］［3］ 대법원 1994. 12. 27. 선고 94다36285 판결 (공1995상, 667) 대법원 1997. 9. 9. 선고 97다12907 판결 (공1997하, 3055) 대법원 1998. 5. 8. 선고 97다36613 판결 (공1998상, 1578) 대법원 1999. 12. 21. 선고 98다29797 판결 (공2000상, 265) 대법원 2003. 4. 25. 선고 2001다59842 판결 (공2003상, 1245) ［1］ 대법원 2001. 10. 23. 선고 99다36280 판결 (공2001하, 2520) 대법원 2002. 3. 12. 선고 2000다55225, 55232 판결 (공2002상, 848) ［3］ 대법원 2001. 4. 13. 선고 2000다34891 판결 (공2001상, 1125)

Plaintiff 1 Co., Ltd and 20 others (Law Firm Han-ro, Attorneys Seo-gil et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul Special Metropolitan City 3 others (Law Firm Chungcheong, Attorneys Yoon-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2002Na74192 delivered on July 11, 2003

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants.

1. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant Seoul Metropolitan Government and Defendant Yangcheon-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government

A. As to the first ground for appeal

In general, when the State or local governments exercise their authority, it must prevent damage to the people, and take into account the safety of the people, and if a public official under their jurisdiction inflicts damage on the people in violation of his/her official duties to protect the safety and interests of the people, the State or local governments shall be liable to the extent that proximate causal relation is recognized. However, even if a public official was specifically obligated pursuant to the provisions of relevant Acts and subordinate statutes in the course of performing his/her duties in order to maintain the internal order of an administrative agency without regard to the interests of the people, or if it is intended to maintain the internal order of an administrative agency, regardless of the interests of the people, or to promote the general public as a whole, not for the interests of the people directly, even if it is related to the interests of the people, the State or local governments are not liable to compensate for damage to the people in violation of their duties (see Supreme Court Decision 9Da

However, in full view of the relevant provisions, such as Articles 15(1), 28(1), 64(1), and 68(1) of the River Act concerning the maintenance and management of rivers and dispositions against the violators of Acts and subordinate statutes, the public officials in charge of Yangcheon-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government who are in charge of the maintenance and management of the Gyeyang-gu in this case and the permission for occupation and use shall promote the proper maintenance and management of the Gyeyang-gu in Yangcheon-gu in Seoul, and have the person who has obtained the permission to occupy and use so as not to cause any damage to the public due to the permission to occupy and use, comply with the conditions of permission, and shall have the duty to take necessary corrective measures in cases where illegal occupancy and use are discovered through regular inspection of the status of occupancy and use, and such duty shall be deemed to have been established not only for the public interest but also for the protection of the safety

In the same purport, the court below's rejection of the assertion that the duty of the public official in charge of Yangcheon-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government solely aims to promote the public interest, is just, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles on the official duty of the public official

B. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 2, 5, and 6

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, after compiling the adopted evidence, the court below acknowledged the facts as stated in the judgment. The public officials of Yangcheon-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government were negligent in monitoring and inspecting whether Defendant 3 Co., Ltd. and Defendant 4 properly abide by the conditions of occupation permission, thereby allowing them to receive a monthly fixed amount and use the site for occupation permission as a permanent parking lot. In particular, if the land of this case occurred each year, it was known that the possibility of flooding exists, and it was not corrected due to the failure to properly ascertain whether Defendant Co., Ltd. and Defendant 4 established the flood control measures. Thus, the Seoul Metropolitan Government is the subject of the maintenance and management of Ansancheon-gu, and the defendant Yangcheon-gu, Seoul Metropolitan Government is the burden of expenses incurred externally in relation to the above affairs, and is liable to compensate each of the plaintiffs for the damages.

In light of the records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are just, and there is no error of law such as misconception of facts as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

In addition, the fact-finding and determination of the ratio of comparative negligence belong to the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court unless it is deemed that it is remarkably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity. In light of the records, the lower court’s fault offsetting seems to be remarkably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity. Therefore, the allegation in the grounds of appeal

C. Regarding ground of appeal No. 3

In determining the existence of proximate causal relation, detailed circumstances should be comprehensively taken into account not only the probability of occurrence of a general result, but also the purpose of statutes and other rules of conduct imposing official duties, or the mode of harmful act and the degree of damage (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da36613, May 8, 1998, etc.).

According to the records, if the public officials in charge of Yangcheon-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government discovered the violation of the terms and conditions of permission by the defendant company and the defendant 4 and take appropriate measures, it would have been likely to prevent the damage of the plaintiffs. The public officials in charge of the duties should be deemed to have been established in order to protect the safety and interests of individual members even if the nature of the duties of the public officials in charge is incidental. In particular, if the flood control measures are allowed, it would have been well known that the vehicle parked on the land of this case would have a high risk of inundation, and in the case of the water permitted companies other than the defendant company and the defendant 4, there was almost little damage to the vehicle. In full view of these circumstances, there is a proximate causal relation between the negligence of the public officials in charge of Yangcheon-gu Seoul

The decision of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to proximate causal relation as alleged in the grounds of appeal, and the precedents cited in the grounds of appeal are different from this case, and thus, they cannot be viewed as

D. Regarding ground of appeal No. 4

According to the records, it can be seen that the amount of expenses that was paid between July 14, 2001 and July 15, 2001 exceeded the daily forecast. However, in light of the fact that among the enterprises occupying the land as a site for temporary parking lot, there was little loss of vehicle intrusion in the case of the companies other than the defendant company and the defendant 4, among the enterprises occupying the land of this case, there was almost no loss of vehicle intrusion. Thus, if the public officials in charge of Yangcheon-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government, the defendant company and the defendant 4 had the defendant company and the defendant 4 properly prepared the flood control measures by taking appropriate measures, it would have sufficiently prevented the damage of the plaintiffs. Thus, it is difficult to view the vehicle intrusion damage of this case as force majeure due to natural disaster only with such strong amount as above.

In the same purport, the court below's rejection of the above assertion by the defendant Seoul Metropolitan Government and the defendant Yangcheon-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as alleged in the grounds of appeal, and the precedents by the party members cited in the grounds of appeal are different from this case,

2. As to the grounds of appeal by the defendant company and the defendant 4

A. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 3

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, after compiling the adopted evidence, the court below acknowledged the facts as stated in the judgment, and found that the defendant company and the defendant 4 did not properly keep the emergency contact network, and did not manage all the emergency motor vehicles of parked vehicles. The defendant company received contact from the public official in charge of the Yangcheon-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government on July 14, 2001, even though around 17:00 on July 15, 2001, the defendant company and the defendant company did not contact the owner of the vehicle or the driver until around 00:20 on July 15, 201, and did not meet their duty to contact the plaintiff 19, etc. immediately after receiving such contact. Accordingly, the defendant company and the defendant 4 are liable for damages suffered by the plaintiffs due to inundation.

In light of the records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are just, and there is no error of law such as misconception of facts against the rules of evidence as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

B. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that the plaintiff 19, 20, and 21 entered into a parking lot use contract with the defendant 4, and the remaining plaintiffs parked their respective vehicles on the land of this case as of July 14, 2001, and that the plaintiff 2, 4, 5, 10, 16, 17, 17, and 18 were parked without permission without obtaining a contract with the defendant company, based on the following facts: the defendant company's assertion that the plaintiff 2, 4, 5, 10, 16, 17, and 18 did not enter into a contract with the defendant company, the non-party, who is an employee of the defendant company, was also aware of the damage caused to them, and

In light of the records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are justified, and there is no violation of law such as failing to exercise the right of explanation as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

C. Regarding ground of appeal No. 4

According to the records, in the back of the “vehicle Fee Agreement” issued and delivered by the Defendant Company to Plaintiff 1 Company, etc. as a parking right, the phrase “the damage or theft of the vehicle is not a civil or criminal liability in this order.” However, in light of the fact that Article 17(3) of the Parking Lot Act provides that “An off-road parking lot manager shall not be exempted from liability due to the loss or damage of the vehicle except where he proves that he/she has not neglected the duty of due care of a good manager with respect to the custody of the vehicle parked in the parking lot,” the above phrase, which provides for the non-mandatory exemption of the Defendant Company, is an unreasonably unfavorable terms to the customer, or the Defendant Company does not perform its duty of due care with intent or gross negligence, and thus, it shall be deemed null and void as it falls under Article 6(2)1 or Article 7 subparag. 1 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act without justifiable grounds.

In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that the above phrase, which provides for the defendant company's non-mandatory immunity, is null and void, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as alleged in the

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Kang-tae (Presiding Justice)